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Chapter 1
Introduction
The main aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the evolution of the
unemployment rate in the OECD area. There is vast variation in unemployment rates
both between countries and over time, and the explanations that have been given in the
economic profession have also changed. The unemployment rates were very low in the
beginning of the 1960s, but increased sharply in the 1970s and remained high through-
out the next decade. The increase was ﬁrst explained by shocks and ﬂuctuations, i.e.
mainly due to the two large oil price shocks in the 1970s. However, when unemployment
remained high, this was explained by a slowdown in total factor productivity growth, i.e.
a structural change, cf. Blanchard (2006a). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, labour
market institutions were put forward as the dominating force behind the combination of
high persistent unemployment and large diﬀerences between countries, see e.g. Layard
and Nickell (1986), Layard et al. (1991) and OECD (1994). This view was supported
by econometric evidence like in Nickell et al. (2005), where 55 percent of the increase in
European unemployment over the period 1960s to 1990s was explained as due to changes
in institutions. Around 2005, there was a gradual decline in the unemployment rates, and
the unemployment problem received less attention. As stated in Boeri (2009), “Europe
is no longer a continent of mass unemployment”.
However, the ﬁnancial crisis has led to a massive increase in unemployment rates in the
OECD-area. This makes it appropriate to review our understanding of the unemployment
problem. Is the “mainstream” view that variation in unemployment can, to a large extent,
be explained by diﬀerences in labour market institutions, consistent with the evolution of
unemployment up till the ﬁnancial crises? And in the current downturn, can ﬁscal policy
be used to combat unemployment?
This thesis can be seen as a contribution to the empirical literature of equilibrium
unemployment. In this literature, explanations of changes in the unemployment rate are
often decomposed into two parts; the factors that explain the long-run relationships of
unemployment (the theory of equilibrium unemployment) and the factors that explain
the ﬂuctuations around equilibrium unemployment. I hope to contribute to both parts,
and investigate both the eﬀect of changes in institutions and government purchases.
This introduction summarises the issues that are discussed in this thesis, and comments
on the main ﬁndings. I will also relate my work to current and previous research on
the same issues. The starting point is a discussion of the theoretical framework for
unemployment which is the foundation for the empirical analysis in the thesis. A brief
discussion of the econometric method is given before the summary of each chapter.
There exist several theories of equilibrium unemployment and its ﬂuctuations. One
inﬂuential direction is laid out in the comprehensive book by Layard et al. (1991). In this
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approach, the equilibrium unemployment rate is determined by the intersection between
the wage and the price curve in an unemployment-real wage diagram. The wage setting
is represented by the outcome of a wage bargaining between the parties in the labour
market. High unemployment weakens workers’ position in the wage setting, implying
that the wage curve is downward sloping. The price curve is the outcome of ﬁrms’ price
setting. Under constant returns to scale and mark-up pricing, the price curve is hori-
zontal. However, the equilibrium unemployment rate is not interpretable as a constant
given from nature. Equilibrium unemployment will increase with factors that shift either
of the curves upwards. For instance, an increase in the wage pressure due to stronger
union power or a higher tax rate will shift the wage curve upwards and raise equilib-
rium unemployment. Normally, the actual unemployment rate will not be equal to the
equilibrium unemployment rate, temporary changes in global or government demand, or
that the actual price level turned out to be lower or higher than expected (e.g. lower
prices on import products due to the production from China) can push the economy out
of equilibrium.
Layard et al. (2005) argue forcefully that the imperfections in the labor market are
of such importance that every theory of unemployment has to put these imperfections
in focus. This argument distinguishes their theory from the Neo-classical framework for
the labour market, where workers maximize their utility depending on consumption and
leisure, given the real wage. Employment is given by the intersection of individuals’
optimal labour supply and ﬁrms’ demand for labour at given wages. The theory assumes
rational expectations and complete information. The theory implies that the unemployed
workers have chosen not to work, since the outside option is better.
The wage-bargaining theory presented in Layard et al. (2005) is to a large extent
consistent with the search-matching theory of unemployment. This theory was developed
by the recent Nobel Price winners Peter Diamond, Dale Mortensen and Chris Pissarides.
The theory explains unemployment by the fact that it usually takes time for employers and
unemployed workers to match, and that the search process involves some costs. The same
institutional variables that lead to high unemployment in the wage-bargaining theory also
raise unemployment here, but the mechanism is somewhat diﬀerent. For instance, stricter
employment protection will make employers more reluctant to hire new workers, because
it is more diﬃcult to ﬁre redundant workers in a recession. This increases the time spent
on search, and thus also the equilibrium unemployment rate. A comprehensive review of
these models is found in Pissarides (2000).
The search-matching model can also be extended to take into account changes in
human capital; see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008). In this paper, they explain why unem-
ployment was lower in Europe than in the US before 1980, but lower in the US since then
(disregarding the recent ﬁnancial crisis). The key mechanism is the interaction between
a turbulence parameter (that has increased over time), and employment protection and
unemployment beneﬁts that they claim to have been fairly constant over time. A combi-
nation of a low level of the turbulence parameter and strict employment protection leads
to low frictional unemployment (short-term unemployment), because the ﬂow of workers
into unemployment is low when employment protection is strict and ﬂuctuations are small.
This was the situation in Europe before 1980, and hence resulted in low unemployment in
this period. Since then, the world has become more risky, i.e. the economies have experi-
enced larger ﬂuctuations. Larger shocks imply that one person loses more human capital
in case of an involuntary job loss, and there is an increase in structural unemployment
(long-term unemployment). Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) claim that both Europe and
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the United States are exposed to larger ﬂuctuations after 1980, but that Europe has a
higher structural level of unemployment due to stricter employment protection and higher
unemployment beneﬁts as compared to the United States.
The above theories do not always give any clear predictions about the eﬀects of insti-
tutional variables on unemployment. One reason might, as already mentioned, be that
the eﬀect of the institution on unemployment is unstable over time, like the eﬀect of strict
employment protection in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008). The eﬀects of an institutional
variable are also claimed to be dependent on the level of the institutional variable itself.
For instance, a high degree of coordination among the wage setters may imply low wage
claims if the level of coordination is above a certain level (Calmfors et al., 1988). This
theory predicts high unemployment rates at a medium level of coordination, because at
this level the wage setters are unable to inﬂuence the national level of unemployment,
yet they have power to raise the wage above the free competition level. Low and high
coordination levels result in lower unemployment levels: At a low coordination level, the
wage setters have low bargaining power and hence, there is less wage pressure. With
high coordination, the national unemployment level is aﬀected by the outcome of the
wage setting, and coordinated wage setters will therefore lower their wage claims to avoid
high unemployment rates. A similar argument can be applied to union density. Wage
setters that cover the whole economy will care about the unemployment levels in their
wage setting, while unions that only cover parts of the economy will care less because
they are unable to inﬂuence the aggregate unemployment level. Finally, unemployment
beneﬁts are normally assumed to increase unemployment because workers reduce their
search eﬀort, but if the existence of unemployment beneﬁts causes workers to take more
risk (beneﬁts protect against the downside risk) by using time to ﬁnd the right job, this
can result in lower unemployment rates because better matching leads to higher produc-
tivity growth; see resent research e.g. Caliendo et al. (2009). The arguments made here
illustrate that according to the theory, many institutional variables have ambiguous ef-
fects on unemployment. This shows that the theory needs to be subjected to empirical
analysis, to ﬁnd which is the dominating eﬀect.
Panel data models for the equilibrium unemployment rate typically include variables
representing the labour market institutions implied from the theory above; see Nickell
et al. (2005), Bassanini and Duval (2006), Belot and van Ours (2004), Belot and van
Ours (2001) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). The empirical papers have also included
interaction terms between the labour market variables to account for the fact that the
eﬀect of institutions may depend on the existence of other institutions. For example, the
unemployment rate might be lower if a country has a high degree of both coordination of
wage setting and union coverage. The reason is that both these variables raise the unions’
eﬀect on the unemployment level. The unions will therefore lower their wage claims to
avoid increasing unemployment rates. Other factors, like macroeconomic shocks and in-
teraction between institutional variables and shocks, are also included in existing research.
Previous literature documents a fairly robust positive correlation between unemployment
beneﬁts and unemployment, while the results in the literature of, for instance, the eﬀect
of labour market taxes and employment protection are less conclusive; see e.g. Belot and
van Ours (2004).
The panel data approach has also been subject to extensive critique; see e.g. contri-
butions by Baker et al. (2005), Blanchard (2006b), Berger and Everaert (2008) and Belot
and van Ours (2004). The issues in this debate can roughly be divided into four parts:
the size of the estimated coeﬃcients, the variables in the empirical analysis, the chosen
3
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indexes, and the econometric method. However, it is diﬃcult to evaluate how the various
elements of the critique aﬀect the overall validity of the results in empirical papers. The
problem arises because key features like the time period, the econometric method, and
the time series for the variables generally vary across papers. This is a recurrent problem
in empirical literature, implying that it is diﬃcult to compare new results with existing
papers. When diﬀerent data or econometric methods are used, it is hard to identify the
source of the diﬀerence in results. This also makes it diﬃcult to determine how robust
the results are. In addition, the empirical speciﬁcations for unemployment do not in gen-
eral distinguish or relate how the variables enter a dynamic speciﬁcation from the static
framework for equilibrium unemployment presented above. One strategy has been to use
a simple ﬁrst-order dynamics in the explanatory part of the model, and compensate by
allowing for ﬂexible dynamics in the residuals of the equations. On the other hand, basing
the speciﬁcation on heuristics alone also means that there is a gap between the underlying
theory of equilibrium unemployment, which is static, and the dynamic speciﬁcation used
to estimate equilibrium rate unemployment.
Despite the critique presented above, panel data involves a clear advantage in analysing
the reasons for diﬀerences in the unemployment rates due to the large variation between
countries for the institutional variables that often exhibit little variation within countries.
In table 1.1, the column with standard deviation shows that the between countries vari-
ation is larger for all variables except unemployment and unemployment beneﬁts. The
larger between variation provides a rationale for using the cross-country analysis, while the
larger within variation for unemployment and unemployment beneﬁt provides a rationale
for using a time series analysis.
I have followed the panel data literature and included variables representing the labour
market institutions in a ﬁnal equation for unemployment. Compared to previous liter-
ature, I have extended the data set to the period 1960 to 2007 for 20 OECD countries.
This gives more variation over the sample period, which covers both high and low levels of
unemployment. Hopefully, this will result in more robust results, in particular compared
with the studies over the period 1960 to 1995, which may have been dominated by the
general increase in the unemployment rate over the same period.
It is appropriate to comment on the choice of estimation method, since this choice
might inﬂuence the results. All estimated models in this thesis have some common struc-
ture; i.e. the models all include country-speciﬁc eﬀects and have a dynamic structure. I
have tried to follow the empirical guidelines for how to choose the right empirical speci-
ﬁcation for these types of models, especially for chapter 3 and 4, but the guidelines also
have some consequences for how to interpret the main results in Nickell et al. (2005) (the
estimation method is ﬁxed eﬀect (FE)) which is the topic of chapter 2.
Country-speciﬁc eﬀects (one-way heterogeneity) are unobserved in our models, but if
they are correlated with the other explanatory variables, the omission of ﬁxed eﬀects will
lead to biased estimates of the other explanatory variables in the model (Baltagi, 2008).
Even though it might be reasonable to assume such a correlation in our panel, this choice
might still be questioned, as will be shown shortly.
A random eﬀect (RE) model assumes there to be no correlation between the ﬁxed
eﬀects and the explanatory variables included in the model. However, as previously
mentioned, table 1.1 shows small within variation for some of the variables, like the
coordination of wage setting. Using an RE model would leave more variation to estimate
the coeﬃcient of these variables. Since the RE approach assumes no correlation with the
other regressors, this additional orthogonality condition can be tested by a Hausman test,
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Table 1.1: Labour market institutions and unemployment. Time period 1960 to 2007
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Unemployment overall 5.37 3.56 0.00 19.11 N = 1019
between 2.00 1.58 9.40 n = 20
within 2.98 -2.51 16.93 T-bar = 50.95
Empl. Protection overall 2.13 1.22 0.00 4.19 N = 1020
between 1.19 0.11 3.98 n = 20
within 0.38 0.67 2.94 T = 51
Unempl. beneﬁts overall 0.42 0.21 0.00 0.89 N = 1020
between 0.14 0.21 0.66 n = 20
within 0.15 -0.16 0.87 T = 51
Beneﬁt duration overall 0.45 0.35 0.00 1.04 N = 1020
between 0.31 0.04 1.02 n = 20
within 0.17 -0.09 0.87 T = 51
Union density overall 0.41 0.19 0.08 0.84 N = 890
between 0.18 0.14 0.76 n = 20
within 0.08 0.08 0.70 T = 44.5
Coordination overall 3.40 1.24 1.00 5.00 N = 960
between 1.09 1.00 4.90 n = 20
within 0.64 0.86 5.46 T = 48
Tax overall 0.44 0.13 0.16 0.79 N = 1012
between 0.12 0.21 0.64 n = 20
within 0.07 0.14 0.62 T = 50.6
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see Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 10.7.). The results of such a test in chapter 4 show that the
Hausman test rejects the RE model at a 6 percent level. Thus, we have chosen a ﬁxed
eﬀect (FE) model where we allow for correlation between the country-speciﬁc eﬀects and
the other regressors.
Ordinary least squares on a model with both ﬁxed eﬀects and a lagged endogenous
variable will, in general, result in biased and inconsistent estimates, see Baltagi (2008).
However, the long time series mitigate the ﬁxed eﬀect bias, cf. Judson and Owen (1999).
The alternative to the FE approach is to transform the model to ﬁrst diﬀerences, which
eliminates the ﬁxed eﬀect, and use instruments for the endogenous ﬁrst diﬀerence of the
lagged endogenous variables, see (Baltagi, 2008). This method leads to unbiased and
consistent estimates, and one such approach is the Arelleano-Bond method. However,
the long time series augments the number of available instruments and these must be
reduced, see Roodman (2009). In spite of some suggestions in this literature of how to
reduce the number of available instruments, there does not exists a clear path. On this
data set, cf. an extensive discussion of the instrumental variable estimation in chapter 3,
it turned out to be diﬃcult to achieve robust results with this estimation method. This
aspect, and the fact that the ﬁxed eﬀect bias is small with long time series, have led us
to the conclusion that the FE-estimation method is preferable. The small bias on long
time series is also a reason why this estimation method is not used in the analysis of the
replication of Nickell et al. (2005) in chapter 2.
The existence of an equilibrium level for unemployment requires that there is no unit
root in the unemployment rate. The unit root of unemployment with a data generating
process up to lag three, subtracted country-speciﬁc means, is rejected by two formal tests
(Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003)) in chapter 3.
Now let us turn to the thesis itself, which includes three chapters in addition to the
introduction. The starting point is a replication of the results in Nickell et al. (2005),
including an investigation of how robust the eﬀect of labour market institutions is to data
revisions and time series extensions. A simulation of the main model for unemployment in
Nickell et al. (2005) reveals that the predictive power of the model is weak, and that the
model underpredicts the unemployment rate for 17 out of 20 countries in the post sample
period. Despite this, the analysis also shows that countries that changed their institutions
in an ’employment-friendly’ way experienced lower unemployment rates in the post sample
period, compared to countries that changed their institutions in the opposite direction.
Chapter 3 re-visits the question of the role of institutions. Compared to chapter 2,
the econometric model is a dynamic version of the wage bargaining theory as speciﬁed
in Layard et al. (2005). The dynamic speciﬁcation implies some notable diﬀerences from
the existing empirical literature: First, the third-order unemployment dynamics in the
ﬁnal equation of unemployment is a consequence of the structural model, which depends
on both the number of equations and the order of dynamics in those equations. This is
an extension of earlier papers that use a ﬁrst-order dynamics (or second-order dynamics
if the residuals in addition are of ﬁrst order). A second result is that the underlying
theory has implications for the signs and the magnitude of the coeﬃcients of the lags of
unemployment, which can be conﬁrmed or refuted by estimation. Third, the labour mar-
ket variables should enter with lag one and two according to the derivation. Fourth, the
formal derivation of the dynamic unemployment equation also makes it clear that there is
no logical or a priori reason why the equilibrium unemployment rate cannot be a function
of other factors than the labour market institutions. Our empirical results support the
chosen dynamic speciﬁcation. Furthermore, they show that temporary changes in the
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economic environment have had a larger impact on the evolution of the unemployment
rate than institutions.
The ﬁnal chapter of the thesis expands the demand side of the model in chapter
3, and includes both government purchases and changes in export demand. The latter
variable is probably more sensitive to aggregate macroeconomic trends, and can be viewed
as a control for the business cycle or as a control for macroeconomic shocks that hit
all economies in the panel at the same time. We ﬁnd that an increase in government
purchases leads to a clear reduction in unemployment, even if the eﬀect varies across
OECD countries.
1.1 Summary of chapter 2
Using panel data for twenty countries from 1960 to 1995, Nickell et al. (2005) ﬁnd that
labour market institutions explain most of the variation in OECD unemployment. They
ﬁnd that 55 percent of the increase in European unemployment are due to changes in
institutions, where changes in the unemployment beneﬁt system and taxes are the main
contributions. The speciﬁed model includes year dummies, country-speciﬁc dummies and
time trends, to avoid that the included variables are distorted by omitted variables with
trends for each country or global shocks. They have also speciﬁed some variables that
are supposed to capture temporary changes in the economic environment, like changes in
labour demand shocks and changes in total factor productivity.
There are several reasons for re-assessing the paper by Nickell et al. (2005). First,
the results are strong, explaining the bulk of the variation in unemployment by variation
in institutions. It is also noteworthy to obtain homogenous eﬀects of institutions for
all countries in the panel. Second, the strand of research focussing on the link between
labour market institutions and unemployment has been very inﬂuential. The results of
this research have been interpreted as supporting the recommendation from international
organizations like OECD to countries for how they should change their institutions in
order to reduce unemployment rates, e.g. reduce the level of unemployment beneﬁts.
The large eﬀect of changes in institutions on unemployment found by Nickell et al.
(2005) is a natural starting point for investigating the role of institutions. The ﬁrst
question addressed in the chapter is whether the results in Nickell et al. (2005) could be
used to forecast the evolution of unemployment in the OECD countries. Ex post, we now
perfectly know the evolution of unemployment and the explanatory variables; thus, we
can test whether their explanations are consistent with the subsequent evolution of the
unemployment rate. A dynamic simulation of the main model in Nickell et al. (2005) from
1995 to 2007 shows strong underprediction for 17 of the 20 countries, while unemployment
is only overpredicted for one country.
I then explore three possible explanations for the underprediction; evolution of shocks,
change in the data generating process and possible misspeciﬁcations of the model in Nickell
et al. (2005). In this investigation, I use the methodology derived in Nickell et al. (2005),
to ensure that the variation in results are not due to a new estimation technique or
method.
The ﬁrst obvious candidate for an explanation of the underprediction is that the shocks
that are included as explanatory variables in the empirical model have evolved diﬀerently
in the post sample period. The results of a simulation with variation in the shock variable
and a simulation where the shock variables are set to zero in the post sample period, show
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nearly no eﬀect of the shocks in the extended period, with Japan and Italy being the only
exceptions.
The second candidate is to investigate if the data generating process has changed,
i.e. if the link between institutions and unemployment has changed, in the post sample
period. The model in Nickell et al. (2005) is reestimated on the revised and extended data
set, and the results show that the size of the coeﬃcients changes quite substantially in
both time periods. I also repeat their analysis of calculating the long-run eﬀect of changes
in institutions for the European countries. I ﬁnd that changes in institutions now account
for 76 percent of the total change in unemployment from the 1960s to 2002-2007, up from
41 percent in my replication of their results over the shorter time period 1990 to 1995. At
face value, this might suggest that institutions have become more important. However,
the interpretation is less clear cut. First, the larger share reﬂects that unemployment
increased less over the longer period, so there is less to explain. In addition, a dynamic
simulation does not give a better ﬁt with the reestimated coeﬃcients than with original
ones, even for the extended sample period, suggesting that changes in the coeﬃcient values
is not the key explanation for the underprediction.
I then investigate the model dynamics to detect if this is the cause of the underpre-
diction in the post sample period on the original data set. A dynamic simulation of the
full model, when the error term is explicitly taken into account, reveals that the model is
non-stationary for some countries. This is veriﬁed by the roots of the 2nd order diﬀerential
equation that is implied by the model in Nickell et al. (2005). The results suggest a re-
consideration of the dynamic speciﬁcation of the model. Especially since the underlying
solution to the speciﬁed model implies a 2nd order dynamics in the unemployment rate.
However, this is not the main cause for the underprediction of the unemployment rate, as
most of the countries have a stable solution to the model. Instead, it turns out that the
underprediction of the unemployment rates is largely driven by the dynamic speciﬁcation
of the model, where the combination of the large coeﬃcient for the lagged unemployment
rate, the trend and the ﬁxed eﬀects, implies a tendency for unemployment to diverge in
one direction or the other. This implies that forecasting a stationary time series as the
unemployment rate is impossible.
In light of the severe underprediction of unemployment, it seems worthwhile to explore
the link between institutions and unemployment in isolation, ignoring the other parts of
the model. Using the estimated coeﬃcients, the change in labour market institutions
would predict that average unemployment increases by 1.3 percentage points over the
period 1995 to the average over the period 2002 to 2007, while actual unemployment
fell by 2.3 percentage points in the same period. Once more, this suggests that the
model does not capture the eﬀects well. However, if one takes country dispersion into
account, a diﬀerent picture emerges. There is a clear tendency that countries which have
changed their institutions in an “employment-friendly” way, like Denmark and Finland,
have experienced a larger reduction in unemployment than countries that have changed
their institutions in the opposite direction like Germany and Portugal. This indicates that
labour market institutions aﬀect unemployment in the direction found by Nickell et al.
(2005).
1.1.1 Future research
The main methodological contribution from this analysis is that one should be very careful
in modelling time trends in unemployment models. The analysis shows that the under-
prediction is largely driven by the model dynamics and that the accounting exercise in
8
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Nickell et al. (2005) is not suited to analysing how much of the variation in unemployment
that can be attributed to changes in institutions in the post-sample period. In addition,
it should be kept in mind that specifying dynamics in the disturbance term might af-
fect the overall stability of the system. Equilibrium theory requires stable solutions for
unemployment.
Despite of this methodological issue, the substantial contribution of Nickell et al.
(2005), i.e. that labour market institutions aﬀect unemployment in the direction found
by Nickell et al. (2005), is to a large degree still valid. There is a clear tendency that
countries which have changed their institutions in an “employment-friendly” way, like
Denmark and Finland, have experienced a larger reduction in unemployment than the
countries that have changed their institutions in the opposite direction like Germany and
Portugal. On the other hand, small eﬀects of the included shocks illustrate that it is not
these shocks that should be the focus of future research.
1.2 Summary of chapter 3
The theoretical literature reviewed above is static, while both static and dynamic spec-
iﬁcations of the unemployment equations are used in the empirical literature reviewed
above. The dynamics is reasonable given that there are adjustment lags in the mani-
fold of economic, administrative and political decisions that jointly determine the rate of
unemployment.
The existing studies rely on heuristics to motivate the dynamic speciﬁcation of the
econometric panel data model. Heuristics gives the empirical researcher considerable free-
dom to choose a speciﬁcation that ﬁts the data well. One strategy has been to use simple
ﬁrst-order dynamics in the regression and compensate by allowing ﬂexible dynamics in
the residuals of the equations. On the other hand, basing the speciﬁcation on heuristics
alone also means that there is a gap between the underlying theory of equilibrium un-
employment, which is static, and the dynamic speciﬁcation used to estimate equilibrium
rate unemployment.
In the third chapter of the thesis, we estimate the quantitative importance of labour
market institutions for equilibrium unemployment in the OECD. Compared to existing
literature, the econometric model is based on the solution of a dynamic macroeconomic
model, which includes structural equations for wage and price setting. We also use a
sample with more variation in unemployment and institutions, and a higher order dy-
namics in the ﬁnal equation for unemployment. Finally, we incorporate objectively and
automatically selected indicators for structural breaks in the unemployment rate. The
argument for this latter assumption is that the eﬀect of changes in institutional variables
on unemployment is likely to be gradual, and are modelled by relatively long lags in ac-
cordance with theory. Therefore, we interpret the intermittent but large changes in the
unemployment rate from one year to another to be due to other factors than institutions,
like extraneous or domestic demand shocks, changes in households’ preferences for work
and leisure or changes in pro-or counter-cyclical economic policies. We call these changes
structural breaks. We have used two statistical methods for detecting such shocks, one of
which leads to fewer breaks that the other.
We ﬁnd that institutional variables have statistical signiﬁcance, but that these vari-
ables account for relatively little of the overall change in the OECD average unemployment
rate. For instance, the most robust eﬀect of labour market institutions is changes in the
beneﬁt replacement ratio. Based on the long-run estimates from our main equation, we
9
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ﬁnd that if the beneﬁt replacement ratio is lowered by 20 percent, from the OECD aver-
age in 2007, the unemployment rate will decrease by 0.8 percentage points. On the other
hand, we ﬁnd that the absence of large negative shocks to the economy has been more
important for the reduction in the actual average unemployment rate from the 1990s and
up until the resent ﬁnancial crises. The inclusion of structural breaks that capture loca-
tion shifts in the distributions for the unemployment rates turns out to be important for
our estimate of the equilibrium rate. If we do not correct for these structural breaks, the
equilibrium rate is simulated to almost 6.2 percent, while the lowest adjusted estimate is
4.3 percent. However, comparing the simulation of the two models with structural breaks
shows that the model with more breaks illustrates a larger gap between time varying and
constant institutions. This could illustrate the importance of controlling for other factors
inﬂuencing unemployment in order to achieve the true eﬀect of institutions.
In terms of modelling methodology, this paper illustrates the importance of a dy-
namic speciﬁcation of the panel data model for the rate of unemployment. We show that
a reduced lag structure on the autoregressive coeﬃcients increases the residual autocor-
relation which might be a sign of misspeciﬁcation. The chosen dynamic speciﬁcation is
theoretically derived and has the status of a ﬁnal equation of a system consisting of equa-
tions for wage and price setting and an equation of unemployment as a function of the
real exchange rate. The theoretical derivation gives a priori assumptions regarding the
magnitude of the autoregressive coeﬃcients. The magnitude is conﬁrmed by the empirical
evidence. On the other hand, our results also show that the exact lag structure of the
institutional variables is of minor importance for capturing the eﬀects of labour market
institutions on unemployment.
1.2.1 Future research
In spite of the advantages of using panel data, there are also some diﬃculties. Even with
substantial eﬀort, empirical work will never be able to model the world perfectly, but
researchers aim at controlling for large outliers and other factors that are not speciﬁed
in the model and that might bias the estimates of the other variables included in the
model. For instance, if an econometrician is aware of special historical events that have
had an substantial impact on the economy and the endogenous variable of interest, like
wars or the breakdown of the former Soviet Union, the empirical model will try to correct
for these events by including dummies. A dummy will exclude this event from having an
impact on the endogenous variable and all explanatory variables in the model. In this
way, researchers try to avoid that their estimates of the included variables in the model
are biased from these events.
Panel data studies might be especially vulnerable to such problems because of het-
erogenous events. When modelling several countries, detecting all such events might be
even more diﬃcult than when modelling only one country. In general, panel data analysis
that models macro variables such as the unemployment rates includes time- and country-
speciﬁc dummies to capture country-speciﬁc eﬀects and macroeconomic shocks that are
not explicitly modelled.
One problem with this approach is that we lose many degrees of freedom in estimating
both country-speciﬁc time trends and common or country-speciﬁc time dummies in long
time series. We have used a diﬀerent approach to account for events in a more objective
way than, for instance, reading the history books and trying to subjectively detect which
special events that should be accounted for in estimating the ﬁnal equation of unemploy-
ment. The method is a statistical method for detecting special events in the time series
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of interest, known as “impulse saturation” and “large outlier” approach. The properties
of this class of automatic model selection procedures using Autometrics are discussed in
Castle et al. (2010) and Hendry and Mizon (2010). The method is by now well known
in time series analysis, but not yet in panel data analysis. The paper in chapter 3 must
therefore be seen as a ﬁrst attempt to use these statistical methods developed for time
series analysis on a panel.
We have followed the time series analysis to account for the breaks country by country.
However, as our knowledge has improved, we have discovered that it is possible to ﬁrst
apply panel data techniques to transform our variable of interest, the unemployment rate,
to avoid country-speciﬁc variation, and stack the data set with all countries in the panel.
Then, the above methods can be directly used on this stacked data set.
The results of this process are somewhat diﬀerent from our ﬁrst method, but still the
results are not too diﬀerent from the country by country method used in this thesis. In
future work, this line could be of considerable interest for panel data econometricians,
since they could, in an objective way, detect whether they should control for special
events by starting out by assuming that every year is a special year, and then reducing
the number of year dummies in this statistical and objective way. If the time series are
long, this will also increase the degrees of freedom if the alternative is one time dummy
per year.
The long time series could gain by testing the stability of the parameter values as in
normal time series approach. This could be a preferable way of investigating how the
parameters change when adding a country, and also when adding one observation to the
regression. For example, this could possibly reveal changes in the eﬀect of employment
protection as captured by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008).
1.3 Summary of chapter 4
In the ﬁnal chapter of my thesis, we expand the demand side of the model with government
purchases. This is an interesting exercise also in light of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Most
OECD countries used the ﬁscal policy extensively to combat the crisis by stimulating the
economy. More recently, ﬁscal policy has been reversed in many countries. The large
changes in policy raise several key questions in relation to the eﬀect on unemployment; in
particular whether ﬁscal policy measures can be used to combat increasing unemployment,
and if ﬁscal tightening is likely to lead to persistent high unemployment.
Whether and possibly to what extent ﬁscal policy should be used to stabilize the
economy is a question subject to a great deal of political controversy. In contrast, more
concrete questions, like how will an increase in government spending aﬀect unemployment,
should be less controversial. However, there is no consensus in the literature on the eﬀect
of ﬁscal policy. There is now a rapid growth in the literature, and hopefully a more
consensus view may emerge.
We test the quantitative importance of government purchases for the evolution of
unemployment in the OECD. The analysis is built on the preferred empirical speciﬁcation
in chapter 3, and adds the change in government purchases and an export market indicator
as explanatory variables. Compared to earlier studies, we use a sample with more variation
in unemployment and institutions.
We ﬁnd that increased government purchases lead to lower unemployment; the point
estimate is that an increase equal to one percent of GDP reduces unemployment by 0.2
percentage points in the same year, and increases to 0.25 percentage points after one year,
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to then gradually vanish over the following decade. The eﬀect is greater in downturns
than in booms, and also greater under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime than under a ﬂoating
regime.
One methodological problem in the analysis is that government purchases might be
endogenous, in the sense that ﬁscal policy decisions clearly depend on the state of the
economy. This might be the case even if the endogeneity problem is likely to be less
severe for government purchases as compared to, for instance, transfers, since government
purchases are not directly linked to the state of the economy. We address the endogeneity
problem by using instruments and including omitted variables. This is a diﬀerent approach
as compared to previous studies which also try to address this problem; see Perotti (2007),
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) and Hall (2009) for recent reviews. In our view, also
the alternative methods have their weaknesses, and our method should be considered as
complementary to the other studies mentioned. We show that our main results are robust
to our methods of addressing the endogeneity problem, even if the instrumental variable
approach indicates that the eﬀect of government purchases is downward biased in the
ﬁxed eﬀect estimation.
1.3.1 Future research
In light of the recent ﬁnancial crises and the large changes in ﬁscal policy, it would be
particulary interesting to extend the data set used in chapter 4 to cover also this period,
and explore if the eﬀect of government purchases remains robust. However, it would be
diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy from other shocks.
Another natural extension of the chapter would be to explore the eﬀect of taxes as a
part of ﬁscal policy, and not a labour market institution as is done in the current analysis.
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Chapter 2
The robustness of empirical models
for unemployment. A review of
Nickell et al. (2005).
Victoria Sparrman
Abstract In an inﬂuential study, Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005) ﬁnd that insti-
tutions explain most of the variation in OECD unemployment, using panel data for 20
countries from 1960 to 1995. The importance of Nickell et al. (2005)’s conclusions has
spurred a lively debate, and several authors have criticized their ﬁndings. This paper re-
assesses the main ﬁndings in Nickell et al. (2005), beneﬁtting from the inclusion of twelve
additional years of data. A dynamic simulation of their main unemployment equation
shows that unemployment is severely underpredicted in the post sample period for 17 of
the 20 countries, while it is only overpredicted for one country. The analysis shows that
the underprediction is largely driven by the model dynamics, and that the accounting
exercise in Nickell et al. (2005) is not suited to analyze how much of the variation in un-
employment that can be attributed to changes in institutions in the post-sample period.
However, there is a clear tendency that countries which have changed their institutions
in an ”employment-friendly” way, like Denmark and Finland have experienced a larger
reduction in unemployment than the countries that have changed their institutions in
the opposite direction like Germany and Portugal. This indicates that labour market
institutions aﬀect unemployment in the direction found by Nickell et al. (2005).
I would like to thank Erik Biørn, Steinar Holden and Ragnar Nymoen for comments and discussions.
The numerical results in this paper were obtained by use of Stata 9. This paper is part of the project
Demand, unemployment and inﬂation ﬁnanced by the The Research Council of Norway. University of
Oslo, Department of Economics
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2.1 Introduction
A number of recent papers have tried to explain the evolution of unemployment in the
OECD area, based on an equilibrium unemployment framework. One of the most inﬂuen-
tial is Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005) NNO hereafter. They ﬁnd that the development
in labor market institutions can account for 55 percent of the increase in European un-
employment for the period 1960 to 1995. In their analysis, the eﬀect of institutions on
unemployment is the same for all the 20 OECD countries in the panel.
There are several reasons to re-asses the paper by NNO. First, the results are strong,
explaining the bulk of the variation in unemployment by variation in institutions. It is also
noteworthy to obtain homogenous eﬀects of institutions for all the countries in the panel.
Second, the strand of research focussing on the link between labour market institutions
and unemployment has been very inﬂuential. NNO is a major, recent contribution to this
literature, spurring a lively debate and receiving 461 references in Google Scholar. This
approach has strongly inﬂuenced the recommendations from international organizations
such as the OECD on how countries should organize their economies. The results of this
strand of research have been interpreted as a recommendation to countries for how they
should change their institutions in order to avoid or reduce unemployment. According to
the ﬁndings of this literature, reducing institutional variables like the beneﬁt replacement
ratio, employment protection, union density and taxes would lower the unemployment
rate considerably.
This paper evaluates the results in NNO over the extended sample 1995 to 2007. I
ask the question of whether the NNO results could be used to forecast the evolution of
unemployment in the OECD countries, if one were able to predict perfectly the evolution of
the explanatory variables. To this end, I undertake a dynamic simulation of the model for
unemployment with the original estimated coeﬃcients. Dynamic simulation from 1995
to 2007 shows strong underprediction for 17 of the 20 countries, while unemployment
is only overpredicted for one country. The diﬀerence between simulation and actual
unemployment rate for the period 1995 to 2007 motivates a closer look at the empirical
model in NNO. I also take a closer look at NNO’s ﬁnding that 55 percent of the increase
in unemployment is caused by changes in institutions in Europe in the sample period. I
explore whether this result survives data revisions within the sample period, and what
the method gives for the post-sample period.
This paper is not the ﬁrst to discuss the results and method in NNO, see for instance
contributions by Baker et al. (2005), Blanchard (2006), Berger and Everaert (2008) and
in Belot and van Ours (2004). The issues in this debate can roughly be divided in four:
the size of the estimated coeﬃcients, the variables in the empirical analysis, the chosen
indexes, and the method. However, in spite of the extensive literature, it is diﬃcult
to evaluate how the various elements of the critique aﬀect the overall validity of the
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NNO results. The problem arises because key features like the time period, the method,
and the time series for the variables generally vary across papers. This is a recurrent
problem in empirical literature, implying that it is diﬃcult to compare new results with
existing papers. When diﬀerent data or methods are used, it is hard to identify the source
of the diﬀerence in results. This also makes it diﬃcult to determine which parts of the
original results that are still valid, and which parts that are not.
In this paper every source of variation in results is separated by looking at one source at
the time: revision of time series and extension of the time period. In addition, a replication
of the original results in NNO ensures that the same method is used throughout the paper.
The results from the extended time period show that the data generating process has
changed somewhat, but the change in estimated coeﬃcients has not led to a markedly
better ﬁt of the model in the extended time period. Institutions explain a larger share
of the increase in unemployment in Europe than over the shorter period until 1995, but
this is because the actual increase in unemployment up to 2007 is lower. The results for
how much of the increase in unemployment that can be explained by institutions are not
convincing and the underprediction of the unemployment rate in the post sample period
is still unexplained.
The empirical speciﬁcation of the model in NNO is evaluated further in section 2.5. A
dynamic simulation where the speciﬁed error term is taken into account in the simulation
illustrates that the estimated model has a non stationary solution for three of the countries;
Japan, Netherland and New Zealand. However, also for the other countries a simulation
of only the dynamic part of the equation, i.e. the lagged unemployment rate, the trend
and the ﬁxed eﬀects, yields severe instability. Stable dynamics is essential to be able to
predict a stationary time series such as unemployment. Most likely, this is the source of
the underprediction.
One possible objection to the present analysis is that the empirical model of NNO was
developed to explain the evolution of unemployment in the period 1960 to 1995, and to ex-
plore the link between institutions and unemployment, but not to predict unemployment.
However, the high impact of the policy recommendations clearly show that the results
in this and similar studies have been regarded as being of general validity. Moreover, if
the empirical model of NNO captures the crude features of the data generating process,
and this data generating process has been fairly stable over time, then one would expect
the model also to be able to perform well in a post-sample dynamic simulation, given
the correct values of the explanatory variables. A failure in the post-sample simulation
would suggest that either the model explains unemployment behavior less well than the
in-sample results indicate, or that the unemployment behavior has changed over time.
Both conclusions would be of considerable interest, as well as motivate further research.
In light of the severe underprediction of unemployment, it seems worthwhile to explore
the link between institutions and unemployment in isolation, ignoring the other parts of
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the model. Using the estimated coeﬃcients, the change in labour market institutions
would predict that average unemployment increase by 1.3 percentage points over the
period 1995 to the average over period 2002 to 2007, while actual unemployment fell by
2.3 percentage points in the same period. Again, this suggest that the model does not
capture the eﬀects well. However, if one takes country dispersion into account, a diﬀerent
picture emerges.
The paper is organized as follows. First I present the development in actual unem-
ployment in the post-sample period, some related literature and the empirical model in
NNO , which is used throughout the paper in section 2.2. Then, in section 2.3 I show that
this model underpredicts the unemployment rate in 17 of the 20 countries in the panel.
The model in NNO is reestimated in section 2.4, and the results show that the data gen-
erating process has changed somewhat, but the reestimation does not lead to a markedly
better ﬁt. In section 2.5 I explore the dynamic speciﬁcation of the model and ﬁnd that
it is unstable for most countries. The link between institutions and unemployment in
the post-sample period are evaluated from a diﬀerent angle in section 2.6. Section 2.7
concludes. Appendix 2.A describes the construction of the data. Appendix 2.B presents
some additional results that do not change the main picture of the prediction results in
section 2.3. The replication of the model in NNO and some additional results to section
2.4 and 2.5 are presented in appendix 2.C.
2.2 Background
Before turning to the model speciﬁcation, it is interesting to look at the actual devel-
opment in the unemployment rates in the sample period available, i.e. 1960 to 2007.
Then, the theoretical framework for explaining the evolution in unemployment as given
in NNO is presented.
2.2.1 The evolution of unemployment in the OECD area
The unemployment rate in the OECD countries changed substantially in the period 1960
to 2007, see table 1. For instance, Switzerland has a relatively low but increasing un-
employment throughout the period, while in Ireland and Spain on the other hand the
unemployment rate is much more volatile. Germany and Japan experience a steady in-
crease in the unemployment rate over time, ending on a fairly high unemployment. The
unweighed average unemployment rate (see bottom row) was very low at the beginning
of the period, but increased sharply and peaked at the decades 1980 and 1990. Then
unemployment fell slightly in the last period 2002 to 2007.
Figure 1 also shows the unemployment rate for all countries in the sample in the period
1960 to 2007. We observe that the rise in unemployment in the early 1970s went together
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Table 1: The unweighed average of unemployment. Revised and extended data set.
Percent
Country 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-01 2002-07
Australia 1.75 1.79 4.66 7.70 8.41 7.33 5.31
Austria 1.70 1.42 1.38 3.25 4.89 5.49 5.67
Belgium 1.48 1.48 4.23 9.61 8.05 8.34 8.05
Canada 6.00 4.76 6.98 9.84 9.53 8.11 6.92
Denmark 1.07 1.04 3.56 6.48 7.50 5.00 4.62
Finland 1.41 2.41 4.14 5.17 10.85 11.54 8.34
France 1.18 1.95 3.71 7.67 9.10 9.66 8.48
Germany 0.69 0.86 3.06 6.56 6.94 8.31 9.29
Ireland 5.32 5.82 8.08 14.05 14.68 7.30 4.47
Italy 3.46 4.17 4.87 7.96 9.91 10.81 7.71
Japan 1.34 1.24 1.84 2.52 2.46 4.22 4.62
Netherlands 0.57 1.26 3.57 8.28 6.60 4.29 4.03
New Zealand 0.08 0.29 0.74 3.95 8.14 6.37 4.12
Norway 1.71 1.53 1.74 2.44 5.13 3.69 3.89
Portugal 2.46 3.91 5.63 8.23 5.48 5.23 6.90
Spain 1.78 2.31 4.04 14.51 15.00 13.61 9.76
Sweden 2.11 2.61 2.62 3.59 6.22 9.06 6.92
Switzerland 0.03 0.01 0.29 0.63 2.24 3.30 3.99
UK 2.79 3.40 4.81 10.44 8.77 6.31 5.10
United States 5.72 4.47 6.51 7.75 6.16 4.63 5.27
Total 2.14 2.34 3.82 7.03 7.80 7.13 6.17
with an increase in the dispersion across the countries in the sample. After 1995, both the
average unemployment rate and the variation in the unemployment rates across countries
have decreased. In appendix 2.A, ﬁgure A1 displays the evolution of unemployment for
various groups of countries.
2.2.2 The empirical speciﬁcation as given in NNO
The approach of NNO is based on an equilibrium unemployment framework. In the short
run actual unemployment may deviate from equilibrium unemployment due to shocks, but
unemployment eventually returns to its equilibrium level. The equilibrium unemployment
theory could be based on several diﬀerent micro founded theories of unemployment, like
wage bargaining, eﬃciency wages, or search and matching theories, see e.g Layard et al.
(1991) and Pissarides (2000).
The empirical model for unemployment in table 5 in NNO is speciﬁed by a simulta-
neous system that consists of the following two equations:
Uit = θUi,t−1 + β1EPLit + β2BRRit + β3(BDit − BD) ∗ (BRRit − BRR)
+β4(UDNETit − UDNETi,t−1) + β5COit + β6(COit − CO) ∗ (UDNETit − UDNET )
+β7TWit + β8(COit − CO) ∗ (TWit − TW ) + α1LDSit + α2DPROD hpit
+α3TTSit + α4D2.MSit + α5RIRLit + γ1t+ γ2i + γ3it+ vit (1)
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Figure 1: Actual unemployment. Revised and extended data set over the years 1960 to
2007. Percent
and
vit = ρivi,t−1 + it (2)
The institutional variables and the interaction terms among these variables in the ﬁrst
part of equation (1) determines the equilibrium unemployment level. The institutional
variables are indexes for employment protection (EPL), beneﬁt replacement ratio (BRR),
beneﬁt duration (BD), union density (UDNET ), tax rate (TW ) and coordination of
wage setting (CO). The interactions are: beneﬁt duration and beneﬁt replacement ratio,
coordination in wage setting and union density, and coordination and tax rate. The
interaction terms are measured as deviation from the variable mean. The second part of
equation (1) consists of ﬁve variables meant to capture deviations from the equilibrium
unemployment rate over the business cycle, the shocks. The shock variables are; labour
demand (lds), total factor productivity (DPRODhp) , import prices (TTS), money supply
(D2.MS) and real interest rate (RIRL). (Ui,t−1) is the unemployment in the previous
period. Finally, the heterogenous part of the model is captured by unobserved country
and time speciﬁc shifts in the intercepts (γ1 and γ2), a country speciﬁc trend (γ3i ∗ t)
and a country speciﬁc autoregressive error term (vit). The latter is deﬁned in equation
(2), where ρi is the country speciﬁc auto regressive coeﬃcient and it is white noise.
The coeﬃcients in equation (1) are estimated with feasible general least squares, where
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the ρi in the error term is estimated simultaneously for every country i by a iteration
process using panel data for 20 OECD countries over the period 1960-1995.
The results in appendix 2.C, in model A in table C1, and are in line with what we would
expect from the equilibrium theory of unemployment: Higher taxes and more generous
unemployment beneﬁts increase unemployment, while more coordination in wage setting
leads to lower unemployment.
NNO chose to evaluate the empirical model and the eﬀect of institutions by a dynamic
simulation of the unemployment rate, disregarding the error term by setting the expected
value of the error term in equation (2) to zero in every period and for every country. They
claim that the close visual similarity between the simulation and the actual unemployment
rate over the estimation period illustrates that the model explains the data well.
They claim, based on the dynamic simulation keeping institutions ﬁxed at their 1960s
level (i.e. the unweighted mean over the period 1960 to 1969), that institutions account
for 55 percent of the increase in European unemployment in the period 1960s to the
early 1990s, measured as the increase in the unweighted mean of unemployment from the
1960s to the period 1990-1995. Changes in the beneﬁt system are the most important,
contributing 39 percent. Increases in labour taxes generate 26 percent, shifts in the union
variables are responsible for 19 percent, and movements in employment protection law
contribute 16 percent.
2.3 Forecast of the unemployment rate by using the
NNO model in the post-sample period 1995 to
2007
This section re-assesses the ﬁndings of NNO, beneﬁtting from twelve additional years of
data. Speciﬁcally, I explore to what extent the empirical model of NNO is able to forecast
the subsequent post-sample evolution of unemployment, given that we now in general
know the correct values of the explanatory variables.
I evaluate the model by use of static and dynamic simulation of unemployment. The
model does very well in a static simulation, see appendix 2.B. However, as the static
simulation is conditional on the lagged unemployment rate, which plays a large role in
the model, the static simulation may not give the right impression about the model’s out
of sample explanatory power. I will thus focus on the dynamic simulation, which is also
used by NNO. In a dynamic simulation the simulated value of unemployment in period
T + t is used to forecast unemployment in period T + t + 1, see Clements and Hendry
(1998, Ch. 2.7).
In general, the sample period is extended by using the time series for the institutional
variables available up to 2003, except for taxes that are available up to 2007, and the time
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series for the macro variables that are available up to 2007. Note that even if most of the
institutional variables only are available up to 2001, 2002 and 2003, this is not a major
problem for predicting unemployment up to 2007 by this model. This is because changes
in institutions are slow and changes take a long time to materialize in the unemployment
rate. With a estimated coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent variable of 0.86, 47 percent of
the full eﬀect of changes in institutions remains after 5 years (0.865 = 0.47). This means
that most of the changes in institutions up to 2003 have materialized in unemployment
by 2007, while changes in institutions after 2003 will have little impact before 2007. See
appendix 2.A for details regarding the extended and revised data set. The time dummies
for new years are set to zero in the simulations. The time trend is prolonged and the
estimated coeﬃcients from the original data set are used in the simulations.
Formally, the dynamic simulation of unemployment in the current period can be writ-
ten as U˜di,T+t = E(Ui,T+t|U˜di,T+t−1,Xi,T+t, βˆ), where U˜di,T+t−1 is the dynamic simulated
unemployment rate for country i in the previous period, Xi,T+t is a vector that contains
all explanatory variables for country i in period T + t 1 and βˆ is a vector with all the
within sample period estimated coeﬃcients as given in NNO2. The error term is set to
zero in every period in this simulation, but the simulations of unemployment follow the
same pattern if the error term is equal to the last estimated value of the country speciﬁc
error term (the results are not reported here).
The dynamic simulation results are shown in ﬁgure 2. The ﬁgure reveals a large
disparity between the dynamic simulation and the actual unemployment rate for most
countries in the post sample period. The simulated unemployment rate is lower than
the actual unemployment rate for 17 countries, i.e. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. The simulated unemployment
rate is substantially higher than the actual rate for Spain. The model simulates well for
only two countries, Finland and Ireland.
If the empirical model speciﬁed by NNO explains the development in unemployment,
the diﬀerence between the simulated and the actual value of the unemployment can be
caused by the development in the institutional variables, the speciﬁed shock variables, the
error term, or how the trend and time dummies are prolonged.
The discrepancy between the simulated and actual unemployment rate remains even
if the trend or the time dummies are prolonged in various ways. In the following, some
examples will be given. The estimated trend is negative for most countries in the sample,
exceptions are Finland, Ireland, New Zealand and Spain, but the simulated unemployment
rate follows a similar pattern if the trend variable is prolonged by the last value of the
1The vector contains mostly actual values of the explanatory variables, but it also contains some
predictions for some of the institutions in the period 2001-07, see appendix 2.A for details regarding time
periods for the diﬀerent variables.
2The country speciﬁc dummies are taken from the replication in section 2.4.1
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Figure 2: Actual unemployment and dynamic simulation of the unemployment rate with
and without time-varying institutions. Estimated coeﬃcients on the original data set are
used in simulation, see appendix 2.C, model A in table C1. Institutions are constant.
Percent
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trend in 1995 or by the average value of the trend. The latter gives the largest change
in simulations and is shown in appendix 2.C, ﬁgure B3. The simulations show that in
this speciﬁcation the predictive power of the empirical model improves somewhat for
most countries in the sample, i.e. the simulated value of unemployment by the model
is closer to actual unemployment in the post sample period, but the improvement is
small compared with the distance between actual and simulated unemployment. The
prediction of the model improved also in Sweden, but the model now overpredicts the
change in unemployment. The predictive power worsens for New Zealand, Germany and
United Kingdom. The simulations of the unemployment rate follow a similar pattern even
if the time series are prolonged by the estimated average of the time dummies (results
omitted for space considerations).
The speciﬁed shock variables have a small impact on the simulations, compare to the
simulations in ﬁgure 2 and B4, where the latter is found in appendix 2.B. Thus, the
underprediction is not caused by the shocks included in the NNO model.
On the other hand ﬁgure 2 illustrates a large eﬀect of changes in institutions on the
development of the unemployment rates. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁgure displays the actual
unemployment rate, the dynamic simulation described above and a dynamic simulation
where the values of the institutional variable are kept ﬁxed at their 1995 level. For 14 of
the 20 countries, incorporating the changes in the institutions leads to a reduction in the
distance between actual and simulated unemployment rate. This is the case for Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. For Ireland, there is no diﬀerence between the
simulated unemployment rate with constant and time-varying institutions. However, for
Finland, New Zealand, Spain, United Kingdom and United States, including the variation
in institutions increases the diﬀerence between actual unemployment and the simulated
unemployment rate. There is large eﬀect of changes in institutions on unemployment even
if we modify the trend, the time dummies or the shocks as described above.
The dynamic simulation of unemployment presented in ﬁgure 2 motivates a further
investigation of the model in NNO post sample. The predictive power of the NNO model
is weak, but changes in institutions still contributes to explain some of the development
in unemployment for 11 of the 15 European countries. One is intrigued to know what
the reason for the underprediction is. Has the data generating process, i.e. the link be-
tween the explanatory variables and unemployment changed after 1995? Or were there
weaknesses in the empirical speciﬁcation already in the original time period? The under-
prediction may also raise questions about the ﬁndings that changes in institutions explain
the bulk of the increase in unemployment in Europe. Thus, it becomes important also
to extend this analysis to the longer sample period. This is the topic of the following
sections, where every source of variation in results is separated by looking at one source
at the time: revision of time series and extension of the time period. Finally, the model
24
Chapter 2. The robustness of empirical models for unemployment. A review of Nickell
et al. (2005).
dynamics and institutions eﬀect on unemployment are investigated from a diﬀerent angle.
2.4 Empirical investigation
In this section the data generating process is investigated. I also explore if these changes
aﬀect the explanatory power of the changes in institutional variables on unemployment.
The starting point in section 2.4.1 is an attempt to replicate the main results in
NNO on the original data. Then, the empirical model in NNO is estimated on the revised
data on two sample periods 1960 to 1995 and 1960 to 2007 in section 2.4.2.
2.4.1 Replication of model 1 in table 5 in NNO
By using the original data set to replicate the empirical model presented in table 5 in
NNO 3 ensures that any diﬀerences in the results in NNO and in the results I will present
in the following, are due to changes in data revisions, deﬁnitions or sample length. The
estimation procedures and results in NNO are described in section 2.2.
I ﬁnd that the estimated coeﬃcients exactly replicates the coeﬃcient values in NNO,
cf. appendix 2.C, model A in table C1. In addition, a detailed visual inspection of the
dynamic simulation on the original data set with and without time-varying institutions
are also the same as in NNO. The replicated simulations are presented in appendix 2.C,
ﬁgure C1.
As the lagged unemployment rate enters among the regressors, the long run eﬀect
of a change in institutions diﬀers from the short run eﬀect. To ﬁnd the exact long run
eﬀect of changes in institutions in the period 1960s to 1990s, NNO compare the outcome
of a dynamic simulation with the actual development of the institutional variables with
dynamic simulation where the institutional variables are kept ﬁxed at their 1960s values
as described in section 2.2. To replicate their analysis, I also compare the outcome of a
dynamic simulation with changing institutions with the outcome of a dynamic simulation
where institutions are ﬁxed at the 1960s values. The results which diﬀer somewhat from
those of NNO, are presented in table 2 and are commented below. However, due to the
discrepancy between NNO and my results, I also calculate the long run eﬀect by a second
method. I compare the long run multiplier also used by Nickell and Nunziata (2002) p.19.
This method intends to capture the permanent eﬀect of a change in institutions by the
standard formulae; the value of the estimated coeﬃcient of the variable that represents
the institution multiplied by the change in the same variable and divided by one minus the
value of the estimated coeﬃcient of the lagged unemployment rate. For instance, the long
run multiplier for the change in employment protection is equal to 0.47 ∗ Δepl/(1 − θ).
Note that the two methods should not give the same results. The long run multiplier
3The data is received from Luca Nunziata.
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is intended to capture the total eﬀect of a change in the variables that represent the
institutions over an inﬁnite time period, and not the exact eﬀect of these variables to
unemployment in the limited time period 1960 to 1995. If institutional variables that
have a negative impact on unemployment have changed late in the sample period, the full
eﬀects will not yet have materialized within the sample period, and hence the formula
will exaggerate the eﬀect of institutions on unemployment.
Table 2: Eﬀects of institutions on unemployment in Europe. Original data set and the
estimated coeﬃcients in appendix 2.C, model A in table C1
Actual change in the unemployment rate and overall eﬀects of institutions:
Dynamic simulation Dynamic simulation Contribution of institutions to U:
Actual of U, all of U, all Dynamic simulation; Long run multiplierc;
Unemployment institutions institutions percentage share of percentage share of
(U) change: constant: points totald points totald
U¯a60−69 2.06 2.09 2.01
U¯ b90−95 8.86 9.16 4.60
U¯ b90−95 − U¯a60−69 6.80 7.07 2.59 4.48 0.66 5.23 0.77
Decomposition to speciﬁc institutions:
Dynamic simulation Dynamic simulation
of U, all of U, one type of Contribution of speciﬁc institutions to U:
institutions institution Dynamic simulation; Long run multiplierc;
change: constant: percentage share of percentage share of
U¯ b90−95 − U¯a60−69 U¯ b90−95 − U¯a60−69 points totale points totale
Constant:
Beneﬁts 7.07 3.77 3.30 0.74 3.73 0.71
Unions 7.07 7.16 -0.09 -0.02 0.47 0.09
Taxes 7.07 6.15 0.91 0.20 0.66 0.13
Empl. protection 7.07 6.71 0.36 0.08 0.37 0.07
Sum 4.48 1.00 5.23 1.00
a) U60−69 is the unweighted average of the unemployment rate, simulated or actual, in the period 1960 to 1969.
b) U90−95 is the unweighted average of the unemployment rate, simulated or actual, in the period 1990 to 1995.
c) The long run multiplier is calculated by the use of formula; βˆ∗ΔX1−θ with the actual change in the speciﬁc institution (X).
d) Share of total increase in unemployment in Europe.
e) Share of total increase in unemployment explained by institutions in Europe.
The upper panel in table 2 shows that the actual unweighted average unemployment
rate increased with 6.8 percentage points, from 2.06 to 8.86, in the period 1960s to 1990s
(U90−95 − U60−69), this is the same as in NNO. Table 2 upper panel also shows that in
the dynamic simulation with time-varying institutions, unemployment increases by 7.07
percentage points from 1960s to 1990s (U90−95−U60−69), while with constant institutions,
unemployment increases by 2.59 percentage points. Thus, changes in institutions can
explain 4.48 percentage points of the actual 6.8 percentage points increase in the unem-
ployment rate over the sample period, or 66 percent. The long run multiplier gives a
somewhat higher share, as changes in institutions account for 77 percent of the increase
in unemployment in Europe. The dynamic simulation method of calculating the contri-
bution from institutions to unemployment is higher than the reported results in NNO,
but lower than the long run multiplier method.
The lower panel in table 2 decomposes the contribution by the diﬀerent types of in-
stitutions. In the dynamic simulation where beneﬁts are kept constant, while the other
institutional variable vary over the sample, unemployment increased by 3.30 percentage
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points. When all institutions change, unemployment increased by 7.07 percentage points,
thus the increase in the beneﬁt replacement ratio contributes to 7.07− 3.77 = 3.30 of the
total increase by dynamic simulation of 4.48. Of this, the increase in replacement ratio
accounts for 74 percent, union variables (union density, coordination and interaction be-
tween the two union variables) −2 percent, tax variables (tax rate and the interaction
between the tax rate and coordination) 20 percent and employment protection 8 per-
cent. The decomposition eﬀects are diﬀerent from the contributions reported in NNO.
Especially, the eﬀect of beneﬁts is higher than the one reported in NNO. The long run
multiplier shows that the increase in the beneﬁt system accounts for 71 percent, unions
9 percent (coordination, union density and the interaction between these two variables),
taxes 13 percent (tax rate and interaction between coordination and taxes) and employ-
ment protection legislation 7 percent of the actual increase in the unemployment rate.
The decomposition on types of institutions is also here quite diﬀerent from that of NNO,
especially the eﬀect of the changes in the beneﬁt replacement ratio which accounts for 71
percentage points here versus 39 percentage points in NNO.
In sum: The replication of regression results has been successful with respect to ob-
taining the exact same coeﬃcients values and a close visual similarity in the dynamic
simulation with constant and time varying institutions as compared with NNO. The long
term eﬀects are somewhat diﬀerent, in spite of my attempt to use the same method as
they use. In the following I use the approach described above to compare the long run
eﬀects of institutions using the extended data set.
2.4.2 Estimation on the revised and extended data set
This section explores the eﬀect of data revisions and an extended sample length on the
results derived in the previous section. To isolate the eﬀect of data revision, I ﬁrst replicate
the results on the original sample period, and then extend the sample length.
The economic variables are revised after the publication of NNO. Generally the data
revisions are small. A comparison of the unemployment rate in table 1 with a similar
table in NNO show no clear pattern of the unemployment rates being revised up or
down since NNO presented their work. The largest increase in the unemployment rate
was in Sweden, where it is revised up with more than 1 percentage point for several
years in the sample. This revision was from a very low level implying a large relative
percentage increase. The unemployment rates are revised down in Belgium, Denmark,
Netherland, Spain and Switzerland throughout the period. The data revision ranges
from −0, 17 to −4, 59 percentage points, with the largest decrease in Spain. Some of the
decrease in the unemployment rate for Spain could be explained by that the time series
used here is from OECD (2008a) while NNO used a time series from International Labour
Organization (ILO). However, the revision in percentage is larger for instance for Belgium
and Switzerland in some years. See appendix 2.A for data details.
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The model in section 2.4.1 and data revisions
Figure 3 and table 3 present the estimated coeﬃcients of the model in NNO on the revised
data set over the time period from 1960 to 1995 4. The left panel of ﬁgure 3 illustrates
the estimated coeﬃcients on the revised data set divided by the replicated coeﬃcients in
appendix 2.C, model A in table C1. The value is equal to one if the coeﬃcient is equal in
both estimations. In general, the ﬁgure illustrates a reduced direct eﬀect of institutions
to unemployment on the revised data set, as most of the normalized coeﬃcient values
are smaller than one. In addition, a comparison of the left panel in table 3 with table
C1, model A, where the latter is found in appendix 2.C, not only shows that the eﬀects
of beneﬁt replacement ratio and coordination to unemployment are reduced, but they
are also outside the original conﬁdence interval. However, these estimated coeﬃcients
are still positive and signiﬁcant. The estimated direct eﬀects of employment protection,
beneﬁt duration and union density have changed sign, but are not signiﬁcant. All the
coeﬃcients of the interaction terms are reduced. Two of the shocks, money supply and
labour demand, have a stronger eﬀect on unemployment than previously reported. The
real interest rate, productivity and import price shock have a smaller eﬀect than previously
reported. The eﬀect of the real interest rate is no longer signiﬁcant.
Figure 3: Estimated coeﬃcients of equation (1) on the revised and extended data in table
3 divided by the original estimated coeﬃcients in appendix 2.C, in model A in table C1
(value 1 means identical estimate)
The changes in the values of the coeﬃcients indicate that the empirical speciﬁcation
is sensitive to small changes in the data set, i.e. to the revisions of the time series. This
may reduce the relevance of their results to other samples. Note also that the persistence
of unemployment in the previous period has increased in the empirical model from 0.86
to 0.90.
4Note however, that the revised data set includes 33 more observations than the original data set,
because missing observations due to missing data for shock variables are included by setting the shocks to
zero. The extra observations does not aﬀect the main picture. In addition, to obtain convergence in the
speciﬁed empirical model on the extended time period the time dummies are pooled for four more years,
i.e. in the period 1960 to 1969. The change does not lead to large changes in the estimated coeﬃcients
on the original data set, compare model A and B in table C1, where the latter is found in appendix 2.C.
28
Chapter 2. The robustness of empirical models for unemployment. A review of Nickell
et al. (2005).
Table 3: Estimation of model 1 in table 5 in NNO on the extended and revised data set
1960 to 2007 1960 to 1995
Coef. t-value min95 max95 Coef. t-value min95 max95
Unemployment previous period 0.90 65.64 0.88 0.93 0.89 45.66 0.86 0.93
Employment protection (EPL) 0.46 2.84 0.14 0.78 -0.13 -0.54 -0.58 0.33
Beneﬁt replacement ratio (BRR) 0.27 1.08 -0.22 0.77 0.98 2.91 0.32 1.64
Beneﬁt duration (BD) -0.06 -0.45 -0.29 0.18 -0.13 -0.77 -0.47 0.21
Interaction - BRR and BD 0.33 0.54 -0.88 1.55 0.19 0.23 -1.42 1.79
Interaction - CO and UDNET -2.08 -3.76 -3.16 -0.99 -2.42 -3.19 -3.91 -0.93
Interaction - CO and TAX -1.41 -1.56 -3.17 0.36 -2.98 -2.48 -5.34 -0.62
Union density, 1st diﬀ. (ΔUDNET ) 1.52 0.93 -1.67 4.70 -0.32 -0.18 -3.82 3.19
Coordination (CO) 0.00 0.02 -0.37 0.37 -0.29 -1.12 -0.81 0.22
Tax rate (TW) 1.67 2.52 0.37 2.97 1.37 1.70 -0.21 2.95
Labour demand shock -32.74 -16.67 -36.59 -28.89 -34.54 -14.84 -39.10 -29.98
Total factor productivity shock -4.44 -5.16 -6.13 -2.76 -3.87 -4.06 -5.73 -2.00
Money supply shock 0.53 2.27 0.07 0.98 0.64 2.48 0.13 1.15
Real interest rate 0.69 0.90 -0.81 2.19 0.13 0.14 -1.64 1.90
Import price shock 3.50 2.41 0.65 6.34 4.70 2.82 1.43 7.97
Total numb. of obs. 853 633
Time periods Numb. groups 45 20 33 20
Log likelihood -822 -656
χ2 of all exogenous variables 666757 565092
The aggregate long run eﬀects of institutions on unemployment are presented in the
upper panel of table 4. The results from the dynamic simulation with and without time-
varying institutions show that changes in institutions can explain 2.78 percentage points
of the 6.79 percentage points actual increase in the unemployment rate in Europe in the
time period 1960s to 1990s, i.e. 41 percent. The results from the long run multiplier eﬀect
of changes in institutions to unemployment is 55 percent.
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Thus, with revised data, the change in institutions explains a smaller share of the
increase in unemployment than with the original data set. Surprisingly, as the data now
diﬀers, the results are more in line with those reported by NNO.
The lower panel of table 4 shows the contribution of institutions on unemployment.
The dynamic simulation shows that the largest contributors to the increase in the sim-
ulated unemployment rate are the increase in taxes which accounts for 46 percent and
the increase in employment protection which accounts for 39 percent on the revised data.
The main contributors to increased unemployment by the long run multiplier method are
beneﬁts and taxes, which contribute with 60 percent and 63 percent. Changes in union
variables and employment protection decrease the unemployment rate in the period 1960s
to 1990s with −21 percent and −2 percent.
The model in section 2.4.1 and extended sample length
We now turn to the eﬀect of extending the sample period. The coeﬃcient estimates on
the extended time period are also divided by the original coeﬃcients in the right panel of
ﬁgure 3. We observe that all the institutional variables except for beneﬁt duration have
the same sign as the original coeﬃcients. The direct eﬀect of employment protection and
taxes have increased. The eﬀect of beneﬁt replacement ratio, the union variables and all
the interaction terms are reduced.
Table 3 summarises the estimated coeﬃcients and the related t-statistics. As seen
from the table, employment protection, taxes and the interaction term between the union
variables have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on unemployment in the extended time period.
For employment protection the signiﬁcance may reﬂect that increased variation due to
the extended time period have made it easier to capture the eﬀect on unemployment. The
beneﬁt and union variables no longer have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the unemployment rate.
By comparing the results in table 3 and the original estimates in appendix 2.C, in model
A table C1, the coeﬃcient estimates of employment protection, beneﬁt replacement ratio
and taxes are the only among the institutional variables that are within the original 95
percent conﬁdence interval. The coeﬃcients of labour demand shock and money supply
have increased and the latter is now also signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients for the other shocks
have decreased, but the eﬀects are still signiﬁcant.
It is interesting to look at the static and dynamic simulations of the model to inves-
tigate whether the values of the estimated coeﬃcients from the revised data set result in
a better ﬁt regarding changes in the actual unemployment rate and the contribution of
changes in institutions on unemployment.
In light of the considerable changes in the coeﬃcient estimates, one might expect that
the model would result in a bad ﬁt of unemployment, at least for the period 1960 to 1995.
However, it seems that the new coeﬃcients in a static simulation simulate unemployment
well over that period, see appendix 2.C, ﬁgure C2. One possible explanation is that
the model is quite ﬂexible because of time dummies and country speciﬁc trends, in the
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sense that the model can capture actual unemployment also with the new values of the
institutional and shock variables estimated on the revised data set. However, as mentioned
in section 2.3, the static simulation is conditional on the lagged unemployment rate, which
plays a large role in the simulation implying that static simulation is not a powerful way
to test the model. Thus, I also undertake a dynamic simulation.
The dynamic simulation of the estimated coeﬃcients from table 3 is presented in ﬁgure
4. The overall picture is that the estimated model on the revised and extended data set
simulates unemployment well for most countries in the sample, but not so good when
the unemployment rate increases sharply at one point in time, cf. for instance Belgium,
Canada, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. However, this seems to be the case also with
the dynamic simulation based on the original estimated coeﬃcients. The simulations of
the two empirical models are compared in ﬁgure 5. As seen from the ﬁgures, the original
empirical model in NNO has a better visual ﬁt for 10 countries as compared with the
empirical model on the extended and revised data set. The new model has a better visual
ﬁt for 6 countries.
The eﬀect of institutions is illustrated in ﬁgure 4. We observe that the simulation
using time varying institutions tracks actual unemployment quite well for most countries,
while the simulation with constant institutions quite often is far oﬀ the evolution of actual
unemployment. This suggests that changes in institutions still are important in explaining
the development of unemployment.
The long run eﬀect of institution is summarised in table 4. Based on the dynamic
simulation with constant and time-varying institutions, the upper panel shows that the
actual unemployment rate increased by 4.32 percentage points, from 2.04 to 6.36, in the
period 1960s to the average of the 2000 to 2007 (U00−07−U60−69). Changes in institutions
account for 76 percent of the increase in unemployment in Europe from 1960s to the 2000s
(U00−07 − U60−69). By using the formula for the long run multiplier, institutions account
for the same percentage share as the dynamic simulation, 76 percent. According to this
exercise, institutions explain a larger share of the increase in unemployment than for the
period 1960s to 1990s, and also a larger share than in NNO. Note however, that the
reason is that actual unemployment increased less. The increase in unemployment that
according to this analysis is due to changing institutions is actually lower for the longer
period until the 2000s.
The decomposed eﬀect of institutions on unemployment is presented in the lower panel
of table 4. The change in beneﬁts account for 12 percent, union variables 12 percent, taxes
53 percent, and employment protection for 24 percent of the increase in the unemployment
rate. The long run multiplier shows that the increase in the beneﬁt system accounts for
12 percent, unions 12 percent, taxes 63 percent, and employment protection legislation
for 13 percent of the actual increase in the unemployment rate. Overall, the two methods
for calculating long run eﬀects give rather similar results. When comparing the results for
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Figure 4: Dynamic simulation of equation (1) with constant and time-varying institutions
on the revised and extended data set. Coeﬃcients values from table 3 over the years 1960
to 2007. Percent
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Figure 5: Dynamic simulation of equation (1) with time-varying institutions. Coeﬃcient
values from table 3 “1960-2007” and from the original estimation in appendix 2.C, model
A in table C1. Percent
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the 1960s to the average of 1990 to 1995 (table 2), the eﬀects of beneﬁts have decreased
while the eﬀect of taxes and employment protection has increased.
The analysis has not revealed the reason for the underprediction of unemployment that
was found in section 2.4. However, a simulation of the unemployment rate seems to cap-
ture the development in actual unemployment also for the countries that has contributed
to the decline in the unweighed average, Australia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Spain and United Kingdom, exceptions might be Canada, Denmark,
Norway and United States. The estimated eﬀect of institutions still have the same direc-
tion of impact on unemployment. In fact, extending the sample suggests that some of the
previous critique towards NNO is perhaps less serious when using the extended sample.
For instance, Berger and Everaert (2008) claim that the cointegration of unemployment
and institutions is spurious due to a non-rejection of a unit root in unemployment. How-
ever, the unweighed average of the unemployment rate has fallen since 1995, and a similar
test on the extended data set would probably reject a unit root.
2.5 The dynamic speciﬁcation of the NNO model.
To sum up so far: The underprediction is not due to the development in the included
shock variables in NNO, as shown in appendix 2.B, ﬁgure B2. The data generating pro-
cess has changed somewhat in the extended sample period, as shown by the estimated
coeﬃcient values displayed in table 3, and also the change to the original estimated co-
eﬃcients as illustrated in ﬁgure 3. The new estimated coeﬃcient values do not lead to a
markedly better ﬁt in the dynamic simulation over the extended sample period, as com-
pared with the original coeﬃcient estimates. The accounting exercise shows that changes
in institutions can explain a large part of the actual change in unemployment similarly
to the results of NNO. In fact, the analysis for the extended period shows that changing
institutions account for a larger share of the increase in unemployment, but this is due to
the actual increase being smaller. In this section, I explore another possible explanation
for the underprediction, which is weaknesses in the dynamic speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst four
sections 2.5.1 to 2.5.4 reveal weaknesses of the heterogenous speciﬁcation of the model,
while 2.5.5 shows that the model has unstable dynamics even if the heterogenous error
term is neglected and the formal stability restrictions are met.
2.5.1 The solution of the full model
The empirical speciﬁcation of NNO imposes the same coeﬃcient values for all countries.
Literally speaking, the interpretation is that the eﬀect of, say, stricter employment pro-
tection on unemployment is the same in all countries. However, the speciﬁcation of
NNO also includes several country-speciﬁc terms, which leads to more ﬂexibility across
35
Chapter 2. The robustness of empirical models for unemployment. A review of Nickell
et al. (2005).
countries than one might expect given the assumption of common coeﬃcients. The het-
erogeneity in the structural part of the model is included “... to ensure that the estimated
coeﬃcients are not distorted by omitted trended variables in each country or common
shocks (NNO, page 15)”. The heterogeneity speciﬁed in the error term is justiﬁed by a
rejection of the joint hypothesis ρi = 0 for all countries in the panel (NNO, page 20). To
illustrate the eﬀect of the heterogenous lagged error term on the solution of the model for
unemployment, equation (1) can be rewritten as follows:
Uit = θUi,t−1 + βXit +αYit + γ1t + γ2i + γ3it+ vit (3)
where X is a vector consisting of the institutional variables and the interaction terms
in equation (1) and the vector β is the corresponding coeﬃcients. The vector Y represents
the shocks and the coeﬃcients in vector α.
Second, by multiplying equation (3) with (1 − ρiL) on both sides of this equation,
using that (1− ρiL)vit = εit deﬁned by equation (2), we obtain
(1− ρiL)Uit = θ(1− ρiL)Ui,t−1 + β(1− ρiL)Xit +α(1− ρiL)Yit
+(1− ρiL)γ1t + (1− ρiL)γ2i + (1− ρiL)γ3it+ it (4)
Equation (4) has a white noise error term, it. The equation can be organized as
follows
(1− (ρi + θ)L+ ρiθL2)Uit = β(1− ρiL)Xit +α(1− ρiL)Yit
+(1− ρiL)γ1t + (1− ρiL)γ2i + (1− ρiL)γ3it+ it (5)
Equation (5) highlights important features of the speciﬁcation used by NNO. The
equation implies a 2nd order dynamic in the solution for the unemployment rate. This
means that the stochastic process for the unemployment rate is an autoregressive moving
average process with exogenous variables. This has some implications for the stability
conditions and when using simulations to illustrate the ﬁt of the model. It also implies
that the estimated coeﬃcients depend on some restrictions.
Equation (5) reveals that even if the coeﬃcient vectors β and α by assumption are
common across all countries, the dynamic eﬀects of the explanatory variables will vary
across countries. For the dynamic eﬀects, the speciﬁcation imposes the same relationship
for all explanatory variables, but allows for variation among countries. To be concrete,
equation (5) implies that an increase in, say, employment protection has the same direct
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eﬀect on unemployment in all countries. However the eﬀect of lagged employment protec-
tion on unemployment will vary across countries, depending on the country speciﬁc value
of ρi. On the other hand, the relationship between short run and long run eﬀects of the
explanatory variables, eg. employment protection and the tax wedge, is assumed to be
the same within each country, also given by ρi. This is not discussed in NNO.
2.5.2 Stability
The stability conditions of the homogenous part of the model depend on the coeﬃcient
value |θ| < 1. This condition is met in NNO since θ = 0.86. However, the stability
conditions of both equation (1) and (2) can be divided into two parts; the stability of the
homogenous part of the equation, i.e. equation (1), and the stability of the full model, i.e.
equation (5). The second stability condition is not explored in NNO. It depends on the
roots of the lag polynomial of order 2 being outside the unit root circle or equivalently
that the corresponding characteristic polynomial lie inside the unit circle, see for instance
Sydsaeter (1994, Ch. 6.5).
Table 5 lists the stability conditions in terms of ρi’s to the solution of the estimated
model in NNO. The conditions are calculated by ﬁnding stability conditions of the 2nd
order diﬀerential equation in equation (5) with the estimated coeﬃcients in appendix
2.C, in model A in table C1. All roots of the characteristic equation are real roots. If the
values of the last three columns of table 5 are greater than zero, the 2nd order diﬀerential
equation (5) will be stable. As seen from the table, Japan, New Zealand and Portugal have
values lower than zero, implying that the stability conditions are not met. This means that
the eﬀect of the error term, for instance unspeciﬁed shocks, on unemployment increases
over time. New Zealand has positive autocorrelation in the error term. This means that
unemployment will increase or decrease steadily over time. Japan and Portugal have
negative autocorrelation in the error term. This means that the error term in one period
will increase unemployment but decrease unemployment in the next period. The positive
and the negative eﬀect of the error term to unemployment will increase over time.
Finally, note that an empirically unstable solution for unemployment is inconsistent
with the equilibrium theory of unemployment. The eﬀects are illustrated by a dynamic
simulation in the next section.
2.5.3 Dynamic simulation rewritten
The simulations in NNO are based on equation (1), but equation (5) illustrates that
the endogenous unemployment rate is also aﬀected by the value of ρi. A simulation of
equation (5) could give a more correct impression of how the model ﬁts the data and how
exogenous shocks not included in the empirical model will aﬀect the unemployment rate
in the long run.
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Table 5: The error term and stability restrictions of equation (5) and the estimated
coeﬃcients in appendix 2.C, model A in table C1
Stability
Country ρi a1 a2 Rot 1 Rot 2 1 + a1 + a2 > 0 1− a1 + a2 > 0 1− a2 > 0
Australia 0.39 -1.25 0.33 0.87 0.38 0.08 2.58 0.67
Austria -0.19 -0.67 -0.16 0.86 -0.19 0.16 1.51 1.16
Belgium -0.59 -0.27 -0.51 0.86 -0.59 0.22 0.76 1.51
Canada -0.33 -0.53 -0.29 0.86 -0.33 0.18 1.24 1.29
Denmark -0.49 -0.37 -0.42 0.86 -0.49 0.20 0.95 1.42
Finland -0.98 0.11 -0.84 0.86 -0.97 0.27 0.05 1.84
France 0.11 -0.98 0.10 0.86 0.11 0.12 2.08 0.90
Germany -0.34 -0.52 -0.30 0.86 -0.34 0.18 1.22 1.30
Ireland -0.21 -0.65 -0.18 0.86 -0.21 0.17 1.46 1.18
Italy -0.68 -0.19 -0.58 0.86 -0.67 0.23 0.61 1.58
Japan -1.11 0.25 -0.96 0.86 -1.11 0.29 -0.21 1.96
Netherlands -0.78 -0.08 -0.67 0.86 -0.78 0.25 0.41 1.67
Norway -0.43 -0.43 -0.37 0.86 -0.43 0.20 1.06 1.37
New Zealand 2.92 -3.78 2.51 2.92 0.86 -0.27 7.29 -1.51
Portugal -1.15 0.29 -0.99 0.86 -1.15 0.30 -0.28 1.99
Spain -0.95 0.08 -0.81 0.86 -0.94 0.27 0.11 1.81
Sweden -0.51 -0.35 -0.44 0.86 -0.51 0.21 0.91 1.44
Switzerland -0.70 -0.16 -0.61 0.86 -0.70 0.23 0.55 1.61
United Kingdom -0.41 -0.45 -0.36 0.86 -0.41 0.19 1.09 1.36
United States -0.35 -0.52 -0.30 0.86 -0.34 0.18 1.22 1.30
A dynamic simulation of equation (5) with the estimated coeﬃcient values in appendix
2.C, in model A table C1, is shown in ﬁgure 6 and in appendix 2.C, ﬁgure C3. The latter
ﬁgure illustrates a similar pattern as the original simulations in appendix 2.C, ﬁgure
C1 which were based on equation (1). This means that the eﬀect of the heterogeneity
in the error term on the simulations is small for a majority of countries. In contrast,
for the countries with unstable solutions discussed in section 2.5.2 above, the eﬀect of
the heterogenous error term increases over time. As seen from ﬁgure 6, the simulated
unemployment rate in New Zealand shows an explosive path. For Japan and Portugal
there is a negative autocorrelation, and for Portugal the positive and negative eﬀects
increase over time.
The simulations illustrate that the empirical model has an unstable solution for three
of the countries when the error term is seen as an integrated part of the econometric model
as in equation (5). The simulations illustrates the instability results for these countries
in table 5.
2.5.4 The heterogeneity and estimation method
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the coeﬃcients of both the lagged en-
dogenous variable and the exogenous variables in equation (5) implicitly depend on the
relationship between the current and lagged values of the variables included in the model.
The relationship between the current and lagged value of the included variables is the
same for all variables captured by the common factor (1−ρiL). One should note that the
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Figure 6: Simulations of equation (5). Estimated coeﬃcients in appendix 2.C, in model
A in table C1. Percent
feasible general least squares with ﬁxed eﬀects which is used to estimate the coeﬃcients,
normally results in a bias for the lagged endogenous variable. The bias occurs since the
value of the unemployment rate in the previous period per assumption is correlated with
the error term, see for instance Baltagi (2008, Ch. 8). Since both θ and ρi are estimated
jointly, a bias in the value of θ could possibly aﬀect the value of ρi and hence the value
of the coeﬃcients of the exogenous variables.
An equivalent procedure to the feasible general least squares estimation method used
by NNO, is to perform a within-transformation of equation (3), (Baltagi (2008, Ch. 3)):
Uit − L.U i. = θ(Ui,t−1 − L.U i.) + β(Xit − L.Xi.)+α(Yit − L.Y i.)
+(γ1t − γ1.) + γ3i(t− t) + (vit − L.vi.) (6)
Ui,t−1 − L.U i. is the unemployment rate in the previous period minus the average
sum of unemployment summed over all time periods up to period t − 2. This term is
correlated with vit−L.vi. by deﬁnition. Since θ is positive, this implies that the estimated
persistence will be underestimated. Since the error term is autocorrelated in the empirical
speciﬁcation and estimated jointly with the autoregressive parameter, the problem is even
more severe given the diﬃculty of deriving a consistent estimate of the AR parameters in
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that context.
If the estimated value of θ are biased, the ρi’s are probably biased too. Due to the
common factor described above, the estimated coeﬃcients of the explanatory variables
might also be aﬀected. In addition, if some of the regressors are correlated with the
lagged dependent variable to some degree, their coeﬃcients may be seriously biased for
this reason as well.
One solution to the bias problem that arises with the combination of an endogenous
lagged variable and country speciﬁc shifts, is to take 1st order diﬀerences of the original
model, see Baltagi (2008, Ch. 8). The 1st diﬀerence transformation removes the country
speciﬁc eﬀect. There is still a correlation between the diﬀerence lagged dependent variable
and the disturbance process (which now is a 1st order moving average, MA(1)), but now
an instrument variable is available. This is true even if the vit follows an AR(1) process.
In the model described in NNO the error term follows an AR(1) process.
Uit − Uit−1 = θ(Ui,t−1 − Uit−2) + β(Xit −Xit−1)+α(Yit − Yit−1)
+(γ1t − γ1t−1) + γ3i(t− (t− 1)) + (vit − vit−1) (7)
since (γ1t − γ1t−1) = γ1t and t− (t− 1)) = 1 the equation can be reduced to
Uit − Uit−1 = θ(Ui,t−1 − Uit−2) + β(Xit −Xit−1)+α(Yit − Yit−1)
+γ1t + γ3i + (vit − vit−1) (8)
One way to use the 1st diﬀerence approach on the speciﬁed model in section 2.2 is
to assume a second order dynamic equation (according to the dynamics in the rewritten
equation (5)) with or without heterogenous error terms.
However, one should be aware of that the bias caused by the endogenous lagged
variable and the ﬁxed eﬀect decreases with a increase in the sample period, see Judson
and Owen (1999). The ﬁxed eﬀect bias on OECD panel data is also discussed in Nymoen
and Sparrman (2010).
2.5.5 The dynamics of the homogenous part of the empirical
model in NNO
The diﬀerence between the simulated and the actual value apparent in ﬁgure 2 of unem-
ployment is still not found. It is therefore interesting to check if some of the diﬀerence
could be explained by the dynamics of the speciﬁed model in NNO.
Figure 7 shows the simulated unemployment rate out of sample for the dynamic part
of the equation, which means that only the lagged unemployment rate, the trend and the
ﬁxed eﬀects are included in the simulation. The ﬁgure illustrates that the unemployment
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Figure 7: Dynamic simulation of U˜it = θˆU˜i,t−1 + γˆ2i + γˆ3it on the revised and extended
data set. Coeﬃcient estimates from appendix 2.C, model A in table C1, over the years
1960 to 2037. Percent
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rate out of sample is largely driven by this dynamics, where only New Zealand seems
to have a stable path for the rate of unemployment. Thus, the large underprediction
seems to be the result of unstable dynamics. Stable dynamics is essential for the ability
to predict a stationary time series such as unemployment by simulation.
2.6 The eﬀect of changes in labour market institu-
tions
In view of the strong and in some cases erratic eﬀects of the dynamic speciﬁcation of NNO,
it is useful to explore the eﬀect of the institutional variables on the rate of unemployment
by other methods. In this section, I explore the predicted change in the rate of unem-
ployment from the NNO model, taking into account only the changes in the institutional
variables. More speciﬁcally, for each country I compute the change in unemployment
that follow from the change in the institutional variables from 1995 to the 5 year average
in the period 2002 to 2007 (2007s hereafter), as measured by long run multiplier using
the coeﬃcient estimates in appendix 2.C, in model A in table C1. Table 6 presents the
results for all countries put together, but viewing one institutional variable at the time.
We see from line 1 that on average, employment protection legislation has become some-
what less strict, with a reduction in the average index value of 0.10. Given the estimated
coeﬃcients, this should lead to a long run reduction of the rate of unemployment of 0.11
percentage points. The long run eﬀect of the change in all institutional variables from
1995 to 2007s is an increase in unemployment of 1.28 percentage points, cf. the last row
in table 6. In contrast, actual unemployment fell by 2.3 percentage points over the same
period.
At ﬁrst thought, the diﬀerence between the predicted increase and actual fall in un-
employment does not look good for the predictive power of the NNO model. However,
by matching separate computations for each country, calculating the predicted change in
unemployment due to changes in all the institutional variables for the country, a more
ﬂattering picture emerges. Figure 8 displays a cross plot of the predicted change in un-
employment due to institutional changes and the actual change in unemployment, for
all European countries and for the whole sample. The positive relationship is clear, and
the slope is estimated to be 0.4; is signiﬁcant at a 5 percent level if Ireland is treated as
an outlier (signiﬁcant at a 10 percent level if the slope is estimated on the whole sam-
ple). This is a fairly strong positive correlation, and 9 out of 14 countries are in the
predicted quadrants (ie. upper right or lower left). In particular Denmark and Finland
have changed their labour market institutions in a way that should give lower unemploy-
ment, and these countries also experienced a large reduction in actual unemployment. In
contrast, Germany and Portugal have changed their institutions in the opposite direc-
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tion, and unemployment has increased. The positive correlation suggest that changes in
institutions do explain an important part of the changes in unemployment. However, as
compared to an upward sloping 45◦ degree line through origin, which would prevail in the
hypothetical case where the model were correct and no other changes took place, we also
observe three discrepancies. First, the observations are too low, indicating that unemploy-
ment has fallen for other reasons. A likely reason is the fairly positive overall evolution
of most OECD economies over this period, with considerable growth of GDP. Second, we
observe two notable outliers, Ireland and Spain, which have experienced a large reduction
in unemployment in spite of the adverse change in labour market institutions. Given the
subsequent sharp deterioration of the Spanish and Irish economies, it seems reasonable to
explain part of the reduction in unemployment as caused by unsustainable overheating of
the economy. Adjusting for this would make these countries more in line with the other
countries. Third, we observe that the slope is less steep than 45◦. However, one should
remember that while the ﬁgure is based on long run eﬀects, the full impact of institutional
changes late in the sample period will not be reaped in 2007, implying that the ﬁgure
in fact may exaggerate somewhat the predicted eﬀect of the institutional variables. Note
also that the scale of the induced change in unemployment, calculated by the long run
multiplier, depends crucially on the estimated value of the lagged unemployment rate
coeﬃcient. As discussed above, this value could be biased, and vary between countries if
the heterogeneity is taken into account. This means that the total eﬀect of institutions,
and general validity of institutions eﬀects on unemployment should be interpreted with
care.
Table 6: The predicted eﬀect on unemployment calculated using actual changes in insti-
tutions from 1995 to 2002-07 and the estimated coeﬃcients in appendix 2.C, model A in
table C1
Contribution of
Actual change institutions to U
Coeﬃcient values in institution X; The long run multiplierb:
from table C1 ΔX = percentage share of
Institutional variable X: in appendix 2.C X¯a07−02 −X95 points totalc
Employment protection (EPL) 0.15 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09
Beneﬁt replacement ratio (BRR) 2.21 0.02 0.36 0.28
Beneﬁt duration (BD) 0.47 0.12 0.41 0.32
Interaction BRR and BD 3.75 0.00 0.08 0.06
Interaction CO and UDNET -6.98 -0.01 0.56 0.44
Interaction CO and TW -3.46 0.01 -0.37 -0.29
Union density, 1st. diﬀ. (ΔUDNET ) 6.99 0.01 0.28 0.22
Coordination (CO) -1.01 0.04 -0.30 -0.23
Tax rates (TW ) 1.51 0.03 0.37 0.29
Sum 1.28 1.00
a) X¯07−02 is the average level of the institutional variable in the period 2002 to 2007.
b) The long run multiplier is calculated by the use of formula;
βˆ∗ΔX
1−θ with the actual change in the speciﬁc institution (X).
c) Share of total increase in unemployment rate induced by changes in institutions.
Table 7 shows the decomposition of the predicted eﬀect on unemployment to speciﬁc
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Figure 8: The predicted change in unemployment is calculated by the long run multiplier,
using the formula; βˆ∗ΔX
1−θ with the actual change in the speciﬁc institution (X) from 1995
to 2002-07. The changes in institutions are calculated on the revised and extended data
set, and β and θ are the estimated coeﬃcients in appendix 2.C, in model A in table C1
Table 7: The predicted eﬀect on unemployment by each institutional variable calculated
using the actual changes in institutions from 1995 to 2002-07 and the estimated coeﬃcients
in appendix 2.C, in model A in table C1
Beneﬁt Beneﬁt BRR CO CO Union Tax
Empl. repl. duration and and and density Coord. rate
Country prot. (BRR) (BD) BD UDNET TW (ΔUDNET ) (CO) TW Tot
Austria -0.1 1.4 0.1 0.7 3.6 -0.3 -0.3 0 0.1 5.2
Belgium -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 0.2 -2.4
Denmark 0 -0.5 -0.3 -1.2 -3.2 -1.3 -0.2 -1.8 0.4 -8.2
Finland -0.1 -5.1 0.9 -1.3 0.7 -0.1 -0.4 0 0.1 -5.1
France 0 0.6 0.4 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 1.6
Germany -0.3 0.3 0.7 -0.1 3.6 -0.2 0.2 0 0.1 4.3
Ireland 0.1 0.6 0 0.4 5 -1.6 4 0 0.7 9.2
Italy -0.6 8.1 1.4 -3.2 2 -2.2 0.3 -2 0.9 4.5
Netherlands -0.2 0.2 0.6 1.4 -0.2 0 -0.2 0 0.3 1.9
Norway 0 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.6 -0.2 0.2 0 0.2 2.1
Portugal -0.1 0.8 0.9 2.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0 0.7 4.2
Spain 0 -0.2 0.2 0.5 0 0.1 0.5 0 0.8 1.9
Sweden -0.1 -1.1 0 0.7 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 0 0.6 -0.5
Switzerland 0 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.3 -0.1 0 0 0.2 2.6
UK 0 -0.5 0.4 -0.9 -2.2 0.4 1 0 0.2 -1.5
Total -0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.6 -0.4 0.3 -0.3 0.4 1.3
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institutions for the European countries in the sample. Increases in the beneﬁt system
for the unemployed workers and increases in unions density are the largest contributors
to the predicted increase in unemployment. Reduction in employment protection and
increase in coordination among the wage setters have lowered the predicted increase in
unemployment. The table also reveals the large variation in the institutional development
among the countries in the sample.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper has replicated and assessed the model of Nickell et al. (2005). Speciﬁcally, I
use the replicated model to predict unemployment out of sample, beneﬁtting from twelve
additional years of data. The dynamic simulation reveals that the model in Nickell et al.
(2005) is not useful to forecast the evolution of the unemployment rate in the post-
estimation period as it delivers a severe underprediction of the change in unemployment.
For most countries, the underprection is reduced, although still quite large, when
taking the change in institutions into account. This is the case for Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Por-
tugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. For Ireland, there is no diﬀerence between simulated
unemployment rate with constant and time-varying institutions. For other countries,
Finland, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, the ﬁt to the
actual unemployment rate worsens when taking the change in institutions into account.
I then explore possible explanations for the underprediction. One obvious candidate
is that the shocks that are included as explanatory variables in the empirical model
have evolved diﬀerently in the post sample period and caused underprediction of the
unemployment rate. However, the results of a simulation with variation in the shock
variable and a simulation where the shock variables are set to zero in the post sample
period, shows nearly no eﬀect of the shocks in the extended period, with Japan and Italy
being the only exceptions.
Another possible explanation for the underprediction could be that the the data gen-
erating process has changed over time. This might be in line with some of the earlier
critique, which have argued that there have been limited possibilities to detect plausible
eﬀects of institutions to unemployment due to short time series (Belot and van Ours,
2004). In order to investigate this possible explanation, the model in Nickell et al. (2005)
was reestimated on the revised and extended data set. The reestimation showed that
the size of the coeﬃcients changed quite substantially both on the revised data set and
on the extended time period. However, dynamic simulation does not give a better ﬁt
with the reestimated coeﬃcients than with original ones, even for the extended sample
period, suggesting that changes in the coeﬃcient values is not the key explanation for the
underprediction.
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The model dynamics have been investigated to detect if this is the cause of the under-
prediction in the post sample period on the original data set. A dynamic simulation of the
full model, when the error term is explicitly taken into account, reveals that the model is
non stationary for some countries. This is veriﬁed by the roots of the 2nd order diﬀerential
equation that is implied by the model in Nickell et al. (2005). The results suggest a re-
consideration of the dynamic speciﬁcation of the model. Especially since the underlying
solution to the speciﬁed model implies a 2nd order dynamics in the unemployment rate.
However, this is not the main cause of the underprediction of the unemployment rate, as
most of the countries have a stable solution of the model. Instead it turns out that the
underprediction of the unemployment rates is largely driven by the dynamic speciﬁcation
of the model, where the combination of the large coeﬃcient for the lagged unemployment
rate, the trend and the ﬁxed eﬀects, implies a tendency for unemployment to diverge in
one direction or the other. This implies that forecasting a stationary time series as the
unemployment rate is impossible.
One could argue that the model in Nickell et al. (2005) was developed to explore the
link between institutions and unemployment and not to predict unemployment. What
about the link between institutions and unemployment, which was the main topic of
interest for Nickell et al. (2005)? Repeating their analysis of the long run eﬀect of changes
institutions for the extended sample period for the European countries, I ﬁnd that changes
in institutions now account for 76 percent of the total change in unemployment from the
1960s to 2002-2007, up from 41 percent in my replication of their results over the shorter
time period until 1990-1995. At face value, this might suggest that institutions have
become more important. However, the interpretation is less clear cut. First, the larger
share reﬂects that unemployment increased less over the longer period, so there is less
to explain. More importantly, looking only at the eﬀect of the change in institutions,
this would actually predict that unemployment increased by 1.3 percentage points over
the period 1995 to 2002-2007, while actual unemployment instead fell by 2.3 percentage
points. Thus, the sign in this aggregate relationship is wrong.
However, taking into account country variation, a diﬀerent picture emerges. There is
a clear tendency that countries which have changed their institutions in an “employment-
friendly” way, like Denmark and Finland, have experienced a larger reduction (or smaller
increase) in unemployment than the countries that have changed their institutions in the
opposite direction, like Germany and Portugal. This is a clear indication that labour
market institutions aﬀect unemployment in the direction found by Nickell et al. (2005),
even if the large underprediction of unemployment for the majority of the countries shows
that their model is unable to account for the overall evolution of the rate of unemployment.
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2.A The Data: Deﬁnitions and sources
This appendix contains information about variables that are important for the evolution
of the unemployment rate in 20 OECD countries. The countries in the sample are:
Australia Finland Japan Spain
Austria France Netherlands Sweden
Belgium Germany Norway Switzerland
Canada Ireland New Zealand United Kingdom
Denmark Italy Portugal United States
The variables are collected in two data bases. The ﬁrst data base contains the original
data set from Nickell et al. (2005) and contains observations from 1960 to 1995. The
deﬁnitions are as given in the appendix in Nickell et al. (2005). The second data base,
referred to as the revised and extended data set hereafter, contains revised and extended
time series for the same variables as the original data set. The sources of the second data
base is OECD (2002), OECD (2006), OECD (2008b), OECD (2008a) and Nickell (2006).
The revised and extended data set follows the set up in Nickell et al. (2005) where
the variables are divided into two groups; economic variables described in section 2.A.1
and institutional variables described in section 2.A.2. The extended at revised data set
contains observations from 1960 to 2007.
2.A.1 Economic variables
The economic variables are available at a yearly frequency in OECD (2008a)5 and missing
observations are replaced with observations from earlier data bases OECD (2002), OECD
(2006) and OECD (2008b).6
U: Unemployment rate
The standardized unemployment rate (UNR) in Economic Outlook OECD (2008a) is
used as a primary data source for the unemployment rate in the OECD countries, and
missing observations are replaced by the growth rate in a corresponding time series in an
earlier data base, OECD (2002). Australia, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Switzerland
are prolonged by the formula in equation (A1):
Yit = Yit+1 ∗ Xit
Xit+1
(A1)
where Yit denotes (UNR) in OECD (2008a) and Xit denotes the (UNR) in the earlier
data base OECD (2002) for country i in time period t.
5Data are collected and organized by the author. This implies that neither OECD nor any other
source is responsible for the analysis or the interpretation of the data in this paper.
6An comprehensive overview of data and data sources are available upon request.
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Figure A1: Actual unemployment. Revised and extended data set over the years 1960 to
2007. Percent
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Australia and Denmark are prolonged ﬁve years backwards. Germany from 1991,
Spain from 1976, Switzerland from 1969 and backwards.
The revised and extended data set has one less observation for Spain in 1960 than the
data base from Nickell et al. (2005).
RIRL: Real interest rate
The real interest rate is calculated in two steps from the nominal interest rate and the
consumer price index. First, inﬂation is calculated by the change in the time series for
consumer price index as in equation (A2). Then, the real interest rate is deﬁned as the
nominal interest rate minus the inﬂation rate as in equation (A3).
πit = 100 ∗ ΔCPIit
CPIit−1
(A2)
Inﬂation for country i in time period t, πit, is the diﬀerence between the price level this
period, CPIit, minus the price level previous period, CPIit−1, divided by the price level
previous period. The real interest rate, rit, is then calculate by subtracting the inﬂation
rate from the long term nominal interest rate, IRLit,.
rit =
IRLit − πit
100
(A3)
The main source for the long term nominal interest rate on government bonds, IRL,
and the consumer price index, CPI is OECD (2008a). CPI for United Kingdom is from
OECD (2006) with the last observation is in 2008. CPI for Spain is from OECD (2007)
with the last observation is in 2009. For Germany before 1991, CPI is prolonged with the
growth rate in the same time series in data base OECD (2002), by equation (A1) where
Y is CPI in OECD (2008a) and X is CPI in OECD (2002). Note that the base year
in CPI varies between countries and data bases. The base year is however not important
since we are only interested in the price growth.
The missing observations in the nominal interest rate for Germany are replaced by the
growth rate in IRL in OECD (2002) by equation (A1) where Y is IRL in OECD (2008a)
and X is CPI in OECD (2002).
Compared with the real interest rate in the original data set in Nickell et al. (2005): 1
observation in 1969 is missing for Australia. One observation in 1960 for France, Germany,
Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and United States is missing. The years 1960 to 1970 are
missing for Ireland. Observations for the years 1960 to 1961 are missing for Netherlands.
Finally the years 1961 to 1969 are missing for New Zealand.
PROD hp: Productivity shock
Productivity shocks are measured by the diﬀerence between actual productivity and the
productivity trend. Productivity trend is calculated by a Hodrick Prescott ﬁlter of log
real gross domestic product, minus log of total employment. The trend is deﬁned by
equation (A4):
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PROD hpt = HPtrend[log(GDPVt)− log(ETt)] (A4)
where GDPV is real gross domestic product and ET total employment.
The main source for both variables the real gross domestic product and total employ-
ment are GDPV and ET in OECD (2008a). Missing observations in Denmark, Germany
and Switzerland for GDPV are replaced by observations in OECD (2002) adjusted by
diﬀerences in mean and slope in the time series as in equation (A5).
Y 1it = Y 1it+1 ∗ (X1it ∗ bi + ai)
(X1it+1 ∗ bi + ai) (A5)
where Y 1 is GDPV in OECD (2008a), X1 is GDPV in OECD (2002), and ai and bi
are the estimated coeﬃcients from a regression between the two time series for country
i. The regression reveals signiﬁcant diﬀerences in both coeﬃcients for most countries. ai
is the average diﬀerence in level and bi the average diﬀerence in slope between the two
series for country i.
The missing observations for ET in Australia before 1964, Denmark before 1966,
Germany before 1991 and Switzerland before 1970 are replaced by the formula in equation
(A1) where Y is ET from OECD (2008a) and X is ET from in OECD (2002).
LDS: Labour demand shock
Labour demand shocks are deﬁned as the residuals, ˆt, from the following regression:
log(ETit) = β0 + β1log(ETit−1) + β2log(ETit−2) + β3log(ETit−3)
+β4log(GDPVit) + β5log(wit) + it (A6)
where ET is total employment and GDPV is real gross domestic product as the
variables deﬁned under the productivity shock above. w is labour cost and deﬁned by
equation (A7).
w = log(IE)− log(ET )− log(PGDP ) (A7)
where, IE is compensations of employees, ET is total employment and PGDP is gross
domestic product deﬂator at market prices.
The data source of the variable ET are described in the previous section, i.e. produc-
tivity shocks.
The main data source for compensations of employees is IE in OECD (2008a), but
the main source is IE in OECD (2006) for New Zealand and contains observations from
1986 to 2008. Compensations of employees is prolonged in Austria before 1964, Germany
before 1991, Norway in the period 1962 to 1974, New Zealand in the period 1971 to 1986
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and Switzerland before 1990 by the formula in equation (A5), where Y 1 is IE in OECD
(2008a) and X1 is IE in OECD (2002).
The main data source for PGDP is OECD (2008a). The deﬂator is prolonged back-
ward in Denmark before 1966, France before 1993, Germany before 1991 and Switzerland
before 1966 by equation (A1) where Y is the PGDP in OECD (2008a) and X is the
PGDP in OECD (2002) when observations are missing.
Note also that the deﬂator used here is diﬀerent from the GDP deﬂator at factor costs
used in the original data set. It could be argued that this deﬂator is more consistent,
since the variable IE includes the eﬀect of value added tax.
Compared with the original data set, there are still some observations missing for the
labour demand shock. The missing observations are replaced by the shocks in Nickell et al.
(2005) for Canada in 1960, Denmark in 1960 to 1965, France in 1960 to 1962, Norway
1960 to 1962, New Zealand 1960 to 1971 and Portugal in the period 1960 to 1982.
d2MS: Acceleration in money supply
Acceleration in money supply is equal to the second diﬀerence of the money supply Δ2MS.
The main source for money supply is MONEY S in OECD (2008a). Observations
for MONEY S in Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Uk and Sweden are from
OECD (2008b). Time series for MONEY S in Denmark, Spain and Switzerland are from
OECD (2006). MONEY S from OECD (2008a) and OECD (2008b) are ﬁrst prolonged
backwards with the growth rate in MONEY S in OECD (2006) when diﬀerences in mean
and slope is adjusted for as in equation (A5). Then, the prolongedMONEY S from OECD
(2008a), OECD (2008b) and OECD (2006) are prolonged backwards with the growth rate
in MONEY S in OECD (2002) when diﬀerences in mean and slope is adjusted for as in
equation (A5).
Still, there are some missing observations. The missing observations are therefore
replaced backwards with the shocks in the original data set: Belgium in the period 1962
to 1970, Canada in the period 1962 to 1969, Denmark in the period 1962 to 1965, Finland
in the period 1962 to 97, France in the period 1962 to 1978, Germany in the period 1962
to 1970, Italy in the period 1962 to 1976, New Zealand in the period 1962 to 1966, Spain
in the period 1962 to 1964 and United Kingdom in the period 1962 to 1964.
TTS: Terms of trade shock
Terms of trade shock is calculated by the change in the import price deﬂator relative to
the real GDP deﬂator at market prices multiplied with the share of imports to GDP. The
following equation (A8) calculates the shocks:
TTS =
MGS
GDP
Δ{ln(PMGS
PGDP
)} (A8)
MGS is imports at current prices, GDP is GDP at current prices, PMGS is import
price deﬂator and PGDP is the real GDP deﬂator at market prices described under labour
demand shock.
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The sources of the time series for PGDP are previously described under labour de-
mand shock. The main source for import price deﬂator and GDP at current prices is
PMGS and GDP in OECD (2008a). GDP and PMGS in OECD (2002) is used to
prolong the variables from OECD (2008a) backwards when observations are missing by
equation (A5).
The replaced observations for GDP and PMGS are Denmark before 1966, Germany
before 1991 and Switzerland before 1965. MGS in OECD (2002) prolongs the time series
for Denmark before 1966, Germany before 1991 and Switzerland before 1965 by equation
(A5).
2.A.2 Structural variables
New information for institutional variables is available every second or ﬁfth year. The
main data source is OECD (2004), but due to missing observation some data are collected
from Nickell (2006). The time series are replaced by data from other sources when obser-
vations are missing. The variables and the method for prolonging are discussed in detail
in the next sections.
TW: Tax wedge
The rates described here are calculated from actual tax payments. The total tax wedge is
equal to the sum of the employment tax rate (t1), the direct tax rate (t2) and the indirect
tax rate (t3), as given in equation (A9).
TW = t1 + t2 + t3 (A9)
t1 is equal to employers total wage costs calculated by the sum of wages received by
employees and taxes payed by the employer to the government. This gives the following
relationship; t1 = SSRG/(IE − SSRG), where SSRG is social security contributions
and IE is compensation to employees. The latter consist of two main components, wages
and salaries and social contributions. Social contributions are payed by the employers to
social security schemes or private funded social insurance schemes. t2 are direct taxes
payed by the households (TAXh) divided by current receipts of households (CRh), i.e.
t2 = TAXh/CRh. Finally t3 = (TAXind − SUB)/Cp, where TAXind are net indirect
taxes, SUB is the value of subsidies and Cp is the value of private ﬁnal consumption
expenditure.
The main data source for tax wedges is OECD (2008c) which contains information for
the period 1960 to 2010. The latter years are predictions. The tax rates are calculated by
the above formulas, and when a tax rate is missing, the growth rate in the same tax rate
but from the data base of Nickell (2006) in the period 1960 to 2003 is used to prolong
the time series for the following countries: Belgium is prolonged before 1965, Denmark is
prolonged before 1966, Germany before 1970, Portugal is prolonged in the period 1960 to
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1995 and Switzerland is prolonged before 1990 with the tax rates in OECD (2008c). Tax
rates for Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States are not prolonged
and are taken directly from the main data source OECD (2008c). New Zealand has the
main data source Nickell et al. (2005) due to missing observations, and before 1975 the
growth rate in the sum of t1 and t2 from the source Nickell (2006) are used to prolonged
the time series backwards. The tax series for New Zealand is then prolonged forward
with the growth rate in t3 from source Nickell (2006) after 1986. Note also that the t3 is
interpolated due to one missing observation in 1991.
BRR: Beneﬁt replacement rates
The beneﬁt replacement ratio is a measure of how much each unemployed worker receives
in beneﬁts from the government. The beneﬁt replacement ratio is described in detail
below.
The detailed rate for unemployment beneﬁts divides data in three diﬀerent family
types: single, with a dependent spouse and with a working spouse. The beneﬁts also
depend on the employment situation: 67 percent and 100 percent of the average earnings.
Within these groups, beneﬁts are divided into the duration of beneﬁts when being unem-
ployed. One variable for how much each of the former groups receives in the ﬁrst year,
the second and third year and the fourth and ﬁfth year. The indexes used in this paper
uses the indexes aggregated over over family types. This results in six diﬀerent groups:
brr67a1, brr67a2, brr67a4, brr100a1, brr100a2 and brr100a4.
brr67a1: First year beneﬁt replacement rate for workers with 67 percent of average
earnings and the average over family types.
brr67a2: Beneﬁt replacement for the second and third year. 67 percent of average
earnings and the average over family types.
brr67a4: Beneﬁt replacement rate for the fourth and ﬁfth year. 67 percent of average
earnings and the average over family types.
brr100a1, brr100a2 and brr100a4: The same as the former but for 100 percent of
average earnings.
The average of brr67a1 and brr100a1 is used as an indicator of beneﬁt replacement
ratios, i.e. BRR.
The main source for the more detailed beneﬁt ratios is tables in employment outlook,
see OECD (2004). Observations are provided every second year from 1961 to 2001. The
time series are interpolated over the years, and extracted by the last known observation.
BD: Beneﬁt duration
Beneﬁt duration is a measure of how long the beneﬁts last when being unemployed.
The ratio is calculated by the time series described under beneﬁt replacement ratio, by
equation (A10).
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BDjit = α
brrja2it
brrja1it
+ (1− α)brrja4it
brrja1it
(A10)
where α = 0.6, j = {67, 100}, i = 1, 2...20 and t = 1960, 1961...2007. brrja1it is the
beneﬁt replacement rate in year 1, brrja2it is the beneﬁt replacement rate in year 2 and
3, and ﬁnally brrja4it is beneﬁt replacement rate in year 4 and 5. α = 0.6 gives more
weight to the second and third year as compared to the fourth and ﬁfth year. The index
is calculated for both employment situations, i.e. j = 67 percent and j = 100 percent of
average earnings.
If beneﬁt duration stops after one year, then brr67a2 = brr67a4 = 0, and BD67 = 0.
If beneﬁt provision is constant over the years, then brr67a1 = brr67a2 = brr67a4, and
BD67 = 1. However, some countries increase payments over time and the value of beneﬁt
duration is above one.The average of bd67it and bd100it is used as an indicator of beneﬁt
duration, i.e. BDit.
UDNET: Union density
Union density rates are mainly constructed using the number of Union memberships
divided by the number of employed, see Visser (2009).
The database Nickell (2006) contains additional information for Sweden before 1975
and Ireland in 1960. The time series for Sweden in the latter source is ﬁrst interpolated
and the growth rate is calculated to prolong the original time series from Visser (2009).
It is the ﬁrst diﬀerence in union density that is used in the regressions in the paper,
ΔUDNET .
By comparing the time series with the original data set in Nickell et al. (2005), some
observations are still missing. The time series, ΔUDNET are extended by splicing in data
from Nickell et al. (2005). The countries are: Australia before 1965, Austria before 1969,
New Zealand before 1972, Portugal in 1975 and 1977, Spain before 1982 and Sweden
before 1964. The time series are dividing by 100 to achieve comparable results to the
database in Nickell et al. (2005).
The intersection terms between union density and coordination are prolonged by last
known observation for these countries.
CO: Coordination of wage setting
The index for coordination of wage setting describes the coordination level in the wage
setting. The index range from 1 to 3, and the most coordinated countries have index
equal to 3.
The main source is Nickell et al. (2005). The time series are prolonged by the growth
rate in the index for coordination in Nickell (2006).
EPL: Employment protection
A measure of the overall employment protection is found in Nickell (2006). Strictness of
employment protection is increasing in scale in the range 0 to 2. Se appendix in Nickell
(2006) for data deﬁnitions, sources and more details.
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The time series exists in the period 1960 to 2003. The time series are prolonged
backwards and forward by last known observation.
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2.B Appendix
This appendix gives additional information to the dynamic simulation of the unemploy-
ment rate in section 2.3. The dynamic simulation explores to what extent the empirical
model of Nickell et al. (2005) is able to forecast the subsequent post-sample evolution of
unemployment, given that we now in general know the correct values of the explanatory
variables. The model is evaluated by use of static and dynamic simulation of unemploy-
ment for twelve additional years of data. The model does very well in a static simulation.
However, as the static simulation is conditional on the lagged unemployment rate, which
plays a large role in the model, the static simulation may not give the right impression
about the model’s out of sample explanatory power. For this reason, the results from the
static simulation and some additional dynamic simulations that don’t change the main
result of the dynamic analysis in section 2.3 are in this appendix, and not in the main
text.
In general, the sample period is extended by using the time series for the institutional
variables available up to 2003, except for taxes that are available up to 2007, and the time
series for the macro variables that are available up to 2007. See appendix 2.A for details
regarding the extended and revised data set. The time dummies are set to zero in the
simulations. The time trend is either extended or set equal to the average value of the
trend and the estimated coeﬃcient from the original data set is used in the simulations.
The simulations are also robust to diﬀerent time dummies extensions: Prolong the time
dummies by the last estimated observation or prolong the times dummies by the estimated
average of the time dummies (the results are not reported in this paper).
2.B.1 Static simulation of unemployment by using the model in
Nickell et al. (2005) on the extended time period 1995 to
2007
The static simulation method simulates unemployment by the empirical model as speciﬁed
in Nickell et al. (2005), one year ahead out of sample. Within sample period has T periods.
This means that we use all available information up to last period, T + t− 1, to simulate
the unemployment rate this period, T + t,Clements and Hendry (1998, Ch. 2.7).
Formally, the static simulated unemployment rate for country i can be written as
U˜ si,T+t = E(Ui,T+t|Ui,T+t−1,Xi,T+t, β̂), where Ui,T+t−1 is the actual unemployment rate for
country i in period T + t− 1, Xi,T+t is a vector that contains all explanatory variables for
country i in period T + t 7 and βˆ is a vector with all the within sample period estimated
7The vector contains mostly actual values of the explanatory variables, but it also contains some
predictions for some of the institutions in the period 2001-7, see appendix 2.A for details regarding time
periods for the diﬀerent variables.
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coeﬃcients as given in Nickell et al. (2005)f˙ootnoteThe country speciﬁc dummies are taken
from the replication in section 2.4.1 The error term is set equal to zero in the simulations.
Figure B1 presents the actual unemployment rate and the static simulated unemploy-
ment rate. The model simulates well for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. The simulated unemployment rate is
somewhat lower than actual unemployment for 10 countries (Australia, Canada, Den-
mark, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States)
while it is higher for only one country Spain.
As in the dynamic simulation the diﬀerence between the simulated and the actual value
of the unemployment can be caused by the development in the institutional variables, the
speciﬁed shock variables or the error term.
Figure B1 also displays the results of a static simulation where the institutional vari-
ables are kept constant. Generally, the simulation shows a fairly close ﬁt of the model.
Including institutional variables in the simulation of unemployment generally improves
the ﬁt. However, for some countries notable New Zealand, Spain, United Kingdom and
United States including institutions actually leads to a worse ﬁt.
The diﬀerence between the static simulation and the actual unemployment rate could
in principle be due to the development in the speciﬁed shock variables. But a simulation
where these variables are set to zero after 1995 illustrates that the evolution in static
simulated unemployment rate with and without the shocks, essentially have the same
development see ﬁgure B2.
2.B.2 Dynamic simulation of unemployment by using the model
in Nickell et al. (2005) on the extended time period 1995
to 2007
The dynamic simulation in section 2.3 showed a substantial over- and underprediction of
the unemployment rate in the post sample period. However, this is not only caused by
continuing the time trend. The unemployment rate follows a similar pattern if the trend is
prolonged by the last value of the trend in 1995 or by the average value of the trend. The
latter gives the largest change in simulations and is shown in ﬁgure B3. The simulations
shows that the predictive power of the empirical model improves for most countries in
the sample, since the simulated value of unemployment by the model is closer to actual
unemployment in the post sample period. The prediction of the model improved also in
Sweden, but the model now overpredicts the change in unemployment. The predictive
power worsens for New Zealand, Germany and United Kingdom.
If the empirical model speciﬁed by Nickell et al. (2005) explains the development in
unemployment, the diﬀerence between the simulated and the actual value of the unem-
ployment can be caused by the development in the institutional variables, the speciﬁed
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Figure B1: Static simulation and actual unemployment rate. Estimated coeﬃcients on
the original data set are used in simulation, in appendix 2.C, model A in table C1. Percent
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Figure B2: Static simulated and actual unemployment rate. Estimated coeﬃcients on the
original data set are used in simulation, in appendix 2.C, model A in table C1. Shocks
are zero after 1995. Percent
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Figure B3: Dynamic simulation and actual unemployment rate. Estimated coeﬃcients
on the original data set are used in simulation, in appendix 2.C, model A in table C1.
Trend is prolonged with the average value of the trend after 1995. Percent
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shock variables or the error term. A simulation where the speciﬁed shock variables are
set to zero after 1995 gives nearly no disparity to the simulation in ﬁgure 2, see ﬁgure B4.
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Figure B4: Dynamic simulation and actual unemployment rate. Estimated coeﬃcients
on the original data set are used in simulation, in appendix 2.C, model A in table C1.
Shocks are set to zero after 1995. Percent
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2.C Appendix
This appendix gives some additional information to section 2.4 and 2.5. First, the em-
pirical model in table 5 in Nickell et al. (2005) (NNO hereafter) and of their evaluation
by using the original data set8 is replicated. Second, a static simulation of the model
in NNO on the revised and extended data set. Third, a dynamic simulation of the full
model, where also the error term speciﬁcation is taken into account in the simulations on
the original data set.
2.C.1 Replication of the NNO model
A replication of empirical model in table 5 in Nickell et al. (2005) and of their results
ensures that any diﬀerences in results that are found in this paper are due to changes in
data revisions or sample length. The estimation procedures and results in Nickell et al.
(2005) are described in section 2.2.
I ﬁnd that the estimated coeﬃcients exactly replicates the coeﬃcient values in Nickell
et al. (2005), cf. model A in table C1 and the original results in table 5 in NNO. In
addition, a detailed visual inspection of the dynamic simulation on the original data set
with and without time-varying institutions are also the same as NNO. The replicated
simulations are presented in ﬁgure C1.
Table C1: Model A and B is a replication of model 5 in Nickell et al. (2005) on the original
data set. In model A, the time dummies are pooled in the time period 1960 to 1966, while
the time dummies are pooled in the period 1960 to 1969 in model B
Model A Model B
Coef. t-value min95 max95 Coef. t-value min95 max95
Unemployment previous period 0.86 48.49 0.83 0.90 0.86 48.06 0.83 0.90
Employment protection 0.15 0.91 -0.17 0.46 0.16 0.96 -0.16 0.47
Beneﬁt replacement ratio (BRR) 2.21 5.44 1.41 3.00 2.28 5.61 1.48 3.07
Beneﬁt duration (BD) 0.47 2.49 0.10 0.85 0.49 2.66 0.13 0.86
Interaction - BRR and BD 3.75 3.97 1.90 5.60 3.82 4.06 1.98 5.67
Interaction - CO and UDNET -6.98 -6.12 -9.22 -4.75 -7.04 -6.15 -9.29 -4.80
Interaction - CO and TAX -3.46 -3.29 -5.52 -1.39 -3.45 -3.29 -5.51 -1.40
First diﬀerence in Union density 6.99 3.17 2.67 11.30 7.02 3.19 2.71 11.34
Coordination -1.01 -3.54 -1.56 -0.45 -0.98 -3.43 -1.54 -0.42
Tax level 1.51 1.72 -0.21 3.24 1.48 1.68 -0.25 3.21
Labour demand shock -23.58 -10.36 -28.04 -19.12 -23.13 -10.26 -27.55 -18.71
Total factor productivity shock -17.87 -14.14 -20.35 -15.40 -17.81 -14.33 -20.24 -15.37
Money supply shock 0.23 0.93 -0.25 0.71 0.27 1.14 -0.20 0.75
Real interest rate 1.81 1.56 -0.46 4.08 1.75 1.52 -0.51 4.00
Import price shock 5.82 3.26 2.32 9.33 5.69 3.20 2.20 9.18
Total numb. of obs. 600 600
Time periods Numb. groups 33 20 33 20
Log likelihood -600 -587
χ2 of all exogenous variables 46497 45880
8The data is received from Luca Nunziata.
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Figure C1: Unweighted Dynamic simulation with the coeﬃcients estimated on the original
data set in Nickell et al. (2005) in the period 1960 to 1995. With constant and time-varying
variation in institutions. Percent
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2.C.2 Static simulation on revised and extended data set
The dynamic simulation explores to what extent the empirical model of Nickell et al.
(2005) is able to explain the evolution of unemployment within the sample period when
the time series are revised and time period extended.
In general, the sample period is extended by using the time series for the institutional
variable available ut to 2003, except for taxes that are available up to 2007. See appendix
2.A for details regarding the revised and extended data set.
In light of the considerable changes in the coeﬃcient estimates in section 2.4 when the
time series are revised and extended, one might expect that the model would result in a
bad ﬁt of unemployment, at least for the period 1960 to 1995. However, it seems that
the new coeﬃcients in a static simulation simulate unemployment well over that period,
cf. ﬁgure C2. One possible explanation is that the model is quite ﬂexible because of
time dummies and country speciﬁc trends, in the sense that the model can capture actual
unemployment also with the new values of the estimated coeﬃcients of the institutional
and shock variables on the revised data set.
However, as the static simulation is conditional on the lagged unemployment rate,
which plays a large role in the model, the static simulation may not give the right impres-
sion about the ﬁt of the model. For this reason, the results from the static simulation is
explored here and the dynamic simulation in section 2.4.
2.C.3 Dynamic simulation of the rewritten model
One possible objection to the empirical speciﬁcation in Nickell et al. (2005) is that all
the heterogeneity is captured by unobserved country and period speciﬁc intercepts (a two
way error component model), a country speciﬁc time trend and a country speciﬁc autore-
gressive error term. In equation (5) in section 2.5, the model is rewritten to explicitly
take the eﬀect of the heterogenous lagged error term into the solution of the model for
unemployment.
A dynamic simulation of equation (5) with the estimated coeﬃcient values in model A
in table C1 above is shown in section 2.5 ﬁgure 6 and in ﬁgure C3. Figure C3 illustrates a
similar pattern as the corresponding graphs in ﬁgure C1 which were based on the original
model in Nickell et al. (2005). This means that the eﬀect of the heterogeneity in the
error term on the simulations is small for a majority of countries, and the two ﬁgures
show a good correspondence between the two simulations. See further discussion for the
countries with unstable solutions related to ﬁgure 6 in section 2.5.
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Figure C2: Static simulation of unemployment in the period 1960 to 2007. Estimated
coeﬃcients used in simulation are found in table 3. Percent
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Figure C3: The transformed equation (5). Model A in table C1. Percent
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unemployment dynamics and
equilibrium.
Ragnar Nymoen and Victoria Sparrman
Abstract We estimate the quantitative importance of labour market institutions for
equilibrium unemployment in OECD. The econometric model is based on the solution
of a dynamic macroeconomic model which includes structural equations for wage and
price setting. Compared to existing studies we use a sample with more variation in
unemployment and in institutions, and a higher order dynamics in the ﬁnal equation for
unemployment. Finally, we incorporate objectively and automatically selected indicators
for structural breaks. We ﬁnd that institutional variables have statistical signiﬁcance,
but that these variables account for relatively little of the overall change in the OECD
average unemployment rate. The shocks to the economy have been more important for
the evolution in the actual average unemployment rate.
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3.1 Introduction
The concept of equilibrium unemployment in the OECD area has been subject to both
analytical and empirically research. One inﬂuential analytical approach, which also un-
derlies our research, combines a model of monopolistic price setting among ﬁrms with
collective bargaining over the nominal wage level, see Layard et al. (2005). Intuitively,
when the system is not in a stationary situation, nominal wage and price adjustments
constitute a wage-price spiral that leads to increasing or falling inﬂation. According
to Layard et al. (2005), equilibrium of real wages requires that unemployment becomes
equal to the Non-Accelerating Inﬂation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU). However, the
equilibrium unemployment rate is not interpretable as a constant given from nature. In-
stead, it depends on diﬀerent institutional labour market aspects such as wage bargaining
coordination, the generosity of the unemployment insurance system and the degree of
employment protection. If these institutional variables change, the conﬂicting real wage
aims will change, and the NAIRU will shift.
The panel data literature presents results that support the hypothesis of equilibrium
unemployment being aﬀected by the level of labour market institutions for most of the
OCED countries. Empirical models for the unemployment rate typically include vari-
ables representing the labour market institutions as implied from the above theory, but
also interaction between these variables, macroeconomic shocks and interaction between
institutional variables and shocks; see Nickell et al. (2005), Bassanini and Duval (2006),
Belot and van Ours (2004), Belot and van Ours (2001) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
Speciﬁcally, Nickell et al. (2005) ﬁnd a strong role for institutional variables that have
an eﬀect on the wage and price setting relationship in explaining unemployment rates in
OECD over the period 1960 to 1995. Belot and van Ours (2004) ﬁnd that speciﬁc inter-
actions between labour institutions are the driving forces over the period 1960 to 1999,
and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) ﬁnd that interactions between institutions and shocks
are the main driving forces over the period 1960 to 1995.
In the literature reviewed above, the theoretical framework is static, while the empir-
ical speciﬁcation of the unemployment equation is either static or dynamic. Dynamics is
reasonable given that there are adjustment lags in the manifold of economic, administra-
tive and political decisions that jointly determine the rate of unemployment. The existing
studies rely on heuristics to motivate the dynamic speciﬁcation of the econometric panel
data model. Heuristics gives the empirical researcher considerable freedom to choose a
speciﬁcation that ﬁts the data well. One strategy has been to use simple ﬁrst-order dy-
namics in the regression and compensate by allowing ﬂexible dynamics in the equations
residuals. On the other hand, basing the speciﬁcation on heuristics alone also means
that there is a gap between the underlying theory of equilibrium unemployment, which is
static, and the dynamic speciﬁcation used to estimate the equilibrium rate unemployment.
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In this paper we attempt to bridge the gap between the formal, but static, theoretical
framework which are common for the studies mentioned, and the dynamic speciﬁcation
of the estimated model based on the framework of Kolsrud and Nymoen (2010). The
result of this exercise is a dynamic speciﬁcation which has some notable diﬀerences from
the existing ones. First, the estimated dynamic unemployment equation is interpretable
as the ﬁnal equation from a system of equations (the “structural model”). As an impli-
cation, the order of unemployment dynamics (ﬁrst-order, second-order or higher) of the
unemployment equation is a consequence of both the number of equations and the order
of dynamics in those equations. The third order dynamics is three, and is an extension of
earlier papers that use a ﬁrst-order dynamics (or a second-order dynamics if the residuals
are also of ﬁrst order). A second gain from the formal derivation of the ﬁnal dynamic
equation is that the underlying theory has implication for the signs and the magnitude of
the coeﬃcients of the lags of unemployment, which can be conﬁrmed or refuted by estima-
tion. Third, we also get some guidelines for how the labour market variables, which reﬂect
institutional changes, should be brought into the equation. By following the theory and
hypothesizing that changes in wage and price settings are primary movers of the equilib-
rium rate of unemployment, the institutional variables associated with these changes also
should enter with potentially long lags. Our speciﬁcation implements institutions at lags
one and two, and shows how the eﬀect of institutions changes with diﬀerent lag struc-
tures. Fourth, the formal derivation of the dynamic unemployment equation also makes
it clear that there is no logical or a priori reason why the equilibrium unemployment
rate cannot be a function of other factors than the labour market institutions. Shocks
also from outside the labour market institutions will logically enter the ﬁnal equation. A
change in monetary regime is an example of a break that may have an inﬂuence on the
equilibrium rate of unemployment, see Iversen (1999) and Holden (2005). In practice,
even temporary shocks can be important to include in the model as controls to avoid
a bias in the intercept of the equation, which is important for the inferred equilibrium
unemployment rate also in panel data models. By allowing for shocks, our formal model
is consistent with, for instance, the empirical ﬁndings in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
We use an econometric algorithm called Autometrics as a practical and objective
method for determining the shocks that force location-shifts in the unemployment rates,
see Doornik (2009). We refer to such shocks as structural breaks. In this way, we avoid a
speciﬁcity problem, namely that one shock which is captured by an included variable may
hide the eﬀect of an omitted variable, see Blanchard (2006). Moreover, the structural
break variables estimated by our method are interpretable by consulting the economic
history of the countries in the data set: Most of the breaks are interpretable as extraneous
shocks (the oil price hikes in the 1970s), policy instigated changes (increased interest rates
in the US in 1981, and Tatcherism in the UK) or ﬁnancial crises (the Nordic banking crisis
in the early 1990s, see Reinhardt and Rogoﬀ (2009).
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In principle all breaks in the rates of unemployment could be due to institutional
changes. However, the breaks are uncorrelated with the institutional variables. Another
interpretation of our method of detecting shocks is that it is an objective way of controlling
for all “special events” which might otherwise have distorted the evidence. Earlier studies
have also addressed this problem, but in diﬀerent ways. Time trends, year dummies and
exogenous explanatory variables have been used. Certain countries and years also have
been excluded from the sample. Bassanini and Duval (2006) is an example of the latter
approach, where Finland, Sweden and Germany are modelled separately due to the shock
to these countries caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
On the data side, and compared to existing empirical OECD panel data literature,
we extend the data set to the period 1960 to 2007. This is important because the time
series now contain long periods with both increasing and falling unemployment. The
earlier studies in particular over the period 1960 to 1995 may have been dominated by
the general increase in the unemployment rate over the same period. As a result, there
is more information in the time series dimension than before, which should increase the
robustness of the results for the importance of institutions for equilibrium unemployment
speciﬁcally.
The empirical results is consistent with our theoretical ﬁnal equation for unemploy-
ment. Moreover, the econometric evidence gives support for a role of institutions in the
determining of the equilibrium rate, but the quantitative importance is considerably re-
duced as compared to previous ﬁndings in Nickell et al. (2005). This may in part be due
to the extended sample, but it is also due to the new econometric speciﬁcation which has
both structural breaks and higher order dynamics. Speciﬁcally, if we decrease the most
signiﬁcant variable, the beneﬁt replacement ratio, from its initial average level of 0.5 in
2007 by 20 percent, the OECD average unemployment rate will decrease by 0.8 percent-
age points. The absence of any large and negative shocks to the economy has been more
important for the reduction in the actual average unemployment rate observed before the
ﬁnancial crisis and the following job crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. First, the dynamic model for equilibrium unem-
ployment is derived from the theoretical dynamic model of the wage and price spiral in
section 3.2. The data for the evolution of labour market institutions, and the evidence for
large shocks (structural breaks), are presented in section 3.3. Econometric issues that are
pertinent to the estimation of dynamic models on a macro panel data set are discussed in
section 3.4. The results from the estimated dynamic unemployment equations, which in-
clude both institutional variables and breaks, are presented and interpreted in section 3.5.
We summarize in section 3.6 where we also discuss some extensions and give suggestions
for further work.
74
Chapter 3. The role of institutions in unemployment dynamics and equilibrium.
3.2 A dynamic equilibrium model for the rate of un-
employment
To derive a stable ﬁnal equation for the rate of unemployment, we built on an open
economy model as speciﬁed in Kolsrud and Nymoen (2010). They focus on the dynamics
of the supply side, and close the model by specifying a minimal version of the demand
side of the economy which is unimportant for the stability of the wage price spiral, but
have important implications for the dynamics of the ﬁnal equation for unemployment. We
therefore alternatively also motivated this speciﬁcation by starting out from the following
identity; the change in the number of unemployed workers from previous period to this
period is equal to the ﬂow from employment into unemployment subtracted the new
hirings.
Within this framework we specify how changes in institutional variables and more
temporary changes in the economic environment can be built into the model. Due to
the complexity of the model, we repeat the modelling framework in Kolsrud and Nymoen
(2010), but makes explicit comments to the model where and how these variables enter the
speciﬁcation. The dynamic (ﬁnal) equation for the rate of unemployment follows logically
from this model. Under mild assumptions, the equilibrium rate of unemployment can be
obtained as the steady-state solution of the estimated equation.
3.2.1 The wage-price spiral
The supply side is modelled such that ﬁrms and workers have conﬂicting interests about
the wage share of valued added, created by the joint utilization of capital and labour,
within the individual ﬁrm as well as in the total economy. However, ﬁrms only set the
nominal product price, and workers, through wage negotiations, only inﬂuence nominal
wages. None of the parties have unilateral control over their target real wage variable.
This means that when the real wage targeted by the ﬁrms is diﬀerent from the real wage
implied by the wage formation, there will be a wage-price spiral . The static wage and
price curves are interpretable as long-run relationships rather than as equations for actual
wage and price setting that hold in each time period.
The starting point of the formal derivation of the wage-price spiral is assumptions
for the two exogenous variables import price, pit, and productivity at. They are both
measured in logarithmic scale and are speciﬁed as independent random walks with drift:
pit = gpi + pit−1 + εpit (1)
at = ga + at−1 + εat (2)
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εat, and εpit are assumed to be innovations with zero conditional mean. Since domestic
wage and price setting are conditional on pit and at, equations (1) and (2) imply that qt,
the (log of the) price level on domestic products, and wt, the (log of) wage compensation
per hour will be non-stationary, integrated of order one, I(1), in a common notation.
Let pt denote the logarithm of the consumer price index, and pt is deﬁned by:
pt = φqt + (1− φ)pit (3)
where the parameter φ measures the share of imports in total consumption.
Next deﬁne two theoretical (latent) real wage variables: The optimal real wages from
the point of view of the ﬁrms, rwft , and the bargained real wage, rw
b
t . They are given by
the following two equations:
rwft ≡ weft − qft = −mq + at + ϑut (4)
rwbt ≡ wbt − qebt = mw + ω
(
pebt − qebt
)
+ ι at −ut. (5)
Equations (4) and (5) are open-economy versions of the relationship for price- and wage-
setting in the model originally due to Layard, Nickell and Jackman; see e.g., Layard et al.
(2005, p 13).1
In the price-setting equation (4), qft denotes the price level set by the ﬁrm on basis
of expected nominal marginal labour costs weft − at. weft denotes the expected hourly
wage cost. We follow custom and assume that pricing is conditional on the actual level of
productivity. The last variable in equation (4) is ut, which is the rate of unemployment
(or its log) that is used as a proxy for capacity utilization in this model. The case of ϑ = 0
is called normal cost pricing.
In the wage setting equation (5), wbt denotes the nominal wage outcome and q
eb
t and
pebt are the price expectations that aﬀect that bargaining outcome. A main implication of
the bargaining model is that elasticity ι with respect to productivity is close to unity, as in
Nymoen and Rødseth (1998). The standard assumption about the sign of the coeﬃcient
for unemployment  is that it is non-negative, hence − < 0. The coeﬃcient ω is
called the wedge-coeﬃcient since
(
pebt − qebt
)
is the wedge between expected consumer and
producer real wages (when we abstract from tax rates). The wedge coeﬃcient is assumed
to be non-negative, ω ≥ 0.
There is one important diﬀerence as compared to the original model of Layard, Nickell
and Jackman. They interpret equations (4) and (5) as a model of actual wages and prices,
and solve for equilibrium unemployment by invoking the assumption that in equilibrium,
there are no expectation errors. The interpretation made here is that neither rwft nor rw
b
t
can be set equal to the actual real wage in period t. The reason is that although it can
1See also Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2010, Ch 12 and 17), Blanchard (2009, Ch 6).
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be assumed that actual wage setting is inﬂuenced by unions and some form of collective
bargaining in all countries, actual real wages need not be well explained by the simple
theory in equation (5).2
Instead, the theory of the wage-price spiral is based on the weaker, but not trivial,
assumption that rwft and rw
b
t are co-integrated with the actual real wage. Similarly, on
the price side, it is reasonable that equation (4) captures the secular trend in the actual
price qt, but not the period-to-period changes in the price level.
The co-integration assumption implies real wages to temporary deviate from the equi-
librium solution. Temporary deviations are theoretically reasonable if the economy are
exposed to shocks and ﬁrms not immediate are able (or willing) to adjust the labour force
to the new economic environment. Consider the following situation; ﬁrst wage setters
agree upon an real wage which are optimal dependent of the unemployment level. Then
the economy is hit by a negative shock which raises the actual wage above the optimal
real wage given this particular economic environment. The Layard, Nickell and Jackman
model implies an immediately increase in unemployment or inﬂation. In this model, un-
employment rates need not to respond immediate, since the real wages only are assumed
to be correlated with the optimal level. This is one assumptions that we could have tested
in this paper, but we only consider factors that aﬀect the wage and the price markup,
and invoke such changes in the the ﬁnal equation of unemployment.
We now complete the speciﬁcation of the dynamic model of wage and price setting:
Equations (1)-(4) imply that the two target variables rwbt and rw
f
t are I(1) variables. The
rate of unemployment, ut, is assumed to be stationary I(0) after controlling for changes
in institutions and other temporary changes in the economic environment. The testing
of the empirical relevance of the stationarity assumption is addressed in section 3.3.1 and
3.3.3.
The underlying dynamics of rwbt and rw
f
t have important consequences for how the
wage-and price dynamics are modelled. First, if the wage and price expectations errors
weft − wt, qebt − qt and pebt − pt are I(0), the expectation variables in equations (4) and
(5) can be replaced by wt, qt and pt without changing the order of integration. Second,
since the non-stationarity of rwbt and rw
f
t is an implication of our theoretical model,
the theory also implies that rwbt and rw
f
t are cointegrated with the actual real wage, rwt.
Third, cointegration implies equilibrium correction, as shown by the Granger-Engle (1987)
representation theorem shows. The equilibrium correction model for the wage-price spiral
can be written as:
2See e.g. the survey evidence from Sweden in Agell and Bennmarker (2007) and the multi-country
evidence on wage premiums in Blanchﬂower and Freeman (1992).
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Δqt = cq + ψqw Δwt + ψqpiΔpit − ς ut−1 + θq ecmft−1 + εqt, (6)
Δwt = cw + ψwq Δqt + ψwpΔpt − ϕut−1 − θw ecmbt−1 + εwt, (7)
where εqt, and εwt are innovations and all parameters are assumed to be non-negative.
The error correction terms, ecmft−1 and ecm
b
t−1, are consistent with equations (4) and (5),
with weft = wt, q
eb
t = qt and p
eb
t = pt imposed. They are deﬁned by
ecmft = wt − qt − at − ϑut +mq (8)
ecmbt = wt − qt − ι at − ω (pt − qt) +ut −mw, (9)
see B˚ardsen et al. (2005) and B˚ardsen and Nymoen (2008) for similar derivations.
The dynamic model of the wage-price spiral is:
Δqt = (cq + θq mq) + ψqw Δwt + ψqpiΔpit − μq ut−1
+ θq (wt−1 − qt−1 − at−1) + εq,t, (10)
Δwt = (cw + θw mw) + ψwq Δqt + ψwpΔpt − μw ut−1
− θw (wt−1 − qt−1 − ι at−1) + θw ω (pt−1 − qt−1) + εw,t, (11)
Δpt = φΔqt + (1− φ)Δpit, (12)
where equation (12) is the result of taking the diﬀerence on both sides of the deﬁnition
in equation (3).3 Note that in equations (10) and (11), notations μq = θq ϑ + ς and
μw = θw  + ϕ are used for the coeﬃcients on ut−1.
3.2.2 Closing the model
In order to close the model, Kolsrud and Nymoen (2010) have referred to a typical
medium-term macroeconomic model and assumed that the GDP output gap is positively
aﬀected by the log of the real exchange rate, ret = pit − qt, and that the unemployment
rate is negatively correlated with the output gap, as predicted by Okun’s law. The mecha-
nism is that an increase in the real exchange rate leads to improved competitiveness. This
increases export, and thereby GDP increases and unemployment falls. Based on these
conventional assumptions, unemployment is speciﬁed as:
ut = cu + αut−1 − ρ ret−1 + u,t, (13)
3For coeﬃcients ψwq, ψqw and ψwp, ψqpi, the non-negative signs are standard in economic models.
Negative values of θw and θq imply an explosive evolution in wages and prices (hyperinﬂation), which is
diﬀerent from the low to moderately high inﬂation scenario that we have in mind for this paper.
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which is a simple, dynamic equation and links the model of the wage-price spiral to the
rate of unemployment. As mentioned, an increase in price competitiveness re is assumed
to reduce unemployment, so ρ ≥ 0. It is easiest to think of the current account as the
source of this mechanism. The lagged real exchange rate reﬂect that it takes time before
a real depreciation lower unemployment. Note that this assumption is important for
the dynamics of the ﬁnal equation of unemployment, in particular for how changes in
institutions enters the equation. We also assume that −1 < α < 1 so that this equation
alone does not represent a source of hysteresis in unemployment, see Røed (1997).
Our alternative interpretation of equation (13) starts with the identity saying that the
change in the number of unemployed from t−1 to t is equal to the ﬂow from employment
into unemployment (separations) minus the ﬂow of new hirings (the number of vacancies
ﬁlled). In discrete time, we may write as a “law of motion” or, for the unemployment
rate ut
ut = s+ (1− s)ut−1 − ftvt−1 (14)
where vt is the vacancy rate and s is the separation rate. ft denotes the rate at which
vacancies are ﬁlled. In principle, because of discretion and since we have abstracted from
population growth, the equation includes a residual which we omit for simplicity.
A key idea in search theory is that ft depends on the properties of the matching
function, see e.g. Pissarides (2000). In the case of a homogenous matching function,
we can deﬁne ft(ut−1/vt−1) with derivative f ′u/v ≥ 0 and an elasticity between 0 and 1.
Linearization then gives
ft ≈ f0 + fuut−1 + fvvt−1, fu > 0 and fv < 0 (15)
The vacancy rate function is probably highly complex, as it depends on the (present)
value of opening a new vacancy. For simplicity, it is here written as:
vt = g0 + g1 ret, with g1 > 0 (16)
so that when the “value of the ﬁrm” increases due to improved price competitiveness more
vacancies are opened.
Inserting equations (15) and (16) in equation (14) gives a relationship like that of
equation (13) but the coeﬃcients are interpreted as cu = s−f0g0−fvg20, α = (1−s−fug0)
and ρ = 2fvg0g1 + f0g1. The error term u,t in equation (13) then becomes a composite
term which mops all the residuals from the approximations in equations (15) and (16), as
well as the cross-product fug1ut−1 ret−1 and the exchange rate squared fvg21re
2
t−1.
In both interpretations, equation (13) is deliberately simple to allow a closed form
solution of the full model (10)-(13).
For our empirical speciﬁcation, we keep in mind that both monetary policy changes
and other important policy and institutional diﬀerences and reforms can be reﬂected in
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the intercept cu. In the matching model interpretation, for example, we see that since we
have cu = s− f0g0 − fvg20, autonomous changes in both vacancies (g0) and the matching
function (f0) will inﬂuence cu. This is one of the reasons why, in the econometric panel
data model below, we allow for both country-speciﬁc intercept dummies and objectively
estimated location shifts in the unemployment rates.
3.2.3 The VAR representation
The simultaneous equation system (10)-(13) can be expressed as a vector autoregressive
model, VAR:
yt = Ryt−1 +Pxt + t. (17)
Vector y = (re, prw, u)′ contains the endogenous variables and vector x = (Δpi,Δa, a−1, 1)′
contains the non-modelled exogenous variables and 1 (for the constant term), and vector
 contains the reduced form disturbances. R is a 3 × 3 matrix and the 3 × 5 matrix P
contains the coeﬃcients of the non-modelled variables.
The endogenous variable prwt in the y vector is the productivity corrected real wage:
prwt = wt − qt − ιat. With ι = 1 we see that prwt is simply the log of the wage share:
wst = wt − qt − at. Kolsrud and Nymoen (2010) show that ι = 1 is also a necessary
condition for asymptotic global stability of the system. We impose ι = 1 in the following.
In order to derive the solution for the rate of unemployment in particular, it is useful
to write the VAR more extensively, as
⎛
⎜⎝
ret
wst
ut
⎞
⎟⎠
yt
=
⎛
⎜⎝
l −k n
λ κ −η
−ρ 0 α
⎞
⎟⎠
R
⎛
⎜⎝
ret−1
wst−1
ut−1
⎞
⎟⎠
yt−1
+
⎛
⎜⎝
e 0 −d
ξ −1 δ
0 0 cu
⎞
⎟⎠
P
⎛
⎜⎝
Δpit
Δat
1
⎞
⎟⎠
xt
+
⎛
⎜⎝
re,t
prw,t
u,t
⎞
⎟⎠ .
t
(18)
The expressions for the coeﬃcients and error terms in equation (18) are given in Appendix
3.C.
3.2.4 The steady-state solution with equilibrium unemployment
The equilibrium rate of unemployment, u∗, is deﬁned as the long-run mean of ut in Kolsrud
and Nymoen (2010). It is the mathematical expectation of the asymptotic stable solution
for ut, obtained from equation (18). Since the model is linear in parameters, u
∗ is given
from the deterministic version of the system. By assuming that the vector of exogenous
variables xt = (Δpit,Δat, 1) is driving the system consists of constants, x = (gpi, ga, 1),
and that the characteristic roots of R are inside the unit-circle, the equilibrium rate is
obtained as
u∗ = −ess gpi − bss
±
ga + dss. (19)
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where
ess = ρ (θq(1− ψwq − ψwp) + θw(1− ψqw − ψqpi))/(θq θw Ω), (20)
bss = ρ (θq − θw ψqw)/(θq θw Ω), (21)
dss = cu ω (1− φ) + ρ [mw +mq + cw/θw + cq/θq])/Ω. (22)
with Ω = ω (1− φ) (1− α) + ρ ( + ϑ). 4
We see that the term dss in the expression for u
∗ depends on the two parameters
mw, from wage setting, and mq, from price setting. mw in particular represents the “real
wage pressure” that results from wage bargaining for the given levels of unemployment
productivity and the wedge. Hence, a change in mw may be due to changes in wage
setting institutions and other labour market related institutions, see Nickell et al. (2005),
Bassanini and Duval (2006), Belot and van Ours (2004), Belot and van Ours (2001) and
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). Hence, we can write mw = mw(I) where I is a vector of
variables that represent the institutional factors for which we have data, see section 3.3.2
below. For symmetry, we may also set mq = mq(I), although the ﬁrms’ real-wage target
may be less institutionally conditioned as mw, see Bjørnstad and Kalstad (2010).
With mw = mw(I) and mq = mq(I) in place, it follows that dss in equation (19) can
shift as a result of changes in mqt and/or mwt that are caused by evolving institutions.
Changes that occur elsewhere in the economy can also have an eﬀect on mw and/or mq as
well, but even if mwand/or mq are unaﬀected by a large drop in aggregate demand, or by
a change in monetary policy, such changes can have an eﬀect through the parameter cu,
as noted in connection with the interpretation of the unemployment relationship equation
(13) above.
In section 3.3.3, we show that for each country in our sample, we are able to identify
one or more large shocks, or structural breaks in the unemployment time series, which we
denote by D. Hence, by writing cu(D), it follows from equation (20) that the equilibrium
rate of unemployment u∗ in equation (19) is conditioned by both institutions, I, and large
shocks in vacancies, matching and possibly regime shifts elsewhere in the economy.
3.2.5 Unemployment dynamics
The VAR in equation (18) implies a ﬁnal equation for ut where the institutional labour
market institutions and temporary changes in the economic environment enters the equa-
tion in the following way:
ut = Υ0+Υ1ut−1+Υ2ut−2+Υ3ut−3+Υ4It−1+Υ5It−2+Υ6Dt+Υ7Dt−1+Υ8Dt−2+u,t, (23)
4This expression is based on the case with wage and price curves, which implies μw = θw  and
μq = θq ϑ . The solution for the version of the model with wage and price Phillips curves ( θq = θw = 0)
is considered in Kolsrud and Nymoen (2010).
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In this equation, u,t is a composite term that contains lags Δpit−j and Δat−j as well as
lags of the error terms in equation (18). For completeness, we give the expression for the
“gross distrubance”:
u,t =− (l + κ)u,t−1 + (λk + lκ)u,t−2 − ρr,t−1 + ρκr,t−2 + kρp,t−2
− ρeΔpit−1 + ρ(ξk + eκ)Δpit−2 − kρΔat−2 (24)
The coeﬃcients Υj (j = 1, 2, 3) are uniquely determined by the theoretical model (10)-
(13) and are important for the asymptotic global stability of the rate of unemployment.
Speciﬁcally, the dynamic solution for the rate of unemployment is globally asymptotically
stable and converges to u∗ in equation (19), if and only if the roots r of the characteristic
equation:
r3 − r2Υ1 − rΥ2 −Υ3 = 0
have a modulus less than one.
The expressions for the three autoregressive coeﬃcients are:
Υ1 = α + κ+ l
Υ2 = − [αl(1− κ) + κ(α + l) + nρ+ λk] (25)
Υ3 = αλk + ρ(nκ− ηk)
From the assumptions, it follows that the ﬁrst autoregressive coeﬃcient Υ1 is positive and
that it may well be larger than 1. The second autoregressive parameter is expected to be
negative, since all terms inside the brackets are positive by assumption. Theory therefore
gives clear predictions about the sign and magnitude of Υ1 and Υ2. We note that it is
possible that Υ1 > −Υ2, since the additional terms in Υ2 are products of factors that are
less than one. The third autoregressive coeﬃcient, Υ3, is likely to be smaller in magnitude
than the ﬁrst two coeﬃcients: αλk is a small number and ρ(nκ − ηk) may be near zero
or even negative. Therefore, it seems reasonable that the coeﬃcient of the third lag of
unemployment may be diﬃcult to discover empirically with a ﬁnite amount of data. On
the other hand, if the eﬀect is tiny, the bias from estimation of a model with “too little
dynamics” may not be signiﬁcant in numeric terms either.
The coeﬃcients Υj (j = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) depend on how It aﬀects mw and mq, and that
Dt primarily aﬀects cu. The exact expressions for the terms in equation (23) are given
below.
A null hypothesis that institutional evolution has no lasting eﬀects on the unemploy-
ment equilibrium can be formulated as:
Υ4 +Υ5 = 0
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This hypothesis can be tested empirically. The institutional variables enter equation (23)
in the following way:
Υ4It−1 = ρdt−1 (26)
Υ5It−2 = kρδt−2 − ρκdt−2 (27)
since parameters d and δ are functions ofmq andmw which, in turn, depend on institutions
as explained above. The exact dating of the institutional variables in equation (23), where
institutions enter the equation with one and two lags, can be justiﬁed by the following
reasoning: Changes in institutions in period t − 1 aﬀect unemployment and wage- and
price setting in the next period, t. Another reason, which is also consistent with the above
theory, is that mark-ups are aﬀected ﬁrst and then unemployment. The distributed lag
would then be in terms of t − 2 and t − 3. That said, a rejection of the null hypothesis
of no long-run eﬀect of institutional changes on unemployment should be robust to the
exact distributed lag of the institutional variables.
Finally, the dynamics of the VAR in (18) implies that Dt follows a distributed lag:
Υ6Dt = cut (28)
Υ7Dt−1 = − [l + κ] cut−1 (29)
Υ8Dt−2 = lκcut−2 (30)
The two interpretations of equation (13) given above, implies that changes in the
matching function or simple demand shocks enter the ﬁnal equation of unemployment
with an immediate eﬀect, and with two lags.
However, if shocks also aﬀects the mw or mq, in equations (8) and (9), the dynamic
eﬀects on unemployment may be diﬀerent from the dynamics in (D1) to (D3).
3.3 Data
In this section, we present the evolution in the variables used in our panel data study;
unemployment rate, labour market variables and shocks. The panel consists of 20 OECD
countries over the period 1960 to 2007. The countries are listed in table 1.
3.3.1 The unemployment rate
The standardized unemployment rate in Economic Outlook at OECD (2008a) is used as
a primary data source for the unemployment rate in the OECD countries, see appendix
3.A for details.
There was a substantial change in the unemployment rates of the OECD countries in
the period 1960 to 2007. Figure 1 shows the unemployment rates in all countries, together
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Table 1: Average unemployment in the OECD countries. Percent
Country 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-01 2002-07
Australia 1.75 1.79 4.66 7.70 8.41 7.33 5.31
Austria 1.70 1.42 1.38 3.25 4.89 5.49 5.67
Belgium 1.48 1.48 4.23 9.61 8.05 8.34 8.05
Canada 6.00 4.76 6.98 9.84 9.53 8.11 6.92
Denmark 1.07 1.04 3.56 6.48 7.50 5.00 4.62
Finland 1.41 2.41 4.14 5.17 10.85 11.54 8.34
France 1.18 1.95 3.71 7.67 9.10 9.66 8.48
Germany 0.69 0.86 3.06 6.56 6.94 8.31 9.29
Ireland 5.32 5.82 8.08 14.05 14.68 7.30 4.47
Italy 3.46 4.17 4.87 7.96 9.91 10.81 7.71
Japan 1.34 1.24 1.84 2.52 2.46 4.22 4.62
Netherlands 0.57 1.26 3.57 8.28 6.60 4.29 4.03
New Zealand 0.08 0.29 0.74 3.95 8.14 6.37 4.12
Norway 1.71 1.53 1.74 2.44 5.13 3.69 3.89
Portugal 2.46 3.91 5.63 8.23 5.48 5.23 6.90
Spain 1.78 2.31 4.04 14.51 15.00 13.61 9.76
Sweden 2.11 2.61 2.62 3.59 6.22 9.06 6.92
Switzerland 0.03 0.01 0.29 0.63 2.24 3.30 3.99
UK 2.79 3.40 4.81 10.44 8.77 6.31 5.10
United States 5.72 4.47 6.51 7.75 6.16 4.63 5.27
Total 2.14 2.34 3.82 7.03 7.80 7.13 6.17
Figure 1: Unemployment rate in the OECD countries. Percent
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with the average unemployment rate. The ﬁgure illustrates that the rise in unemployment
in the early 1970s went together with an increase in the dispersion. The diﬀerence between
the highest and the lowest unemployment rate in 1995 is larger than in 1960. After 1995,
both the average unemployment rate and the variation in unemployment rates across
countries have decreased. In our model, institutions and structural breaks capture this
development in dispersion.
The evolution of the unemployment rate for each country in the sample in the period
1960 to 2007 is also summarised in table 1. For instance, Norway and Switzerland have a
relatively low unemployment rate throughout the period compared to most other countries
in the sample. One might question the accuracy of the data showing low unemployment
rates in New Zealand and Switzerland in the beginning of the sample period. However,
our main results are robust to the exclusion of these countries. Ireland and Spain, on the
other hand, are examples of countries with high levels of unemployment in some years and
high volatility over time. Germany and Japan have an upward sloping trend, i.e. there
is a steady increase in the unemployment rate over time. No country in the data has a
tendency of a declining trend in unemployment.
The last row in table 1 contains the average unemployment rate among the OECD
countries. Unemployment was very low at the beginning of the period, but increased
sharply and peaked at the beginning of the 1980s and 1990s. The average unemployment
rate fell slightly towards the end of the period.
The trendlike behavior of the series makes it relevant to test for unit roots. Absence
of a unit root is of course essential, since otherwise the empirical relevance of equilibrium
unemployment as we have deﬁned it can be questioned, as it has been in the “hysteresis”
literature, see Røed (1997).
The Dickey-Fuller tests are the standard tests for unit-root in panel data, see Ma´tya´s
and Sevestre (2008). Assume that the unemployment rates are generated by the following
ﬁrst-order autoregressive process:
uit = (1− αi)μi + αiuit−1 + it (31)
where the initial values, ui0, are given, and the errors it are identically, independently
distributed across i and t. Equation (31) can be re-written as a Dickey-Fuller regression:
Δuit = φiμi + φiuit−1 + it (32)
where φi = αi − 1.
The null hypothesis of a unit-root is
Ho : φ1 = ... = φN = 0
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Table 2: Unemployment: Dickey-Fuller unit root tests
Alternative: Homogenous H1a Heterogenous H1b
Statistic (p-value) Statistic (p-value)
lag 1 -4.28 (0.00) -2.29 (0.01)
lag 1, (Uit − U i)a -4.34 (0.00) -4.04 (0.00)
lag 2 -2.18 (0.02) -0.45 (0.33)
lag 2, (Uit − U i)a -1.81 (0.03) -1.99 (0.02)
lag 3 -2.82 (0.00) -0.91 (0.18)
lag 3, (Uit − U i)a -1.67 (0.05) -1.80 (0.04)
a) Unemployment (U) subtracted country speciﬁc mean (U i)
and the two alternative hypotheses are
H1a : φ1 = ... = φN ≡ φ, and φ < 0
H1b : φ1 < 0, ..., φN0 < 0, N0 < N.
Under H1a (homogenous alternative), it is assumed that the autoregressive parameter
is identical for all cross section units. Under H1b (heterogenous alternative), it is assumed
that N0 of the N panel units are stationary with individual-speciﬁc autoregressive coeﬃ-
cients. A method for testing the null hypothesis against the ﬁrst alternative is developed
by Levin et al. (2002) and a method for the second heterogenous hypothesis is described
in Im et al. (2003).
Table 2 shows the test results of the two methods. The tests are performed for three
types of augmentations of the basic Dickey-Fuller regression in equation (32), where one,
two or three lags in the change in the unemployment rate are included. The table also
includes the test statistics which is similar to the above procedures, but ﬁrst the country-
speciﬁc mean of unemployment is subtracted from the unemployment rates prior to de-
riving the test statistic. The procedure mitigates the eﬀect of cross-sectional dependence.
“Homogenous alternative” in table 2 shows that the hypothesis of non-stationary is re-
jected at the conventional ﬁve percent signiﬁcance level for all variations of the test. The
“Heterogenous alternative” rejects non-stationarity when the data generating process in-
cludes one lag of the change in unemployment, and when the unemployment time series
are adjusted for a country-speciﬁc mean prior to deriving the test statistic.
Note that the test could depend on whether we control for breaks in the unemployment
rate time series as claimed in Camarero et al. (2006). However, since the tests reject the
null hypothesis of a unit root without the structural breaks or institutions, the test will
also signiﬁcantly reject the null hypothesis if breaks and institutions are included.
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Table 3: Average tax rate in the OECD countries
Country 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-01 2002-07
Australia 0.23 0.26 0.31 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.37
Austria 0.43 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.54
Belgium 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.59 0.60 0.61
Canada 0.30 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.46 0.47 0.44
Denmark 0.43 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.59 0.63 0.63
Finland 0.41 0.44 0.50 0.54 0.64 0.69 0.68
France 0.66 0.60 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.66 0.64
Germany 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49
Ireland 0.31 0.35 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.49
Italy 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.43 0.53 0.64 0.64
Japan 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.35
Netherlands 0.39 0.43 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.45 0.48
New Zealand 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.40 0.37 0.38
Norway 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.59 0.58
Portugal 0.2 0.25 0.26 0.33 0.40 0.44 0.48
Spain 0.20 0.25 0.31 0.40 0.45 0.46 0.51
Sweden 0.38 0.50 0.61 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.75
Switzerland 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24
United Kingdom 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.40
United States 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.30
Total 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.50
3.3.2 Institutional factors
The main hypothesis to be tested is whether the equilibrium rate of unemployment has
been aﬀected by changes in labour market institutions over the sample period. Institu-
tional changes are measured by indices for employment protection (EPL), beneﬁt replace-
ment ratio (BRR), beneﬁt duration (BD), union density (UDNET ), tax level (TW ) and
the degree of coordination of wage setting (CO). These indicators are assumed to be
correlated with mwt above. We do not have any indicators for mqt or cut. Appendix 3.A
contains a detailed description of all variables and their sources.
The tax rates are calculated from actual tax payments. The total tax wedge is equal
to the sum of the employment tax rate (t1), the direct tax rate (t2) and the indirect tax
rate (t3). As seen in table 3, there has been a steady increase in tax rates in most OECD
countries over the period 1960 to 2007. The largest increases are found in Sweden, Spain
and Portugal, and the highest tax rates, larger than a 50 percent tax wedge, are found
in the Nordic countries and in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Germany. In
Canada and Germany, there was a small decline in the tax rate towards the end of the
sample period.
The time series for employment protection measure the strictness of the employment
protection for the employee. The overall indicator for employment protection is measured
on a scale from 0 to 5. Strictness is increasing in scale. Some other measures only consider
the employment protection for regular or temporary contracts. Table 4 shows an average
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Table 4: Average employment protection in the OECD countries
Country 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-01 2002-07
Australia 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.76 0.90 1.20 1.20
Austria 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 1.95
Belgium 3.32 3.32 3.43 3.30 3.20 2.37 2.20
Canada 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Denmark 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.16 2.19 1.40 1.40
Finland 1.46 1.78 2.30 2.30 2.22 2.08 2.00
France 3.89 4.11 4.11 3.35 2.93 3.00 3.00
Germany 3.52 3.58 3.65 3.43 3.17 2.60 2.25
Ireland 0.63 0.63 0.75 0.89 0.90 0.90 1.07
Italy 3.85 3.91 3.94 3.77 3.60 2.83 1.94
Japan 1.97 1.97 2.07 2.16 2.12 1.90 1.80
Netherlands 2.35 2.35 2.67 2.74 2.70 2.40 2.10
New Zealand 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 1.10 1.50
Norway 3.95 3.95 3.33 2.92 2.88 2.67 2.60
Portugal 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.19 3.95 3.70 3.57
Spain 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.63 2.97 3.10
Sweden 3.89 3.82 3.55 3.49 3.12 2.25 2.20
Switzerland 0.73 0.76 1.02 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10
United Kingdom 0.51 0.52 0.57 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.70
United States 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.20
Total 2.23 2.26 2.29 2.25 2.16 1.91 1.83
Table 5: Average beneﬁt replacement ratio in the OECD countries
Country 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-01 2002-07
Australia 0.18 0.15 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.19
Austria 0.16 0.16 0.28 0.34 0.34 0.40 0.40
Belgium 0.39 0.37 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.44
Canada 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.57 0.58 0.52 0.50
Denmark 0.36 0.53 0.79 0.78 0.74 0.66 0.65
Finland 0.20 0.25 0.37 0.43 0.60 0.52 0.35
France 0.47 0.51 0.46 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.61
Germany 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.38
Ireland 0.21 0.24 0.39 0.51 0.41 0.35 0.36
Italy 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.45 0.66
Japan 0.36 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.30 0.36 0.40
Netherlands 0.32 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.71
New Zealand 0.39 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.32
Norway 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.53 0.62 0.63 0.65
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.39 0.65 0.66 0.70
Spain 0.17 0.50 0.58 0.74 0.68 0.63 0.64
Sweden 0.24 0.31 0.70 0.85 0.87 0.77 0.74
Switzerland 0.17 0.12 0.27 0.50 0.67 0.72 0.74
United Kingdom 0.27 0.35 0.34 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.19
United States 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.25 0.29 0.29
Total 0.26 0.30 0.40 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.50
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Table 6: Average beneﬁt duration in the OECD countries
Country 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-01 2002-07
Australia 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.00
Austria 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.78
Belgium 1.00 0.99 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.80
Canada 0.32 0.33 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.35 0.39
Denmark 0.45 0.49 0.60 0.62 0.69 0.97 0.90
Finland 0.00 0.04 0.65 0.60 0.51 0.66 0.80
France 0.30 0.24 0.20 0.35 0.49 0.50 0.62
Germany 0.57 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.70 0.81
Ireland 0.67 0.78 0.45 0.38 0.55 0.75 0.75
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.40
Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.17
Netherlands 0.03 0.35 0.49 0.65 0.60 0.60 0.67
New Zealand 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.01 1.00
Norway 0.00 0.02 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.56 0.60
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.35 0.51 0.66
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.26 0.31 0.35
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Switzerland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.29 0.30
United Kingdom 0.89 0.63 0.54 0.69 0.71 0.80 0.84
United States 0.08 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.20
Total 0.32 0.33 0.39 0.44 0.47 0.55 0.60
decline in the strictness of employment protection since the beginning of the 1970s.
The beneﬁt replacement ratio is a measure of how much each unemployed worker
receives in beneﬁts from the government in the ﬁrst period when being unemployed. As
seen from table 5, there has been a steady increase in the average beneﬁt ratio for the ﬁrst
period in the period 1960 to 2007. There are large diﬀerences in unemployment beneﬁts
between the OECD countries, the lowest beneﬁts are found in Australia and the United
Kingdom to the highest beneﬁts in Sweden and Switzerland in period 2002-07. Some
countries have reversed the beneﬁts during the period, see for instance Canada, Denmark
and the United Kingdom, while for instance the United States has been on a low level in
the whole sample period.
Beneﬁt duration is a measure of the unemployment beneﬁts for recipients who have
been unemployed more than one year, relative to beneﬁts during the ﬁrst year. As seen
from table 6, in many countries the payments stops after one year and the index is then
equal to zero. If beneﬁts are the same for the ﬁrst four years of unemployment, the value
of the index is equal to one. If beneﬁts increase over time, the index is larger than one.
We observe that in most countries beneﬁt duration has increased over the sample period.
We are interested in the eﬀect of coordination on unemployment, exploring whether
centralized wage setters induce wage moderation to reduce unemployment. We use the
index in OECD (2004) which measures the formal level of coordination and not whether
the coordination actually results in wage moderation at all times as, for instance, in the
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Table 7: Average coordination in the OECD countries
Country 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-01 2002-07
Australia 4.00 4.00 4.04 4.28 2.50 2.00 2.00
Austria 5.00 5.00 4.96 4.35 4.00 4.00 4.00
Belgium 4.00 4.00 3.69 3.96 4.07 4.48 4.50
Canada 1.00 1.00 2.26 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.00
Denmark 5.00 5.00 4.83 3.53 3.40 3.97 4.00
Finland 5.00 5.00 4.91 4.45 5.00 5.00 5.00
France 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Germany 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Ireland 4.00 4.00 3.74 1.79 3.63 4.00 4.00
Italy 2.00 2.00 2.13 2.83 2.90 3.97 4.00
Japan 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Netherlands 3.00 3.00 3.76 4.28 4.00 4.00 4.00
New Zealand 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 1.75 1.00 1.00
Norway 4.50 4.50 4.41 3.95 4.50 4.50 4.50
Portugal 5.00 5.00 4.20 3.08 3.75 4.00 4.00
Spain 5.00 5.00 4.29 3.81 3.13 3.00 3.00
Sweden 4.00 4.00 3.96 3.35 3.00 3.00 3.00
Switzerland 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
United Kingdom 3.00 3.00 3.46 1.23 1.00 1.00 1.00
United States 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total 3.67 3.67 3.68 3.25 3.13 3.20 3.20
Table 8: Average union density in the OECD countries
Country 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-01 2002-07
Australia 0.48 0.45 0.49 0.46 0.38 0.27 0.21
Austria . 0.62 0.59 0.53 0.45 0.38 0.34
Belgium 0.40 0.42 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.53
Canada 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.30
Denmark 0.57 0.59 0.71 0.79 0.76 0.75 0.71
Finland 0.35 0.47 0.66 0.69 0.77 0.77 0.72
France 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.08
Germany 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.26 0.22
Ireland 0.49 0.56 0.62 0.61 0.55 0.41 0.35
Italy 0.25 0.32 0.48 0.45 0.39 0.36 0.34
Japan 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.25 0.22 0.19
Netherlands 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.21
New Zealand . 0.57 0.62 0.59 0.40 0.23 0.22
Norway 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.55
Portugal . . 0.59 0.43 0.26 0.21 0.19
Spain . . . 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.15
Sweden 0.66 0.68 0.75 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.76
Switzerland 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.20
United Kingdom 0.40 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.38 0.30 0.29
United States 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.12
Total 0.38 0.42 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.36 0.34
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index from Kenworthy (2001). The development in the coordination index is shown in
table 7.
Union density rates are constructed using the number of union members divided by
the number of employed. Trade union density rates are based on surveys, wherever
possible. Where such data were not available, trade union membership and density in
European Union countries, Norway and Switzerland were calculated using administrative
data adjusted for non-active and self-employed members by Prof. Jelle Visser, University
of Amsterdam. Table 8 shows that union density has declined since the beginning of the
1970s in most countries.
We also investigate the interaction between the following institutional variables: bene-
ﬁt duration and beneﬁt replacement ratio, coordination in wage setting and union density,
and coordination and tax level. These interaction terms are measured as the deviations
from country speciﬁc means. For instance, the interaction between coordination and tax
is equal to (CO−CO)(TW − TW ), where CO and TW are the country speciﬁc mean of
that variable.
3.3.3 Structural breaks
In the theoretical section, we showed that also other factors than the institutional variables
can enter the ﬁnal equation of unemployment.
Previous studies oﬀer two ways of handling this feature of the data: First, some
studies include theoretically motivated variables that represent short-run changes in the
unemployment rates, cf. Blanchard andWolfers (2000) and Nickell et al. (2005). Examples
are the change in the interest rate and residuals from short-run changes in labour demand.
A second and a complimentary approach is to give special treatment of some years, or
some countries in the data set, on account of signiﬁcant historical events. One example of
this approach is Bassanini and Duval (2006) who model Finland, Sweden and Germany
separately, because of the eﬀects of the collapse of the Soviet Union on these economies.
In this paper, we take a third approach; we systematically treat the rate of unem-
ployment as a variable which is subject to intermittent structural breaks that may lead
to location-shifts. The argument is that the eﬀect of changes in institutional variables
on unemployment are likely to be gradual, and are modelled by relatively long lags in
accordance with theory above. We have also shown that it is complementary to this
hypothesis that the intermittent but large changes in the unemployment rate from one
year to another can be due to other factors than institutions, like extraneous or domestic
demand shocks, changes in households’ preferences for work and leisure or changes in
pro-or counter-cyclical economic policies. On the other hand, if the shocks are permanent
they could in principle also capture omitted institutions.
To identify shocks in an objective way, we have used the procedures in Autometrics
for ﬁnding the breaks, see Doornik (2009). For each country, we speciﬁed a second-order
91
Chapter 3. The role of institutions in unemployment dynamics and equilibrium.
autoregression, and then used two methods called “large outlier” and “impulse saturation”
to estimate the structural breaks. The method of “large outlier” adds dummies for years
with signiﬁcant outliers. “Impulse saturation” ﬁrst adds dummies for each year and
then uses the algorithms for automatic model selection to produce a ﬁnal model with
a smaller set of signiﬁcant structural breaks. The properties of this class of automatic
model selection procedures using Autometrics are discussed in Castle et al. (2010) and
Hendry and Mizon (2010).
Research shows that it is advisable to use a lower level of signiﬁcance for “impulse
saturation” than for “large outliers”, and the breaks used in the following are based on the
signiﬁcance level 5 percent of a “large outlier” and 2.5 or lower for impulse saturation, see
Doornik (2009). The result is a relatively small number of break dummies. With “large
outliers”, there is typically just a couple of break dummies. With “impulse saturation”,
there are more breaks. Based on table 9, the average number of breaks per country from
“impulse saturation” is 5.45. With the “large outlier” approach, the average number of
breaks is only 1.65.
The majority of the shocks in table 9 are negative location shifts (higher ut), but there
are also positive shocks, in particular in the results from “impulse saturation”. Some of
these represent the eﬀects of the well-know housing and credit market booms (for example
the UK in 1988 and Norway in 2007). There are also eﬀects of “bubbles” that burst at a
later stage, for example in the UK in 1991.
Table 9: Impulse saturation and large outlier
Country Impulse saturation Large outlier
Australia 1975, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1990, 1991, 1992 1983, 1991
Austria 1975, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1989, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2007 1982
Belgium 1975, 1981, 1993, 2001, 2002 1975, 1981
Canada 1970, 1975, 1982, 1991 1982, 1991
Denmark 1975, 1981, 1986, 1994 1994
Finland 1967, 1969, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1997 1991, 1992
France 1975, 1984, 1995, 2000, 2007 2000
Germany 1975, 1981, 1982, 1992 1968, 1992
Ireland 1971, 1972, 1975, 1981, 1983, 1995, 1998 1975, 1981, 1983
Italy 1974, 1986, 1993, 1998 1986
Japan 1975, 1988, 2004 1998
Netherlands 1981, 1982, 1983, 1993 1981, 1982, 1984
New Zealand 1983, 1988, 1991 1991
Norway 1975, 1988, 1989, 2006 1989, 2006
Portugal 1970, 1975, 1987, 1993, 1998 1970
Spain 1980, 1984, 1990, 1992, 1993, 2002 1993
Sweden 1971, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2003 1993, 1996
Switzerland 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2003 1991
UK 1964, 1973, 1980, 1981, 1988, 1991 1981, 1991
United States 1975, 1980, 1982 1975, 1982
To check whether the location-shifts capture something else than the eﬀects of variation
in our institutional variables, we have constructed two (“N ×T”) data series by using the
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Table 10: Correlations between breaks and changes in institutions
Saturation break Break by large outlier
Coeﬃcent Observations Coeﬃcent Observations
Impulse saturation 1.00 960.00
Change in employment protection -0.07 940.00 -0.07 940.00
Change in beneﬁt replacement ratio 0.01 940.00 -0.00 940.00
Change in beneﬁt duration -0.06 940.00 -0.07 940.00
Change in union density 0.12 870.00 0.04 870.00
Change in coordination -0.14 940.00 -0.13 940.00
Change in tax rate -0.09 935.00 -0.09 935.00
Large outlier detection 1.00 960.00
Obs. 960 960
estimated coeﬃcients for the break-dummies, and calculated the correlations between the
two location-shift series and the institutional variables, see table 10.
We observe that the correlation between changes in institutions and breaks is generally
low, indicating that the breaks do not capture changes in institutions.
The estimated breaks are interpretable on basis of recent economic history. For ex-
ample, the years 1981-82 are years with location shifts in the unemployment rates of nine
countries (seven European countries plus Australia and the US). These years followed
the stagﬂation in the 1970s, the two oil-price shocks, widespread closures in traditional
manufacturing in many OECD countries, and marked the start of an evolution of a post-
industrial society in many of these countries. For the US in particular, there is only a few
well deﬁned breaks, in line with the perception of the US labour market as a ﬂexible one.
The ﬁrst US break, in 1975, can be interpreted as the eﬀect of the oil-price shock. In our
interpretation, the break in 1982 captures the eﬀect of the FED’s increase of the interest
rate to 20 percent at the beginning of the 1980s. This policy was motivated by the need
to curb inﬂation and much of the eﬀect of the interest rate on inﬂation “went through”
the labour market and the rate of unemployment. Another concentration of breaks (8)
occur in the ﬁrst years of the 1990s. This time, the Nordic countries, Finland and Sweden
in particular, were also subject to very large cyclical ﬂuctuations and involuntary sharp
increase in unemployment.
3.4 Econometric issues
Our primary interest is to estimate the ﬁnal equation for unemployment, equation (23),
derived in section 3.2. To ensure suﬃcient variation in institutional indicators that may
inﬂuence the wage and price mark-ups and therefore also unemployment, we follow Nickell
et al. (2005) and use macro panel data that consists of 20 OECD countries; however, we
extend the period from 1960 to 2007. The evolution of the variables is described in detail
in section 3.3, and the deﬁnitions and sources are given in the 3.A.
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Equation (23) is rewritten to account for country variation i:
uit = β0i+β1uit−1+β2uit−2+β3uit−3+β4Iit−1+β5Iit−2+β6Dit+β7Dit−1+β8Dit−2+it (33)
where i = 1, 2, ... 20 and t = 1960, 1961, ... 2007. Theoretically, it is a combination
of disturbances in price and wage setting, ﬁrms’ hiring, and the labour supply. We do
not impose any particular error structure from the outset. Instead, we test the residual
properties of a given speciﬁcation of the regression and take note if e.g. a test statistic
for residual autocorrelation is signiﬁcant.
Formally, in panel data terminology, the model in equation (1) has heterogeneity in one
dimension of the panel, country-speciﬁc shifts, and is referred to as one-way heterogeneity
(Baltagi, 2008). The country-speciﬁc shifts are unobserved, but may be correlated with
the explanatory variables and are therefore modelled by the inclusion of dummies for
each country. In the case of correlation, omission of β0i in the model would lead to a bias
in the estimation of the parameters of the other explanatory variables. Moreover, since
the variables that constitute Dit consist of dummies for country-speciﬁc structural breaks
(for example large demand shocks), we can also interpret the equation as a model with
two-way heterogeneity, i.e. with time eﬀects.
It seems plausible that there is more heterogeneity in the “real world” than what
our model is furnished with. However, in this paper, we are only interested in the aver-
age equilibrium unemployment, and we believe that the heterogeneity modelled here is
suﬃcient for this purpose.
Estimation of equation (1) by OLS, called the least square dummy variable approach
(LSDV), leads to biased and inconsistent estimates in the cross section dimention even if
the error term it is not serially correlated, see (Baltagi, 2008, Ch. 8).
A popular alternative approach to the LSDV approach relies on transforming model
(1) to ﬁrst diﬀerences, thus eliminating the individual eﬀect. The procedure is then
to instrument for the variables that are correlated with the error term and perform a
two-stage least square estimation. In this case, the endogenous variable Δuit−1 is, by
construction, correlated with Δit and should be replaced by an instrument. Note also
that if the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is rejected empirically, the endogenous
variable of a higher lag order will also be correlated with the disturbances and needs to
be instrumented for, and the ﬁrst available instrument will be of higher order too.
A valid instrument is correlated with the endogenous variable and uncorrelated with
the error term. The ﬁrst available instrument correlated with Δuit−1 and uncorrelated
with the error term (assuming no autocorrelation), is unemployment in period t− 2. The
instrument can also work as an instrument later periods. The number of instruments is
therefore quadratic in t. Note also that diﬀerences can be used as instruments. The ﬁrst
available instrument in diﬀerences is Δuit−2, but this variable is highly correlated with
the second endogenous variable Δuit−2. To avoid multicollinearity problems, the ﬁrst
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available instrument is from order four, Δuit−4. The exogenous variables are alternative
instruments to lagged values of the endogenous variable both in levels and in diﬀerences,
and can be used as instruments in all time periods.
The Sargan (1958) test is commonly used, see Ma´tya´s and Sevestre (2008, Ch. 4)
in the evaluation of the absence of any (asymptotic) correlation between instrumental
variables and the disturbances. However, it should be keep in mind that a signiﬁcant
Sargan test can be a sign of econometric misspeciﬁcation, see Davidson and MacKinnon
(2004, Ch. 8.6 and 8.7).
“Diﬀerence GMM” follows from the ﬁrst diﬀerences approach, but instead of using
only one of the available instruments above, the method uses all available instruments in
levels in a one- and two-step procedure, see Baltagi (2008). The calculations are quite
complicated but the intuition is that the one-step estimator is derived by replacing the
endogenous right-hand side variable in the ﬁrst diﬀerentiated version of equation (1) with
all available instruments in levels in a two-stage least square estimation. In our case,
this means replacing Δuit−1 by a lagged level of unemployment from t − 2 and higher.
The two-step estimator uses the residuals from the one-step process and calculates the
variance for each group in the sample. The empirical variance is then used to adjust
the weights of each group in the sample, so that the country with the largest variance
has least weight when deriving the estimator. The latter GMM estimator requires no
knowledge concerning the initial conditions or the distributions of it or the ﬁxed eﬀect
μit (Baltagi, 2008). If the error term is white noise, the one- and two-step estimators will
be asymptotically equivalent.
However, the use of “Diﬀerence GMM” on equation (1) is not straightforward in a
panel with many time periods because the number of instruments becomes very large,
this problem is known as instrument proliferation see for instance Bowsher (2002) and
Roodman (2009). The problem aﬀects both the one-step and the two-step estimators.
Disregarding the loss of possible instruments due to multicollinearity problems, the in-
struments grows quadratic in t, and in our case, the number of available instruments is
472. The literature notes three problems with many available instruments, this is also
our experience: First, we ﬁnd that applying the “Diﬀerence GMM” method overﬁts the
endogenous variable, and the GMM result approaches the OLS results. Second, the num-
ber of sample moments used to estimate the optimal weighting matrix for the identifying
moments between the instruments and the errors, var[z′], is equal to 474. This means
that the optimal weighting matrix is uniquely identiﬁed. Third, this second problem also
causes a bias in the Sargan (1958) and Hansen test, see Roodman (2009) and Bowsher
(2002). Our results are in line with these ﬁndings; the Sargan test rejects the existence
of correlation, but the Hansen test showed an implausibly high rejection with a p-value
equal to one.
In line with the recommendations from Roodman (2009), we have reduced the number
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of moment conditions by restricting the number of instruments in two ways: First, the
number of lags available as GMM instruments is reduced to 8. Second, the number of
moments to be estimated is reduced by collapsing the instrument matrix, which reduces
the number of variances per country.
Despite using these methods to reduce available instruments, the results from GMM
estimation show a much too large diﬀerence between the LSDV results and the GMM
results, i.e. they cannot be interpreted as only being corrections of the ﬁnite i bias in
the ﬁxed eﬀect model5. For instance, the estimated coeﬃcient of the lagged endogenous
variable changed by a factor of three. In addition, there was a large change in the numer-
ical values of the estimates of the exogenous variables; for instance, beneﬁt replacement
changed sign. The reduction in available instruments is therefore probably not suﬃcient
to avoid the erratic behavior of the estimators in this complex model. Also in this case
did the Hansen test show rejection with an implausible high p-value equal to one. Note
also that the theory gives no clear guidelines for the choice of how to reduce the number
of lags available as instruments before the “collapse” function is applied to the model.
We have tried with a diﬀerent number of lags, but all choices reveal erratic behavior of
the estimates and large variations (not reported for space consideration).
Another aspect is that several of the LSDV estimates of the coeﬃcients in equation (1)
are insigniﬁcant. The implication of applying the “Diﬀerence GMM” method on a model
with insigniﬁcant variables is not clear. In practice, a straightforward implementation
of the “Diﬀerence GMM” means that we instrument the lagged unemployment rate with
many weak instruments. It is not clear how this method will aﬀect the weighted matrix or
how the resulting estimates should be interpreted. The standard deviation of the residuals
in the estimated model has increased by 100 percent, and clearly worsens the ﬁt of the
model. The hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation is not rejected, but this is not a
problem for consistency. The relevant statistic for the consistency property is the test for
the absence of second-order autocorrelation, and this hypothesis is not rejected.
Our results might also suﬀer from a weak instrument problem caused by the trans-
formation to ﬁrst diﬀerences when the unemployment rate is close to a random walk, see
Ma´tya´s and Sevestre (2008, Ch. 8). Then, past unemployment levels convey little infor-
mation about future changes in the same variable, and untransformed lags may be weak
instruments for transformed variables. If past changes are better predictors for current
levels than past levels are of current changes, new instruments are more relevant. In our
panel data set, the weak correlation between the lags and diﬀerences in unemployment
rates can be seen in table 11.
This brief overview shows that several alternative estimators exist to the LSDV estima-
tor, but each of the alternatives has its own problems. The bias related to the ﬁxed-eﬀect
model should therefore be judged against problems associated with the instrumental vari-
5All results from the “Diﬀerence GMM” method are available upon request
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Table 11: Correlations between lagged values of unemployment and diﬀerences
Unemployment rate (U) 1st diﬀ. in unempl. rate (DU)
Coeﬃcient Observations Coeﬃcient Observations
U this period 1.00 959.00 0.09 939.00
U previous period 0.97 939.00 -0.15 939.00
U two years ago 0.92 919.00 -0.26 919.00
U three years ago 0.85 899.00 -0.29 899.00
U four years ago 0.80 879.00 -0.27 879.00
U ﬁve years ago 0.75 859.00 -0.24 859.00
DU this period 0.09 939.00 1.00 939.00
DU prev. period 0.20 919.00 0.46 919.00
DU two years ago 0.23 899.00 0.11 899.00
DU three years ago 0.21 879.00 -0.12 879.00
DU four years ago 0.17 859.00 -0.16 859.00
DU ﬁve years ago 0.14 839.00 -0.14 839.00
Obs. 959 959
able alternatives. On the other hand, the diﬀerences in estimators might imply that more
than one estimator should be considered in a macro model like equation (1). We have
chosen to report the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator, and the one- and two-step estimator for the
reduced model where only signiﬁcant variables enter as explanatory variables.
3.5 Empirical results
In this section, we start by estimating versions of equation (1) where we allow for other
forcing variables than the institutional factors, namely the “structural breaks” that we
motivated in section 3.3. First, we discuss the role of institutions within this model. Then
we explore whether the results are sensitive to the dynamic speciﬁcation or the choice of
method of detecting structural breaks.
3.5.1 The role of institutions
The column marked “All countries” in table 12 shows the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation results
of equation (1) with the sequence of location-shift dummies obtained from the “large
residuals” method. The lower part of the table contains the two χ2-test relevant for the
role of institutions. They both reject their respective joint null-hypotheses of no eﬀect
of institutions. The value of the test statistic for the signiﬁcance of levels eﬀects of the
institutional variables is 37.63, and the value of the test statistics for the signiﬁcance of the
interaction terms is 22.62. From the detailed coeﬃcient estimates of the diﬀerent variables,
we see that the level of employment protection and the beneﬁt replacement ratio are both
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level so that both stricter employment protection
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and higher replacement ratio lead to higher unemployment. For the two interaction
terms, only the short-term eﬀects are signiﬁcant, the change in the interaction between
coordination and union density, and the change in interaction between coordination and
taxes signiﬁcantly reduces unemployment. At the signiﬁcance level of 10 percent there
is also evidence of a long-term eﬀect on unemployment from the interaction between
beneﬁt replacement ratio and beneﬁt duration, so that a change in this variable increases
unemployment.
Table 12: Estimates from the ﬁxed eﬀect model with large outlier dummies
All countries All countriesa Heterosc. Red. data setb
Coef. Std Coef. Std Coef. Std Coef. Std
Unemployment prev. period 1.38 0.03 1.31 0.03 1.45 0.03 1.38 0.03
Unemployment two years ago -0.52 0.05 -0.43 0.05 -0.65 0.05 -0.52 0.05
Unemployment three years ago 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.06 0.03
Employment protection (EPL), 1st diﬀ. prev. period 0.12 0.24 -0.11 0.22 0.10 0.21 0.14 0.25
EPL, two years ago 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.07
Beneﬁt replacement ratio (BRR), 1st diﬀ. prev. period -0.89 0.81 -0.85 0.73 -0.64 0.69 -0.88 0.84
BRR, two periods ago 0.63 0.24 0.35 0.21 0.55 0.20 0.63 0.26
Beneﬁt duration (BD), 1st diﬀ. prev. period -0.51 0.54 -0.36 0.49 -0.14 0.43 -0.49 0.56
BD, two periods ago 0.00 0.17 -0.13 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.18
Interaction - BRR and BD, 1st diﬀ. prev. period -2.59 2.03 -1.31 1.81 -1.37 1.63 -2.90 2.16
Interaction - BRR and BD two periods ago 1.17 0.63 1.16 0.56 1.05 0.52 1.27 0.68
Interaction - CO and UDNET, 1st diﬀ. prev. period -4.16 2.15 -3.62 1.92 -3.06 2.35 -4.30 2.43
Interaction - CO and UDNET two periods ago -0.77 0.46 -0.86 0.41 -1.05 0.36 -0.98 0.53
Interaction - CO and TW, 1st diﬀ. prev. period -8.02 2.48 -6.05 2.24 -4.63 1.92 -8.40 2.70
Interaction - CO and TW two periods ago -0.18 0.81 0.10 0.71 -0.19 0.63 -0.05 0.84
Union density (UDNET), 1st diﬀ. prev. period 0.43 2.02 1.84 1.88 -0.18 1.87 0.56 2.29
UDNET, two periods ago 0.26 0.28 0.11 0.30 0.23 0.27 0.39 0.31
Coordination (CO), 1st diﬀ. prev. period 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.18 0.18
CO, two periods ago -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.00 0.04
Tax rate (TW), 1st diﬀ. prev. period -0.29 1.52 1.74 1.40 1.67 1.31 -0.05 1.61
TW, two periods ago 0.48 0.53 0.40 0.55 0.63 0.46 0.42 0.57
Break by Large outlier approach 0.94 0.05 0.79 0.04 0.90 0.05 0.94 0.05
Tot. obs and the number of countries 837 20 837 20 837 20 761 18
Standard deviation of residuals 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6
χ2 of all the exogenous variables.c 531.93 (0.00) 417.04 (0.00) 451.42 (0.00) 490.27 (0.00)
χ2 of institutional variables (level).c 37.63 (0.00) 31.41 (0.03) 37.33 (0.00) 33.83 (0.01)
χ2 of institutional variables (interaction).c 22.62 (0.00) 20.28 (0.00) 22.52 (0.00) 21.47 (0.00)
1st order autocorrelationc 0.37 (0.71) 0.37 (0.71) 0.37 (0.71) 0.51 (0.61)
2nd order autocorrelationc -1.71 (0.09) -1.71 (0.09) -1.71 (0.09) -1.49 (0.14)
a) With time dummies.
b) Without New Zealand and Switzerland.
c) Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for the relevant null.
Table 12 also contains three additional estimation results; “All countriesa” which in-
cludes time dummies for each year which are common to all the countries in the sample,
“Heterosc.” which is a GLS estimation which accounts for heterogeneity in the error term
and “Red. data set” which excludes New Zealand and Switzerland due to the unrealistic
low values for unemployment at the beginning of the period, see section 3.3 for data de-
tails. Time dummies are included in “All countriesa” since macroeconomic shocks that are
common to all countries in the sample might bias the estimated coeﬃcents. “Heterosc.”
is included as a robustness test since the theoretical derivation shows that the disturbance
term of the model may contain short term inﬂuences from changes in the world price and
productivity growth, cf. equation (24) above.
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For all models in table 12, the conclusions based on the χ2-test are the same as in the
“All countries” model, which is one way of illustrating the importance of institutions. A
closer inspection of table 12 reveals that, as a rule, the sign and the signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients in “All countries” are retained in all models. The exception is employment
protection, which is insigniﬁcant in the “All countriesa” model.
When it comes down to results for other individual variables, both the direct eﬀect
of union density and the direct eﬀect of tax rates have changed signs in the “Heterosc.”
model. However, it is not obvious what the correct short-run coeﬃcient is. Several authors
have claimed that the causality between institutions and unemployment is unclear: For
instance, a higher coordination level can imply lower wage claims if the coordination
level is above a certain level, cf. Calmfors et al. (1988). The wage claims are then a
function of the degree of coordination, where medium level of coordination results in the
highest wage clams. The low and high coordination levels result in low wage claims. A
similar argument also applies to union density. Holden and Raaum (1991) argue that
increased union density in some cases may facilitate wage moderation and thus induce
lower unemployment.
The long-run solution to the estimated model in table 12, “All countries”, is presented
in equation (34). The numbers in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients are asymptotic stan-
dard deviations, and the long-run t-values can be obtained by dividing the estimated
coeﬃcients by these standard deviations. The long-term eﬀects of institutions all have
the signs that we expect from theory. Beneﬁt duration, coordination and the interaction
between beneﬁt replacement ratio and beneﬁt duration, increase unemployment, while
the interaction between coordination and union density decreases unemployment. The
long-run t-value is larger than two in absolute value for all these variables. The institu-
tional variables which are signiﬁcant in the long-run equation correspond well to those
variables which have low p-values in table 12.
u∗ = Constant + 1.6
(0.9)
EPL+ 7.6
(2.2)
BRR + 0.03
(1.6)
BD
+ 3.1
(2.8)
UDNET − 0.1
(0.5)
CO + 5.2
(6.4)
TW + 14.2
(5.5)
(BRR−BRR)(BD − BD)
− 9.1
(3.5)
(CO − CO)(UDNET − UDNET )− 3.0
(6.9)
(CO − CO)(TW − TW ) (34)
We illustrate the quantitative eﬀect of institutions on the average OECD unemploy-
ment rate by two dynamic simulations of the “All countries” model in table 12. Both
simulations start in 1969 and end in 2007. The ﬁrst simulation is conditional on the
actual values of all non-modelled exogenous variables over the solution period. We call
this the solution with time varying institutions. The second simulation is based on con-
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stant values (from 1968) of the institutional variables, and we call this the solution with
constant institutions. The residual term is set to zero in both simulations. The result of
the simulation is shown in ﬁgure 2.
Overall, the model with “large outlier breaks” seems to ﬁt the data quite well since
the gap between the simulated unemployment rate and actual unemployment is small
in ﬁgure 2. The unweighted average unemployment rate in OECD is estimated to be
6.0 percent in 2007 which is close to 5.5 percent, i.e. the actual value of the average
unemployment rate in OECD in 2007. The ﬁgure also shows a small gap between the
simulation with time-varying and constant institutions, and illustrate that only a small
part of the evolution of unemployment can be attributed to changes in institutions. Note
however that on average there have been only small changes in the institutional variables
over the OECD countries in table 13.
Figure 2: Dynamic simulation of the OECD average unemployment rate. Estimated
coeﬃcient values from table 12 “All countries” (break by large outlier). Simulations with
and without time varying institutions
Several of the variables in table 12 and also in equation (34) have insigniﬁcant esti-
mated coeﬃcients. When we drop all variables that are insigniﬁcant at the 10 percent
level from table 12 in “All countries” and reestimate the simpliﬁed equation, we obtain
the more parsimonious model in the column of table 14 labelled “Fixed eﬀects”. The
results show that the variables which have sizable eﬀects in the general model remain
signiﬁcant and the values of the estimated coeﬃcients are of the same magnitude also in
the simpliﬁed model. The corresponding long-run equation is:
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u∗ = Constant + 2.0
(0.8)
EPL+ 7.9
(1.8)
BRR
+ 13.5
(7.5)
(BRR−BRR)(BD − BD)− 9.6
(4.2)
(CO − CO)(UDNET − UDNET ) (35)
We can use equation (35) to illustrate the long-run eﬀects of labour market institutions
in a diﬀerent way than the dynamic simulation. One of the most signiﬁcant variables is the
beneﬁt replacement ratio. The average value is equal to 0.5 in 2007. According to equation
(35), a reduction in the beneﬁt replacement ratio of 20 percent will decrease average OECD
unemployment with 0.8 percentage points. Note that the eﬀect is somewhat stronger if
the interaction eﬀect with beneﬁt duration is included. The overall conclusion is that the
change in labour market institutions have to be quite large in order to lower the OECD
unemployment rate substantially.
Table 13: Actual changes in institutions over the period 1960 to 2007
Institutional variable X: X¯a69−60 − X¯b89−85 X¯c07−00 − X¯b89−85 X¯c07−00 − X¯a07−60
Employoment protection (EPL) -0.03 -0.36 -0.39
Beneﬁt replacement ratio (BRR) 0.21 0.01 0.22
Beneﬁt duration (BD) 0.13 0.15 0.28
Interaction BRR BD -0.04 0.00 -0.04
Interaction CO UDNET 0.00 0.00 0.00
Interaction CO TW 0.01 0.01 0.02
Union density (UDNET) 0.03 -0.08 -0.05
Coordination (CO) -0.47 0.00 -0.48
Tax rate (TW) 0.10 0.03 0.13
a) X¯69−60 is the average level of the institutional variable in the period 1960 to 1969.
b) X¯89−85 is the average level of the institutional variable in the period 1985 to 1989.
c) X¯07−00 is the average level of the institutional variable in the period 2000 to 2007.
Table 14 also contains the results of the Arellano-Bond one- and two-step estimation
method, with lagged levels of unemployment in addition to the exogenous variables as
GMM instruments. The main impression is that there are small diﬀerences between the
results for the two estimation methods, and all variables except for taxes have the same
sign (compare the results under “Fixed eﬀects”, “Arellano bond, onestep” and “Arellano
bond, two step” in table 14). Taken at face value, this shows that the “bias-problem” of
the LSDV estimator does not constitute a major issue for the parsimonious model. This
is as expected for a sample like ours, where the time series are quite long and there are
no roots “on” the unit circle.
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Table 14: Estimation result for a simpliﬁed model with large outlier dummies, ﬁxed eﬀects
and Arellano Bond one-step and two-step.
Fixed eﬀects Arellano bond, onestep Arellano bond, twostep
Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value
Unemployment prev. period 1.37 0.02 0.00 1.19 0.06 0.00 1.17 0.04 0.00
Unemployment two years ago -0.45 0.02 0.00 -0.40 0.03 0.00 -0.43 0.04 0.00
EPL, two years ago 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.40 0.23 0.08 0.46 0.13 0.00
BRR, two periods ago 0.60 0.20 0.00 0.45 0.63 0.48 0.33 0.62 0.60
Interaction - BRR and BD two periods ago 0.98 0.55 0.07 0.35 1.67 0.83 0.45 1.41 0.75
Interaction - CO and UDNET 1st diﬀ. prev. period -4.59 2.09 0.03 -6.14 2.74 0.03 -5.30 0.83 0.00
Interaction - CO and TW 1st diﬀ. prev. period -7.58 2.37 0.00 -8.38 2.75 0.00 -4.89 3.14 0.12
Break by Large outlier approach 0.95 0.04 0.00 0.83 0.05 0.00 0.79 0.02 0.00
Tot. obs and the number of countries 913 20 893 20 893 20
Standard deviation of residuals 0.59 0.52 0.52
χ2 of all the exogenous variables.a 26.69 (0.00) 17.32 (0.00) 95.17 (0.00)
χ2 of institutional variables (level).a 10.99 (0.00) 3.23 (0.20) 11.99 (0.00)
χ2 of institutional variables (interaction).a 17.00 (0.00) 12.64 (0.01) 49.81 (0.00)
1st order autocorrelationa 1.07 (0.29) -7.57 (0.00) -2.22 (0.03)
2nd order autocorrelationa -0.04 (0.97) -1.97 (0.05) -0.46 (0.64)
Sargan testa 16.35 (0.00) 16.35 (0.00)
Hansen testa 13.46 (0.04)
a) Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for the relevant null.
3.5.2 The role of dynamic speciﬁcation
We now discuss how the empirical conclusions derived in the previous section depend on
the dynamic speciﬁcation and the exact dating of institutions on unemployment.
The autoregressive part of table 12 “All countries” corresponds to a characteristic
equation with three roots; one real root is equal to 0.85 and two roots are complex with
moduli equal to 0.59. Since all roots are well inside the unit circle, the model has a stable
steady-state solution, which is also consistent with the more formal tests of stationarity in
section 3.3. The absence of a unit root is of course essential since otherwise, the dynamic
stability assumption that underlies the existence of an equilibrium level of unemployment
would be empirically unfounded. Also the other models with heterogenous residuals and
the results from the reduced data set are consistent with the assumption of a stable long-
run mean of the rate of unemployment (conditional on a ﬁxed value of the institutions).
The estimated autoregressive coeﬃcients in table 12 “All countries” correspond well
with the a priori magnitude derived from plausible assumptions for the model parameters
which we discussed in section 3.2: First, the ﬁrst-order coeﬃcient is large and positive.
Second, the coeﬃcient of ut−2 is negative and highly signiﬁcant. And, ﬁnally, ut−3 is
numerically small.
Table 15, model 1 shows the results of an estimation where the autoregressive lags
are reduced to one lag, but is otherwise similar to the model in table 12 “All countries”.
The value of the estimated autoregressive coeﬃcient is close to one. Reduced dynamics
therefore implies more persistence in the evolution of the unemployment rate. All the
signiﬁcant institutional variables in table 12 “All countries” are signiﬁcant in table 15 in
model 1, except for the interaction term between beneﬁt replacement ratio and beneﬁt
duration. In addition, beneﬁt duration, the 1st diﬀerence in union density, and union
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density in previous period are signiﬁcant in table 15 in model 1. However, the ﬁrst
order autocorrelation test in the lower part of the table rejects the hypothesis of no
autocorrelation. This is a sign of misspeciﬁcation and it also damages the formal test
based on t-values. In this sense our theoretically motivated dynamic speciﬁcation is
supported by the evidence.
As explained in the theoretical section above, the dynamic speciﬁcation of the insti-
tutional variables is based on the assumption that changes in institutions in period t− 1
jointly aﬀect unemployment and the wage- and price setting in the next period, t. From
another perspective, it might be hypothesized that we put institutional variables at a
disadvantage by excluding within year eﬀects. Indeed, the speciﬁcation without lags has
been used in previous literature, e.g. Nickell et al. (2005), Bassanini and Duval (2006)
and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
The estimation results when we change the dynamic speciﬁcation of institutions are
shown in table 15, model 2 and 3. In model 2, all the institutional variables enter con-
temporaneously and with one lag, while in model 3 the institutions enter with a level this
period. As shown in the lower part of table 15, model 2 and 3, the ﬁrst χ2-test for the
institutional variables in level rejects the hypothesis of no joint eﬀect from labour market
institutions on unemployment. However, the χ2-test for the interaction terms between the
institutional variables are insigniﬁcant. The autocorrelation tests for model 2 model reject
the hypothesis of 1st. and 2nd. order autocorrelation, while the 1st order autocorrelation
is not rejected in model 3.
Equation (36) gives the corresponding equilibrium unemployment equation for model
2 in table 15:
u∗ = Constant + 1.8
(1.0)
EPL+ 5.5
(2.1)
BRR + 0.4
(1.5)
BD
+ 5.5
(3.3)
UDNET − 0.4
(0.5)
CO + 8.6
(7.2)
TW + 11.0
(5.0)
(BRR−BRR)(BD − BD)
− 11.9
(4.6)
(CO − CO)(UDNET − UDNET )− 6.1
(8.5)
(CO − CO)(TW − TW ) (36)
The estimated coeﬃcients in this equation are not too diﬀerent from the estimated
coeﬃcient in equation 34. We conclude that the exact lag speciﬁcation is of minor impor-
tance for capturing the eﬀect of the institutional variables. This is not surprising given
that the labour market institutions change gradually.
Table 15 model 4 also shows the results of a static equation. The estimated coeﬃcients
in model 4 are completely diﬀerent from the other models, and the test of the residual
autocorrelation at the end of the table conﬁrms an increasing degree of misspeciﬁcation,
since the test statistics indicate both ﬁrst- and second-order residual autocorrelation.
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Table 15: Estimation results for the ﬁxed eﬀect model with large outlier dummies, diﬀerent
dynamic speciﬁcations
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. Std Coef. Std Coef. Std Coef. Std
Unemployment previous period 0.95 0.01 1.38 0.03 1.39 0.03
Unemployment two years ago -0.52 0.05 -0.54 0.05
Unemployment three years ago 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03
Employment protection (EPL), 1st diﬀ. prev. period -0.08 0.28
EPL, two years ago 0.28 0.08
Empl. protection (EPL), 1st diﬀerence -0.36 0.24
EPL prev. period 0.14 0.07
EPL this period 0.11 0.07 -0.87 0.24
Beneﬁt replacement ratio (BRR), 1st diﬀ. prev. period -0.54 0.94
BRR, two periods ago 0.72 0.27
Beneﬁt repl. ratio (BRR), 1st diﬀerence -0.66 0.81
BRR prev. period 0.41 0.24
BRR this period 0.50 0.23 5.62 0.80
Beneﬁt duration (BD), 1st diﬀ. prev. period -1.32 0.63
BD, two periods ago -0.13 0.19
Beneﬁt duration (BD), 1st diﬀerence -0.09 0.55
BD prev. period 0.02 0.17
BD this period 0.08 0.17 0.42 0.59
Interaction - BRR and BD, 1st diﬀ. prev. period -2.53 2.37
Interaction - BRR and BD two periods ago 0.73 0.72
Interaction BRR and BD, 1st diﬀerence -0.09 2.04
Interaction BRR and BD prev. period 0.83 0.63
Interaction BRR and BD this period 0.96 0.62 16.16 2.13
Interaction - CO and UDNET, 1st diﬀ. prev. period -6.24 2.51
Interaction - CO and UDNET two periods ago -1.28 0.53
Interaction CO and UDNET, 1st diﬀerence 0.28 2.15
Interaction CO and UDNET prev. period -0.89 0.46
Interaction CO and UDNET this period -0.81 0.45 -3.77 1.63
Interaction - CO and TW, 1st diﬀ. prev. period -9.79 2.87
Interaction - CO and TW two periods ago -0.92 0.92
Interaction CO and TW, 1st diﬀerence -2.87 2.46
Interaction CO and TW prev. period -0.31 0.81
Interaction CO and TW this period -0.45 0.80 -1.37 2.78
Union density (UDNET), 1st diﬀ. prev. period 4.54 1.87
UDNET, two periods ago 0.55 0.32
Union density (UDNET), 1st diﬀerence 6.31 2.00
UDNET prev. period 0.42 0.29
UDNET this period 0.52 0.28 4.41 0.98
Coordination (CO), 1st diﬀ. prev. period -0.08 0.20
CO, two periods ago 0.03 0.05
Coordination (CO), 1st diﬀerence 0.06 0.17
CO prev. period -0.03 0.04
CO this period -0.02 0.04 -1.34 0.14
Tax rate (TW), 1st diﬀ. prev. period -2.89 1.74
TW, two periods ago -0.27 0.60
Tax rate (TW), 1st diﬀerence -1.56 1.52
TW prev. period 0.70 0.54
TW this period 0.28 0.53 16.30 1.70
Break by large outlier 0.99 0.05 0.92 0.05 0.94 0.04 0.65 0.17
Tot. obs and the number of countries 851 20 838 20 844 20 886 20
Standard deviation of residuals 0.7 0.6 0.6 2.2
χ2 of all the exogenous variables.a 497.21 (0.00) 528.53 (0.00) 495.32 (0.00) 549.98 (0.00)
χ2 of institutional variables (level).a 70.42 (0.00) 29.54 (0.00) 12.75 (0.05) 495.24 (0.00)
χ2 of institutional variables (interaction).a 25.26 (0.00) 6.81 (0.34) 5.68 (0.13) 61.57 (0.00)
1st order autocorrelationa 3.52 (0.00) 0.09 (0.93) 3.48 (0.00) 3.70 (0.00)
2nd order autocorrelationa 0.17 (0.87) -1.61 (0.11) 0.70 (0.49) 3.64 (0.00)
a) Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for the relevant null.
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3.5.3 The role of identifying structural breaks
As discussed above, we have used two methods for estimation of location-shift variables:
“impulse saturation” and “large outliers”. As also noted, the “impulse saturation” ap-
proach leaves less variation to be explained by changes in institutions as compared to the
“large outlier” approach, simply because the “impulse saturation” approach gives more
year dummies. Whether this leads to more or less explanatory power of the included
variables remains to be seen. As a benchmark model, we also investigate the model where
we exclude the break variables.
In table 16, “All countries” shows OLS results for the ﬁxed eﬀects model with breaks
estimation determined by the “impulse saturation” method. Compared to table 12 (result
with “large outlier”approach), employment protection and the diﬀerence in union density
are no longer signiﬁcant, and the eﬀect of tax rates has changed sign even though the
eﬀect of taxes is insigniﬁcant both in tables 12 and 16.
The autoregressive part of table 16, “All countries” corresponds to a characteristic
equation with three real roots equal to 0.91, 0.27 and 0.12, this implies that also this
model has a stable steady-state solution.
The long-run solution to the estimated model in table 16 is:
u∗ = Constant + 1.3
(1.0)
EPL+ 8.2
(2.2)
BRR + 0.4
(1.7)
BD
+ 0.6
(3.0)
UDNET − 0.9
(0.5)
CO − 2.1
(6.5)
TW + 18.0
(7.6)
(BRR−BRR)(BD − BD)
− 12.8
(5.8)
(CO − CO)(UDNET − UDNET )− 5.6
(6.8)
(CO − CO)(TW − TW ) (37)
We observe that the beneﬁt replacement ratio alone, the interaction with beneﬁt duration,
and the interaction between coordination and union density all have signiﬁcant eﬀects on
unemployment. The long-run eﬀects correspond well with the variables that have low
p-values in table 16. Compared to the long-run solution in equation (34), the signiﬁ-
cant estimated coeﬃcients have nearly the same magnitude in both equations, while the
insigniﬁcant variable taxes, has changed sign.
Figure 3 shows the average dynamic simulated unemployment rate of equation (1) with
the estimated coeﬃcient values from “All countries” in tables 12, 16 and B1, where the
latter table is found in appendix 3.B. The motivation for bringing in the appendix result is
that this model is estimated without any location-shift variable, hence the corresponding
simulated solution is denoted “without breaks” in ﬁgure 3. The model with “impulse
saturation” has a visually better ﬁt than the model with “large outlier”, and the estimated
unweighted average unemployment rate in OECD with “impulse saturation” is 5.8 percent
and closer to the actual average unemployment rate than the model with dummies from
the “large outlier” data series.
A simulation with and without timevarying institutions illustrates the quantitative
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Table 16: Estimates from the ﬁxed eﬀect model with saturation breaks
All countries All countriesa Heterosc. Red. data setb
Coef. Std Coef. Std Coef. Std Coef. Std
Unemployment prev. period 1.30 0.02 1.26 0.02 1.35 0.02 1.30 0.02
Unemployment two years ago -0.39 0.04 -0.34 0.04 -0.49 0.04 -0.39 0.04
Unemployment three years ago 0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.02
Employment protection (EPL), 1st diﬀ. prev. period 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.19
EPL, two years ago 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.05
Beneﬁt replacement ratio (BRR), 1st diﬀ. prev. period -0.90 0.63 -0.88 0.59 -0.19 0.53 -0.90 0.63
BRR, two periods ago 0.52 0.19 0.34 0.17 0.45 0.16 0.52 0.19
Beneﬁt duration (BD), 1st diﬀ. prev. period -0.18 0.43 -0.07 0.40 -0.21 0.33 -0.18 0.43
BD, two periods ago 0.02 0.13 -0.10 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.13
Interaction - BRR and BD 1st diﬀ. prev. period -2.01 1.59 -1.63 1.46 -0.29 1.29 -2.01 1.59
Interaction - BRR and BD two periods ago 1.16 0.49 1.06 0.45 1.23 0.43 1.16 0.49
Interaction - CO and UDNET 1st diﬀ. prev. period -6.73 1.69 -6.08 1.56 -4.70 1.87 -6.73 1.69
Interaction - CO and UDNET two periods ago -0.84 0.36 -0.92 0.33 -1.33 0.28 -0.84 0.36
Interaction - CO and TW 1st diﬀ. prev. period -4.43 1.95 -4.00 1.81 -2.35 1.53 -4.43 1.95
Interaction - CO and TW two periods ago -0.19 0.63 -0.09 0.58 0.01 0.49 -0.19 0.63
Union density (UDNET), 1st diﬀ. prev. period -0.31 1.58 1.19 1.52 0.33 1.45 -0.31 1.58
UDNET, two periods ago 0.03 0.22 0.08 0.24 0.08 0.19 0.03 0.22
Coordination (CO), 1st diﬀ. prev. period 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.12 -0.06 0.13 0.07 0.13
CO, two periods ago -0.06 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 0.03
Tax rate (TW), 1st diﬀ. prev. period 0.74 1.19 1.83 1.13 1.84 1.01 0.74 1.19
TW, two periods ago -0.09 0.42 -0.23 0.45 0.08 0.35 -0.09 0.42
Saturation break 0.93 0.03 0.83 0.03 0.90 0.03 0.93 0.03
Tot. obs and the number of countries 837 20 837 20 837 20 837 20
Standard deviation of residuals 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5
χ2 of all the exogenous variables.c 1397.41 (0.00) 1079.91 (0.00) 1401.92 (0.00) 1397.41 (0.00)
χ2 of institutional variables (level).c 43.96 (0.00) 47.17 (0.00) 59.27 (0.00) 43.96 (0.00)
χ2 of institutional variables (interaction).c 33.42 (0.00) 33.71 (0.00) 44.04 (0.00) 33.42 (0.00)
1st order autocorrelationc 0.62 (0.53) 0.62 (0.53) 0.62 (0.53) 0.74 (0.46)
2nd order autocorrelationc -0.30 (0.76) -0.30 (0.76) -0.30 (0.76) -0.17 (0.87)
a) With time dummies.
b) Without New Zealand and Switzerland.
c) Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for the relevant null.
eﬀect of institutions on the average OECD unemployment rate. The importance of the
institutional changes for the development of unemployment appears to be stronger with
the “impulse saturation”, i.e. with the larger number of breaks, since the gap between
simulated unemployment with and without time-varying institutions is visually larger in
ﬁgure 4 than in ﬁgure 2. This result is achieved despite of the fact that the ﬁrst model
leaves less of the variation to be explained by institutions. This could illustrate the
importance of controlling for other factors inﬂuencing unemployment to achieve the true
eﬀect of institutions.
The results of the long-run steady-state projections are presented in ﬁgure 5. The
models “All countries” in tables 12, 16 and B1, where the latter is found in appendix
3.B, extending into the future the end-of-sample values of the institutional variables and
assuming no future location-shifting breaks in the rate of unemployment. This gives
some insight into the speed of unemployment adjustment. It also gives a picture of the
implied equilibrium level of unemployment, u∗, based on the assumptions just mentioned.
The steady-state solution of the estimated dynamic model in table 12 is, in practice,
determined by simulation, keeping the institutional variables ﬁxed at their 2007 level,
and by switching oﬀ the “large outlier breaks”. The simulated unemployment rate will
then converge to a steady state. The eﬀect of the “large outlier breaks” inﬂuences the
estimates of the institutional variables and the autoregressive parameter, even though
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Figure 3: Dynamic simulation of unemployment by using the estimates in tables 16, 12
and B1, “All countries”, where the latter is found in appendix 3.B
they only have a temporary eﬀect.
The graphs in ﬁgure 5 also show that even controlling for shocks that are impulses
rather than step-functions is important for the estimated level of equilibrium unemploy-
ment. Intuitively, when the structural breaks explain a larger part of the growth in
unemployment, the simulation until 2037 when no structural breaks are imposed, leads
to lower unemployment. The ﬁgure illustrates that “impulse saturation” gives the lowest
estimate for equilibrium unemployment, then comes “large outlier” and the highest level
is the model without any dummy included.
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Figure 4: Dynamic simulation coeﬃcient values from the estimation in table 16, “All coun-
tries” (saturation break) with and without time varying institutions, unweighed average
of the unemployment rate in OECD
Figure 5: Dynamic simulation of estimates in tables 16, 12 and B1, where the latter is
found in appendix 3.B from 2007 to 2037. The unweighed average of the unemployment
rate in OECD, within sample
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3.6 Conclusions
The equilibrium rate of unemployment is an important parameter in economic models
that are used for forecasting and as an aid for policy analysis and decisions. A realistic
estimate of the equilibrium rate could, for example, be used together with other targets
to assess the economic performance of the economy, and motivate medium-term ﬁscal and
monetary policies. Also when another variable than unemployment is targeted (i.e. an
inﬂation target), one priority of policy may be to avoid large destructive shocks to the
economy which threaten to shift the equilibrium rate upwards through increased long-term
unemployment and discouraged worker eﬀects, see Layard et al. (2005). Furthermore,
it may be an aim for more long-term economic policy to reduce the equilibrium rate
of unemployment through institutional and other structural reforms. These are some
of the reasons for trying to capture the main determinants of the equilibrium rate of
unemployment and model the dynamics of the actual rate of unemployment around that
equilibrium.
The results in this paper conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings that labour market institutions have
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the OECD unemployment rate. The estimated long-term eﬀects
of the institutions all have the signs as expected from theory (maybe with one excep-
tion, a increase in the union density leads to higher unemployment, but the eﬀect is not
signiﬁcant). The parsimonious long-run solution, where all variables with a lower signif-
icance level than 10 percent are dropped from the model, shows that unemployment is
increasing in the following variables: level of employment protection, the unemployment
beneﬁt replacement ratio, and the interaction between beneﬁt replacement ratio and ben-
eﬁt duration. An increase in the interaction between coordination and union density
decreases unemployment. These results imply that appropriate institutional reforms have
the potential of lowering equilibrium unemployment.
That said, if one looks at the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients, labour market
institutions have to change quite substantially to achieve a sizeable reduction in the un-
employment rate. For instance, the isolated eﬀect of a reduction in beneﬁt replacement
ratio of 20 percent, from the OECD average in 2007, will lower the average OECD un-
employment rate by 0.8 percentage points. This eﬀect is half the size of the estimated
long-run eﬀect of the unemployment beneﬁt replacement ratio that was found in Nickell
et al. (2005). The small eﬀect of institutions is consistent with historical evidence, a sim-
ulation of our main unemployment equation with and without time varying institutions
reveal a small eﬀect of institutions over the sample period, but one should be aware of
the fact that on average there have been small changes in the institutional variables over
the sample period.
Over the same period, we ﬁnd that the actual rates of unemployment have reacted to
shocks in a way that has dominated the evolution of the unemployment rate. We suggest
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to treat the rate of unemployment as a variable which is subject to intermittent structural
breaks, that may lead to location-shifts. The argument is that the eﬀect of changes in
institutional variables on unemployment are likely to be gradual, and are modelled by
relatively long lags in accordance with theory. The intermittent but large changes in
the unemployment rate from one year to another is treated as caused by other factors
than institutions, like extraneous or domestic demand shocks, changes in households’
preferences for work and leisure, or changes in pro-or counter-cyclical economic policies.
We call these changes structural breaks. We have chosen two statistical methods of
detecting such shocks, “large outliers” and “impulse saturation”.
The inclusion of structural breaks that capture location shifts in the distributions for
the unemployment rates turns out to be important for our estimate of the equilibrium
rate. If we do not correct for these structural breaks, the equilibrium rate is simulated to
almost 6.2 percent, while the lowest adjusted estimate is 4.3 percent. However, comparing
the simulation of the two models with structural breaks shows that the model with more
breaks illustrate a larger gap between time varying and constant institutions. This might
illustrate the importance of controlling for other factors inﬂuencing unemployment in
order to achieve the true eﬀect of institutions.
In terms of modelling methodology, this paper has also illustrated the importance of
the dynamic speciﬁcation of the panel data model for the rate of unemployment. We
show that a reduced lag structure on the autoregressive coeﬃcients increases the residual
autocorrelation, which might be a sign of misspeciﬁcation. The chosen dynamic speciﬁca-
tion is derived theoretically and has the status of a ﬁnal equation of a system consisting
of equations for wage and price setting and an equation of unemployment as a function
of the real exchange rate. The theoretical derivation gives a priori assumptions regarding
the magnitude of the autoregressive coeﬃcients. The assumptions are conﬁrmed by the
empirical evidence. On the other hand our results also show that the exact lag structure
of the institutional variables are of minor importance for capturing the eﬀects of labour
market institutions on unemployment.
In this paper, the shocks have been identiﬁed using the automatic model speciﬁcation
for each country. An interesting extension and improvement of this methodology is to use
the panel dimension also in the identiﬁcation of the structural breaks. Another extension
is to provide interval estimates for equilibrium rate of unemployment.
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3.A The Data: Deﬁnitions and sources
This appendix contains information about variables that are important for the evolution
of the unemployment rate in 20 OECD countries. The countries in the sample are:
Australia Finland Japan Spain
Austria France Netherlands Sweden
Belgium Germany Norway Switzerland
Canada Ireland New Zealand United Kingdom
Denmark Italy Portugal United States
The variables in this data set are divided into two groups; economic variables and
labour market institutions. This data set contains observations from 1960 to 2007.
3.A.1 Economic variables
The economic variables are available at a yearly frequency in OECD (2008a)6 and missing
observations are replaced with observations from earlier data bases OECD (2002), OECD
(2006) and OECD (2008b).7
U: Unemployment rate
The standardized unemployment rate (UNR) in Economic Outlook OECD (2008a) is
used as a primary data source for the unemployment rate in the OECD countries, and
missing observations are replaced by the growth rate in a corresponding time series in an
earlier data base, OECD (2002). Australia, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Switzerland
are prolonged by the formula in equation (A3):
Yit = Yit+1 ∗ Xit
Xit+1
(A1)
where Yit denotes (UNR) in OECD (2008a) and Xit denotes the (UNR) in the earlier
data base OECD (2002) for country i in time period t.
Australia and Denmark are prolonged ﬁve years backwards. Germany from 1991,
Spain from 1976, Switzerland from 1969 and backwards.
3.A.2 Labour market institutions
New information for institutional variables is available every second or ﬁfth year. Labour
market institutions such as the tax wedge, union density, coordination among wage setters,
and beneﬁt replacement ratio and duration are used in this paper. The variables and the
method of combining data sources are discussed in detail in the next sections.
6Data are collected and organized by the author. This implies that neither OECD nor any other
source is responsible for the analysis or the interpretation of the data in this paper.
7An comprehensive overview of data and data sources is available upon request.
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TW: Tax wedge
The rates described here are calculated from actual tax payments. The total tax wedge is
equal to the sum of the employment tax rate (t1), the direct tax rate (t2) and the indirect
tax rate (t3), as given in Equation (A4).
TW = t1 + t2 + t3 (A2)
t1 is equal to employers’ total wage costs calculated by the sum of wages received by
employees and taxes payed by the employer to the government. This gives the following
relationship; t1 = SSRG/(IE−SSRG), where SSRG is social security contributions and
IE is compensation to employees. The latter two consist of two main components, wages
and salaries and social contributions. Social contributions are payed by the employers to
social security schemes or private funded social insurance schemes. t2, are direct taxes
payed by the households (TAXh) divided by current receipts of households (CRh), i.e.
t2 = TAXh/CRh. Finally t3 = (TAXind − SUB)/Cp, where TAXind are net indirect
taxes, SUB is the value of subsidies and Cp is the value of private ﬁnal consumption
expenditure.
The main data source for tax wedges is OECD (2008c) which contains information for
the period 1960 to 2010. The latter years are predictions. The tax rates are calculated by
the formulas above, and when a tax rate is missing, the growth rate in the same tax rate
but from the data base of Nickell (2006) in the period 1960 to 2003 is used to prolong
the time series for the following countries: Belgium is prolonged before 1965, Denmark is
prolonged before 1966, Germany before 1970, Portugal is prolonged in the period 1960 to
1995 and Switzerland is prolonged before 1990 with the tax rates in OECD (2008c). Tax
rates for Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States are not prolonged and are
taken directly from the main data source OECD (2008c). New Zealand has the main
data source Nickell et al. (2005) for the period 1975 to 1986 due to missing observations
in OECD (2008c). Time series for t1, t2 and t3 from Nickell (2006) are used to extend
the main data source: The growth rate of the sum of t1 and t2 is used before 1975, and
the growth rate in t3 after 1986. Note also that the t3 is interpolated due to one missing
observation in 1991.
BRR: Beneﬁt replacement rates
The beneﬁt replacement ratio is a measure of how much each unemployed worker receives
in beneﬁts from the government. The beneﬁt replacement ratio is described in detail
below.
The detailed rate for unemployment beneﬁts divides data in three diﬀerent family
types: single, with a dependent spouse and with a working spouse. The beneﬁts also
depend on the employment situation: 67 percent and 100 percent of the average earn-
ings. Within these groups, beneﬁts are divided into the duration of beneﬁts when being
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unemployed. One variable for how much each of the former groups receives in the ﬁrst
year, the second and third year and the fourth and ﬁfth year. This results in six diﬀerent
groups: brr67a1, brr67a2, brr67a4, brr100a1, brr100a2 and brr100a4.
brr67a1: First year beneﬁt replacement rate for workers with 67 percent of average
earnings and the average over family types.
brr67a2: Beneﬁt replacement rate for the second and third year. 67 percent of average
earnings and the average over family types
brr67a4: Beneﬁt replacement rate for the fourth and ﬁfth year. 67 percent of average
earnings and the average over family types
brr100a1, brr100a2 and brr100a4: The same as the former but for 100 percent of
average earnings.
The main source for the more detailed beneﬁt ratios is tables in employment outlook,
see OECD (2004). Observations are provided every second year from 1961 to 2001. The
time series are interpolated over the years, and extracted by the last known observation.
BD: Beneﬁt duration
Beneﬁt duration is a measure of how long the beneﬁts last when being unemployed.
The ratio is calculated by the time series described under beneﬁt replacement rates and
equation (A5).
BDjit = α
brrja2it
brrja1it
+ (1− α)brrja4it
brrja1it
(A3)
where α = 0.6, j = {67, 100}, i = 1, 2...20 and t = 1960, 1961...2007. brrja1it is the
beneﬁt replacement rate in year 1, brrja2it is the beneﬁt replacement rate in year 2 and
3, and ﬁnally, brrja4it is the beneﬁt replacement rate in years 4 and 5. α = 0.6 gives more
weight to the second and third year as compared to the fourth and ﬁfth year. The index
is calculated for both employment situations, i.e. 67 percent and 100 percent of average
earnings.
The average of bd67it and bd100it is used as an indicator of beneﬁt duration, i.e. BDit.
If beneﬁt duration stops after one year, then brr67a2 = brr67a4 = 0, and BD67 = 0.
If beneﬁt provision is constant over the years, then brr67a1 = brr67a2 = brr67a4, and
BD67 = 1. However, some countries increase payments over time and the value of beneﬁt
duration is above one.
UDNET: Union density
Union density rates are constructed using the number of union memberships divided by
the number of employed.
The main data source is Visser (2009), where they have mainly calculated the trade
union density index based on surveys. When data were unavailable, they have used
administrative data adjusted for non-active and self-employed members. The database
Nickell (2006) contains additional information for Sweden before 1975 and Ireland in 1960.
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The time series for Sweden in the latter source is interpolated, and this growth rate is
then used to prolong the original time series from Visser (2009).
The interaction terms between union density and coordination are prolonged by the
last known observation for these countries.
CO: Coordination of wage setting
The index for coordination of wage setting describes the coordination level in the wage
setting. The index ranges from 1 to 5, and the most coordinated countries have an index
equal to 5:
The main source is OECD (2004), see table 3.5. The frequency for observations are
ﬁve-year intervals over the period 1970-2000. The years are interpolated between means,
i.e. between 1972-1977, and with 1970 and 2000 equal to the ﬁrst and last ﬁve-year
intervals. In the period 1960 to 1970, the observations are prolonged backwards by the
last known observation for all countries. The same procedure is used to extend the time
series until 2007.
EPL: Employment protection
The time series for employment protection measures the strictness of the employment
protection for the employer. The overall measure for employment protection is measured
on a scale from 0 to 5. Strictness is increasing in scale. Some other measures only measure
the employment protection for regular- or temporary employment.
The time series for employment protection is provided by OECD (2004) for the period
1985 to 2004. The time series are based on the point observations in Annex 2.A2. 6.
Note, however, that OECD (2004) claims that judgement is made when constructing the
time series. That implies that time series for employment protection not are only a linear
interpolation between the point observations. The measure of employment protection
refers to the protection of overall employment (EPL).
Before 1985, the time series are prolonged backwards using data from Belot and van
Ours (2004). The source contains data in ﬁve-year intervals, but the data are here used
annually by interpolation between the means of the observation points. The percentage
change is used to prolong the time series in OECD (2004), by equation (A6):
Yt = Yt+1 ∗ Xt
Xt+1
where Y = epl and X = ERTOT bo (A4)
Portugal and Spain are prolonged backwards by the last known observation in the
period 1960 to 1984. The United States is prolonged backwards by the last known obser-
vation in the period 1960 to 1982.
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3.B
Table B1: Estimates from the ﬁxed eﬀect model without dummy variable.
All countries Heterogenous residuals Reduced dataseta
Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value
Unemployment previous period 1.39 0.03 0.00 1.49 0.03 0.00 1.40 0.04 0.00
Unemployment two years ago -0.56 0.06 0.00 -0.75 0.06 0.00 -0.57 0.06 0.00
Unemployment three years ago 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.06
Employment protection (EPL), 1st diﬀerence previous period 0.08 0.29 0.78 0.06 0.25 0.81 0.10 0.31 0.76
EPL, two years ago 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.17 0.09 0.06
Beneﬁt replacement ratio (BRR), 1st diﬀerence previous period 0.44 1.00 0.66 -0.10 0.82 0.90 0.49 1.04 0.64
BRR, two periods ago 0.95 0.29 0.00 0.72 0.23 0.00 0.94 0.32 0.00
Beneﬁt duration (BD), 1st diﬀerence previous period -0.87 0.67 0.20 -0.33 0.50 0.52 -0.79 0.69 0.25
BD, two periods ago -0.19 0.21 0.37 -0.03 0.17 0.85 -0.13 0.22 0.54
Interaction - BRR and BD 1st diﬀerence previous period 1.24 2.49 0.62 0.03 1.89 0.99 1.13 2.65 0.67
Interaction - BRR and BD two periods ago 1.66 0.77 0.03 1.18 0.60 0.05 1.82 0.84 0.03
Interaction - CO and UDNET 1st diﬀerence previous period -2.40 2.65 0.36 -0.86 2.82 0.76 -3.05 3.00 0.31
Interaction - CO and UDNET two periods ago -1.22 0.57 0.03 -1.49 0.43 0.00 -1.53 0.65 0.02
Interaction - CO and TW 1st diﬀerence previous period -13.29 3.04 0.00 -6.90 2.34 0.00 -14.20 3.31 0.00
Interaction - CO and TW two periods ago -0.48 0.99 0.63 -0.33 0.78 0.67 -0.25 1.03 0.81
Union density (UDNET), 1st diﬀerence previous period -0.22 2.49 0.93 -1.11 2.21 0.61 0.18 2.82 0.95
UDNET, two periods ago 0.66 0.35 0.06 0.49 0.32 0.12 0.85 0.38 0.03
Coordination (CO), 1st diﬀerence previous period -0.54 0.20 0.01 -0.51 0.20 0.01 -0.47 0.22 0.03
CO, two periods ago -0.06 0.05 0.22 -0.03 0.05 0.56 -0.04 0.05 0.40
Tax rate (TW), 1st diﬀerence previous period 0.03 1.87 0.99 1.72 1.57 0.27 0.55 1.99 0.78
TW, two periods ago 1.28 0.66 0.05 1.14 0.55 0.04 1.15 0.70 0.10
Tot. obs and the number of countries 837 20 837 20 761 18
Standard deviation of residuals 0.7 0.7 0.7
χ2 of all the exogenous variables.b 66.78 (0.00) 51.98 (0.00) 60.92 (0.00)
χ2 of institutional variables (level).b 66.78 (0.00) 51.98 (0.00) 60.92 (0.00)
χ2 of institutional variables (interaction).b 28.63 (0.00) 25.85 (0.00) 28.49 (0.00)
1st order autocorrelationb -0.18 (0.86) -0.18 (0.86) 0.51 (0.61)
2nd order autocorrelationb 0.61 (0.54) 0.61 (0.54) -1.48 (0.14)
a) Without New Zealand and Switzerland.
b) Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for the relevant null.
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3.C Additional results for section 3.2.
We ﬁrst ﬁnd the coeﬃcients in the reduced form for the mode in equation (18). For ret :
l = 1− θw ω ψqw (1− φ)/χ,
k = (θq − θwψqw)/χ,
e = 1− (ψqpi + ψqw ψwp (1− φ))/χ, = 0 if dynamic homogeneity
n = (μq + μw ψqw)/χ,
d = (mq θq + cq + (mw θw + cw)ψqw)/χ,
where the denominator is: χ = 1− ψqw(φψwp + ψwq) > 0. For wst:
λ = θw ω (1− ψqw)(1− φ)/χ,
κ = 1− (θw (1− ψqw) + θq (1− ψwq − φψwp))/χ,
ξ = (ψwp (1− ψqw)(1− φ)− ψqpi (1− ψwq − φψwp))/χ, = 0 if dynamic homogeneity
η = (μw (1− ψqw)− μq (1− ψwq − φψwp))/χ,
δ = ((mw θw + cw)(1− ψqw)− (mq θq + cq)(1− ψwq − φψwp))/χ.
By inspection, it is clear that all coeﬃcient are non-negative for reasonable values of the
structural coeﬃcients. The exception is δ which can be both positive and negative. The
ﬁrst two disturbances in the reduced form are
re,t = (εq,t + ψqw εw,t)/χ and prw,t = (εq,t (1− ψwq − φψwp)− εw,t (1− ψqw))/χ,
while the third is identical to εut in the unemployment equation.
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Chapter 4
Do government purchases aﬀect
unemployment?
Steinar Holden and Victoria Sparrman
Abstract During the ﬁnancial crisis, most OECD countries used the ﬁscal policy exten-
sively to combat the crisis by stimulating the economy. More recently, ﬁscal policy has
been reversed in many countries. The large changes in policy raise several key questions
in relation to the eﬀect on unemployment; in particular whether ﬁscal policy measures
can be used to combat increasing unemployment, and if ﬁscal tightening is likely to lead
to persistent high unemployment. We test the quantitative importance of government
purchases for the evolution of unemployment in OECD. Compared to earlier studies we
use a sample with more variation in unemployment and in institutions. We ﬁnd that
increased government purchases leads to lower unemployment; the point estimate is that
an increase equal to one percent of GDP reduces unemployment by 0.2 percentage point
in the same year, and 0.25 percentage point the year after. The eﬀect is greater in down-
turns than in booms, and also greater under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime than under a
ﬂoating regime.
We are grateful to Ragnar Nymoen for comments and discussions. The numerical results in this paper
were obtained by use of OxMetrics 6/PcGive 13 and Stata 9. This paper is part of the project Demand,
unemployment and inﬂation ﬁnanced by the The Research Council of Norway.
University of Oslo, Department of Economics.
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4.1 Introduction
During the ﬁnancial crisis, most OECD countries used the ﬁscal policy extensively to
combat the crisis by stimulating the economy. More recently, increasing public debt and
a sharp rise in default premia on sovereign debt for some countries have led to plans of
substantial ﬁscal tightening in many countries. At the same time, unemployed has soared
in the OECD area, especially in Spain, Ireland and the US. The large changes in policy
and unemployment rates raise several key questions; in particular whether ﬁscal policy
measures can be used to combat increasing unemployment, and if ﬁscal tightening is likely
to lead to persistent high unemployment.
This paper explores the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy in the form of a change in government
purchases on goods and services on aggregate unemployment, using panel data for 20
OECD countries for the period 1960-2007. Our analysis builds on previous research on
equilibrium unemployment by Nymoen and Sparrman (2010), who use a framework with
annual panel data that draws considerably on Layard et al. (2005) and Nickell et al.
(2005). In the present study we start out from the empirical unemployment relationship
derived by Nymoen and Sparrman (2010), and add the change in government purchases as
an explanatory variable, so as to explore the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy controlling for changes
in the export market and institutions in the labour market.
Whether and possibly to what extent one should use ﬁscal policy to stabilize the
economy is a question subject to a lot of political controversy. In contrast, more concrete
questions about eﬀects should be less controversial. For example, if government purchases
increase by one percent, how will this aﬀect unemployment? - should in principle be a
straightforward empirical question. Clearly, the eﬀect is likely to vary with the circum-
stances and the speciﬁc policy, yet there should be a clear objective answer. However,
there is no agreement in the literature on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. To some extent, this
may reﬂect that there has been little empirical research on this issue for decades. There
is now rapid growth in the literature, and hopefully a more consensus view may emerge.
One methodological problem is that ﬁscal policy is potentially endogenous, in the sense
that ﬁscal policy decisions clearly depend on the state of the economy. The large majority
of the studies in the literature deal with this problem in one of three ways; see Perotti
(2007), Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010), and Hall (2009) for recent reviews. Some studies
focus on the eﬀect of speciﬁc events that can be thought to be exogenous, such as changes
in military spending in a response to political changes, see e.g. Ramey and Shapiro
(1999) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005). Other studies explore the eﬀect of ﬁscal
policy within a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model, where the model explains
several macroeconomic variables by their lags and exogenous shocks to the variables in
the model, see e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fata´s and Mihov (2001), Beetsma and
Giuliodori (2010) and Monacelli et al. (2010). Finally, a number of studies analyze the
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eﬀect of ﬁscal policy within structural models used for macro policymaking, typically of
the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) type, see e.g. Coenen et al. (2010).
The various approaches have diﬀerent strengths and weaknesses, which are discussed in
the literature (see below).
We focus on the eﬀect of a change in government purchases, for which we will argue that
the endogeneity problem is less severe than it is for the other main budget components,
taxes and transfers. Tax and transfers are given in rules and legislation, implying that
changes in tax bases and the number of transfer claimants (e.g. unemployed and retirees)
more or less directly lead to changes in revenues and expenditure. In contrast, government
purchases are not directly linked to the state of the economy. However, as the state of
the economy clearly also aﬀects purchase decisions, we address the potential endogeneity
by use of instrumental variables and by controlling for omitted variables. As compared to
most existing studies, our study has the advantage of using a more extensive panel data
set, which makes it possible to explore whether the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy depends on a
host of other factors, like the cyclical situation of the economy, the monetary regime, the
openness of the economy, the type of ﬁscal impulse, etc. Overall, we view our study as
complementary to the existing literature in this ﬁeld.
We ﬁnd that an increase in government purchases leads to an economically and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant reduction in unemployment. The point estimate in our base equation
implies that a permanent increase in government purchases equal to one percent of GDP
leads to a reduction in unemployment of 0.25 percentage points after one year. The eﬀect
on unemployment decreases gradually, and only about 1/5 remains after ten years. The
size of the eﬀect is highly dependent on other factors in the economy. For example, we
ﬁnd that the reduction in unemployment due to a rise in government purchases is greater
when the economy is in a weak cyclical situation. Furthermore, in line with the Mundell-
Fleming model, we ﬁnd a strong eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on unemployment in countries with
a ﬁxed exchange rate, but no eﬀect for countries with a ﬂoating exchange rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 4.2 provides a brief review of the
theoretical and empirical literature on the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on GDP and unemploy-
ment. In section 4.3, we present our empirical approach, while the empirical results are
laid out in section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on GDP and unemploy-
ment - theory and evidence
The aim of the paper is to explore the eﬀect of changes in government purchases on goods
and services on aggregate unemployment. However, as most of the literature focuses on
the eﬀect of GDP, and an increase in GDP usually is associated with a reduction in
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unemployment, we ﬁrst review the eﬀect on GDP. According to traditional Keynesian
theory, the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy comes via the eﬀect on aggregate demand. Increased
government spending has a direct positive eﬀect (by being part of GDP), and indirect
eﬀects via private consumption and investment. The increase in GDP arising from the
direct eﬀect will have a positive impact on private consumption, due to the increase in
contemporaneous private disposable income. However, increased government spending is
also likely to lead to a higher interest rate, depending on the monetary policy regime,
which will have a negative eﬀect on private consumption and investment. Overall, GDP
will increase, but the multiplier may be smaller or greater than unity.
In a neoclassical model Baxter and King (1993), the eﬀect on output depends on the
eﬀect on the labour supply. Higher government spending will imply a negative wealth
eﬀect for households (as the spending sooner or later must be tax-ﬁnanced), leading to in-
creased labour supply and thus increased employment and output. Increased employment
will raise the marginal return to capital, and thus also increase investment. However, the
negative wealth eﬀect will imply that private consumption falls. Furthermore, if higher
government spending is ﬁnanced by distortionary taxation, this will have a negative eﬀect
on labour supply, possibly leading to lower output and lower investment.
New Keynesian models exhibit sticky wages or prices, thus allowing for eﬀects of
aggregate demand. Nevertheless, the eﬀects of government spending in general mimics
those found in the neoclassical model. Under strict inﬂation targeting, the government
expenditure multiplier is the same as with ﬂexible prices. Flexible inﬂation targeting leads
to a greater multiplier, but the multiplier of a temporary increase in government purchases
is still below unity Woodford (2010). However, if there are restrictions on the monetary
policy, the eﬀects might be larger. If the real interest rate is kept constant, the multiplier
is unity as there is no eﬀect on private consumption Woodford (2010). If the real interest
falls, for example because the nominal interest rate is constant (e.g. for a small country
in a monetary union, or because of a zero bound restriction), while inﬂation increases,
the government multiplier might be considerably above unity (see e.g. Christiano et al.
(2009)).
Without restrictions on the monetary policy, the negative wealth eﬀect for the house-
holds implies, as noted above, that private consumption will fall, in contrast to the tradi-
tional keynesian assertion. There have, however, been several suggestions of mechanisms
that can reverse the negative wealth eﬀect. Devereux et al. (1996) present a model where
higher government spending increases the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the intermediate
good sector, where there is increasing returns to specialization. This results in a rise in
productivity, leading to increased demand for labour, higher real wages and increased con-
sumption. More recently, Gal´ı et al. (2007) consider a model which includes rule-of-thumb
consumers, that is, a share of the households consume their whole income, without any
borrowing or saving. They show that the interaction of sticky prices and rule-of-thumb
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consumers implies that real wages increase when government consumption rise, and this
also leads to an increase in private consumption.
The empirical research on the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy involves a number of methodological
issues. The issue that has received most attention is that government spending is likely
to be endogenous, in the sense that ﬁscal policy decisions are aﬀected by the state of the
economy, implying that a correlation between ﬁscal policy and GDP or unemployment
might reﬂect reverse causality. Thus, much of the recent research attempting to analyze
the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy have used methods designed to address the endogeneity issue.
While the large majority of the empirical studies focus on the eﬀect on GDP, and to some
extent also the eﬀect on private consumption, the empirical problems are to a large extent
the same also for us, who study the eﬀect on unemployment.
Some studies focus on the eﬀect of speciﬁc events that can be thought to be exogenous,
such as changes in military spending in a response to political changes, see e.g. Ramey and
Shapiro (1999) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005). The key advantage of this approach is
that with an appropriate choice of events, one avoids the endogeneity problem. However,
the method also implies other weaknesses. First, there is a risk that the political changes
that induce changes in military spending are also associated with other changes in the
economy. As argued by Monacelli et al. (2010), it is questionable whether the eﬀect of
ﬁscal policy will be the same in a war period, with heavy rationing and public regulation
of production, as it will be in normal periods. Private sector expectations are also likely
to being strongly inﬂuenced by the political changes, in particular if there is a war, and
this may also aﬀect the evolution of the economy. Second, it is also questionable whether
an increase in military spending will have the same eﬀect on unemployment as other types
of public spending, like increases employment in e.g. education.1
Another popular approach to study the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy, is to use a structural
vector autoregression (SVAR or VAR) model, where the model explains several macroeco-
nomic variables by their lags and exogenous shocks to the variables in the model, see e.g.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fata´s and Mihov (2001), Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010)
and Monacelli et al. (2010). VAR-studies attempt to ﬁnd the eﬀects of unanticipated
ﬁscal shocks on the economy, where the ﬁscal shock is identiﬁed as a deviation from a
systematic ﬁscal policy. A crucial part of these studies is the assumptions that are made
to identify the shocks, and Caldra (2010) shows that diﬀerences in results to a large ex-
tent depend on diﬀerent identifying assumptions. Furthermore, as pointed out by e.g.
Monacelli et al. (2010), one potential problem is that changes in government spending
that appear unpredictable to the econometrician might well have been anticipated by the
1In a recent study, Cohen et al. (2010) show that ﬁscal spending shocks have a negative impact on
corporate sector investment and employment. The key innovation of this study is that the spending
shocks are identiﬁed by changes in congressional committee chairmanship, which is shown to have a
sizeable impact on federal expenditures at state-level. However, the study does not explore the eﬀect on
GDP or unemployment.
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private sector, for example from budget plans and decisions. A diﬀerent problem is that
one may question whether private agents in the economy are aware of the systematic
ﬁscal rule. The systematic ﬁscal rule is estimated on the whole sample, while agents
would only know the history up till the relevant year. Even for the recent history, it is
not clear to what extent private sector agents’ perceptions of the ﬁscal policy corresponds
to the systematic rule estimated by the econometrician based on a very limited set of
macroeconomic variables.
A third popular way of analyzing the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy is within structural models
used for macro policymaking, typically of the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) type, see e.g. Coenen et al. (2010), or large scale estimated models Duell et al.
(2009). Such studies have the great advantage that one explores the eﬀect within a
consistent theoretical framework, and where the model is estimated/calibrated also to
satisfy certain empirical criteria. However, the reliability of the results clearly depend on
whether the model captures the main mechanisms of the economy, and it is fair to say
that also these models have their weaknesses, cf. e.g. the discussion of DSGE models in
Chari et al. (2009).
Overall, our view is that the methods have their diﬀerent strengths and weaknesses,
which make them complementary.
As noted above, the main focus in the literature has been on the eﬀects on GDP,
private consumption and to some extent also private investment. However, there are
also some studies that analyze the eﬀect on unemployment, i.e. the topic of the current
study. Holmlund and Linden (1993) explore the eﬀects of public employment in a cal-
ibrated search model, and ﬁnd ambiguous eﬀects on unemployment as increased wage
pressure may counteract the direct unemployment-reducing eﬀect of increased public em-
ployment. More recently, Gomes (2010) shows that in a search-matching model, higher
public employment leads to lower unemployment, and he also ﬁnds empirical support for
this result. Monacelli et al. (2010) explore the eﬀect of government consumption in a
neoclassical model augmented with search and matching frictions. They show that while
higher government consumption increases the hiring rate due to the negative wealth ef-
fect inducing higher labour supply, this eﬀect is dampened by the rise in the real interest
rate. Overall, the eﬀect is a fairly small reduction in unemployment, and smaller than
what the authors ﬁnd in their empirical study, which is a structural VAR analysis on
US data. In contrast, Bru¨ckner and Pappa (2010), in an analysis of 10 OECD countries
using structural VARs, ﬁnd that a typical estimate from the impulse responses implies
that a 10 percent increase in government expenditures increases the unemployment rate
at peak (which varies from 3 − 16 quarters) of around 0.2 − 0.5 percent. Bru¨ckner and
Pappa (2010) explain the diﬀerence in results compared to Monacelli et al. (2010) as
due to diﬀerent sample period, arguing that the increased government spending raises
unemployment after 1975. Note however that Bru¨ckner and Pappa (2010) also ﬁnd that
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increased government spending leads to higher GDP and higher employment, so that the
increase in unemployment is caused by higher participation rates due to increased labour
supply.
We consider the eﬀect of a change in government purchases on unemployment, building
on a panel data estimation framework derived by Nymoen and Sparrman (2010). More
speciﬁcally, we add the real change in government purchases, measured as a share of trend-
GDP, to an empirical equation for aggregate unemployment as a function of a number
of labour market institutions. This approach has several advantages. First, an extensive
literature has shown that aggregate unemployment to a large extent is determined by
labour market institutions, see e.g. Layard et al. (2005) and Nickell et al. (2005). Thus,
it seems expedient to control for the eﬀect of labour market variables when analysing the
eﬀect of ﬁscal policy. Second, with a data set covering 20 countries and 47 years, there is
large variation in a number of key variables, making it possible to explore how the eﬀect
of ﬁscal policy may vary depending on for instance the monetary regime, the openness of
the economy, or the size of the public debt.
As noted in the introduction, the fact that we restrict attention to the eﬀect of govern-
ment purchases makes the endogeneity problems less compelling than if we had analysed
the eﬀect of changes in taxes and transfers. Tax revenues and expenditures on transfers are
clearly endogenous, following changes in the economy according to rules and legislation.
In contrast, government purchases are not directly linked to the state of the economy. For
example, all “passive” unemployment expenditure like beneﬁts, and the large majority
of active unemployment related expenditure are classiﬁed as transfers, not government
purchases, and thus not included in our analysis. Clearly, the state of the economy also
aﬀects purchase decisions, but also other factors come into play, like electoral cycles, party
politics, lobbyism and pressure groups, media attention, etc. Furthermore, a large part
of government purchases may be subject to a lengthy bureaucratic process involving both
the decision making and the implementation, implying that there is no clear cut or simple
relationship between the state of the economy and government purchases. Yet there is
of course a potential endogeneity problem: When we include the change in government
purchases as a regressor in the estimated equation, any correlation between our ﬁscal
variable and the error term in the equation may bias our estimate.
We address this problem in two ways. First, we use instrumental variable estimation,
where we treat the measure of ﬁscal policy as endogenous. However, it is hard to ﬁnd
appropriate instruments, even if the ones we use (past values of the change in government
purchases and past values of government debt) seem to pass the most basic tests.
Second, we use an omitted variables approach. The idea here is that ﬁscal policy might
be correlated with the error term because it is aﬀected by other explanatory variables
that also aﬀect unemployment. For example, ﬁscal policy might be pro-cyclical, because
in a boom, tax revenues increase making it possible for politicians to increase public
127
Chapter 4. Do government purchases aﬀect unemployment?
spending. At the same time, the increase in tax revenues during the boom might be
correlated with a fall in unemployment. However, in this case including tax revenues
as a regressor in the unemployment equation would lend ﬁscal policy uncorrelated with
the error term, removing the bias in the coeﬃcient. Likewise, ﬁscal policy might be
countercyclical because the government wants to stabilize the economy, and thus increase
spending whenever GDP growth falls. As a fall in GDP growth also will be associated with
a rise in unemployment, this policy will involve a correlation between ﬁscal policy and
the error term. However, by including GDP growth as a regressor in the unemployment
equation, the correlation between ﬁscal policy and the error term will be removed, and
there is no bias in the coeﬃcient for ﬁscal policy. Admittedly, it is impossible to include
all possible omitted variables, so one would not expect this approach to remove any
correlation between ﬁscal policy and the error term. However, by including the most
likely omitted variables, one should be able to reduce any possible bias substantially.
From a theoretical perspective, one would expect the eﬀect of an increase in govern-
ment spending to depend on whether it is deﬁcit-ﬁnanced or debt-ﬁnanced. However, to
distinguish between these two alternatives one needs a measure of discretionary changes
in taxes, so that one can circumvent the problem that an upswing in the economy at the
same time will involve lower unemployment and higher tax revenues. However, as noted
above, we view the endogeneity problem as larger for taxes than for government pur-
chases, and at the present stage we have chosen not to include a measure of discretionary
tax changes. Because of this, we are unable to distinguish between deﬁcit-ﬁnanced and
debt-ﬁnanced government spending. Thus, our results must be interpreted as an average
eﬀect, where the weights depend on the average method of ﬁnancing over the sample
period. As government debt has increased in most countries over the sample period, the
increase in government spending is partly debt-ﬁnanced and partly deﬁcit-ﬁnanced.
4.3 Empirical Approach
There is now a vast literature arguing that unemployment is aﬀected by labour market
institutions; see e.g. Layard et al. (2005) and Nickell et al. (2005). Changes in labour
market variables are also important for explaining the evolution of unemployment over
time, cf. Nickell et al. (2005). As we are interested in the eﬀect of government purchases,
we want to control for other eﬀects by use of the unemployment equation derived in
Nymoen and Sparrman (2010), which in accordance with Layard et al. (2005) and Nickell
et al. (2005), is a function of labour market institutions and shocks. Speciﬁcally, Nymoen
and Sparrman (2010) derive a preferred equation on the form
uit = β0i + β1uit−1 + β2uit−2 + β3uit−3 + β4Iit−1 + β5Iit−2 + β6Dit + it
where uit is unemployment in country i in period t, Iit−1 is a vector of institutional
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variables, and Dit is a vector of structural breaks (detected by a large outliers approach),
capturing other important shocks that might aﬀect unemployment. The parameters are
functions of the underlying model; for example the theory implies that β1 > 0 and β2 < 0.
The dynamic structure follows from the theoretical labour market framework of Nymoen
and Sparrman (2010), where the system of wage and price curves implies that the autore-
gressive order of the unemployment equation should at least be three.
To this equation we add the real change in the government purchases on goods and
services, measured as a share of trend GDP. This variable (dG) is calculated as the real
growth rate of government purchases (i.e. real government consumption and investments,
not including government transfers), multiplied by government purchases as a share of
trend of GDP, in nominal prices, see appendix 4.A for details and calculations.
The decade averages of the change in government purchases are shown in table 1. We
observe that government purchases have generally increased in real terms, and more so in
the 1960s and 70s. There is however considerable variation within and across countries.
The motivation behind this speciﬁcation is to ensure that our left hand side variable
only measures changes in government purchases, and that it not directly aﬀected by a
change in GDP. Some studies (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna (2009), Duell et al. (2009)
consider the eﬀect of a change in the ratio of government spending to GDP. This choice
involves the risk that a reduction in GDP caused by e.g. an external shock leads to an
increase in the ratio of government spending to GDP, which would then be associated
with a reduction in GDP. For this reason we also use a backward-looking measure of
trend GDP, where the trend real growth is measured as the moving average of the growth
rate over the past ten years. With a two-sided measure of trend-growth, there would
be a risk that the future evolution of GDP aﬀects the estimated trend-GDP, implying
a possibility that the future evolution of GDP aﬀects the measure of contemporaneous
ﬁscal policy. We have also explored the eﬀect of ﬁscal indicator of Braconier and Holden
(1999), which is similar to the change in the ratio of government purchases to trend GDP,
with essentially the same results.
We also include another shock variable, which is an indicator for the cyclical state
of the economy of the trading partners. More speciﬁcally, the indicator is calculated as
a weighted average of the GDP-gap of the trading partners, where the GDP-gap is the
deviation of GDP from Hodrick Prescott-trend, divided by the trend, and the weights
reﬂect the share of the exports from country i that goes to each of the trading partners
j. The motivation for including this variable, which we term export market, is the idea
that the cyclical situation among the trading partners aﬀects the demand for a country’s
export, which again may aﬀect GDP, unemployment and ﬁscal policy in the country.
Including the export market indicator may improve the precision of the estimates, as well
as reduce any possible bias in our coeﬃcient of interest, to the extent that the added
explanatory variable is correlated with the change in ﬁscal policy.
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Table 1: Growth in government purchases - country speciﬁc mean and standard deviation
Country stats 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 1960-07
Australia mean 1.38 0.87 0.87 0.64 0.80 0.90
sd 0.75 0.60 0.57 0.26 0.21 0.55
Austria mean 0.93 0.89 0.23 0.48 0.13 0.53
sd 0.48 0.35 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.46
Belgium mean 1.55 1.36 0.17 0.35 0.43 0.75
sd 0.52 0.40 0.53 0.37 0.29 0.70
Canada mean 1.56 1.16 0.72 0.25 0.82 0.88
sd 0.59 0.70 0.36 0.52 0.20 0.66
Denmark mean . 0.89 0.16 0.54 0.52 0.51
sd . 0.69 0.52 0.45 0.31 0.55
Finland mean 1.31 1.19 0.79 0.20 0.37 0.77
sd 1.07 0.72 0.32 0.85 0.35 0.81
France mean 1.13 0.89 0.80 0.44 0.49 0.72
sd 0.21 0.35 0.24 0.41 0.20 0.38
Germany mean 1.47 1.22 0.19 0.45 0.13 0.68
sd 0.94 0.58 0.51 0.48 0.21 0.78
Ireland mean 1.06 1.59 -0.04 1.11 1.45 1.02
sd 0.57 0.81 1.41 0.50 1.37 1.13
Italy mean 0.88 0.70 0.59 0.04 0.40 0.51
sd 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.37 0.17 0.37
Japan mean 2.17 1.79 0.53 0.73 -0.08 1.03
sd 0.85 1.44 0.47 0.62 0.21 1.14
Netherlands mean 1.12 0.78 0.67 0.65 0.93 0.81
sd 0.37 0.76 0.32 0.24 0.76 0.54
New Zealand mean 0.73 0.97 0.28 0.54 0.93 0.68
sd 1.07 1.49 0.94 1.01 1.14 1.13
Norway mean 1.64 1.56 0.87 1.18 0.90 1.22
sd 0.58 0.45 0.53 0.61 0.53 0.61
Portugal mean . 1.80 0.93 0.94 0.21 0.80
sd . 0.83 0.66 0.61 0.61 0.74
Spain mean 0.49 0.99 0.96 0.79 1.18 0.91
sd 0.18 0.27 0.50 0.46 0.18 0.40
Sweden mean 1.86 1.10 0.50 0.41 0.24 0.80
sd 0.49 0.70 0.31 0.56 0.45 0.76
Switzerland mean 0.37 0.22 0.36 0.10 0.07 0.21
sd 0.13 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.15 0.27
United Kingdom mean 0.70 0.53 0.20 0.30 0.74 0.46
sd 0.75 0.62 0.32 0.39 0.82 0.60
United States mean 1.20 0.12 0.67 0.26 0.44 0.51
sd 0.82 0.43 0.42 0.28 0.23 0.58
Total mean 1.25 1.00 0.52 0.52 0.56 0.74
sd 0.77 0.80 0.61 0.58 0.65 0.73
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The large outliers breaks are likely to capture all types of shocks, including shocks to
the ﬁscal policy and the export market. Thus, if we were to retain these breaks, one would
expect that this would involve a downward bias in the eﬀect of the ﬁscal policy. Thus,
in our main estimations, we omit these breaks and estimate an equation of the following
form
uit =β0i + β1uit−1 + β2uit−2 + β3uit−3 + β4ΔIit−1 + β5Iit−2
+ β6ΔdGt + β7dGt−1 + β8ΔdGt−1 + β9ΔXMt + β10XMt−1 + β11ΔXMt−1 + it
(1)
The evolution of the change in government purchases and the rate of unemployment
are illustrated in ﬁgure 1 and 2. There may seem to be a negative comovement between
these two variables in some countries like Belgium, Canada, Denmark and New Zealand,
but not in others.
In most of the analysis, we use a Fixed Eﬀects (FE) estimator, allowing for permanent
country-speciﬁc diﬀerences in unemployment that are not accounted for by the other
explanatory variables. A random eﬀect model would require that there is no correlation
between the country ﬁxed eﬀects and the explanatory variables in the model. However,
this assumption is rejected in a Hausman test, although only with a p-value of 6 percent.
In principle, the FE estimator is biased when the regression includes a lagged endogenous
variable. However, with a long time dimension of more than 40 years, this bias is small,
cf. Judson and Owen (1999). In addition, other estimations methods which avoid the
sample bias also have their diﬃculties, cf. Roodman (2009). Some alternative estimation
methods on this data set are discussed in Nymoen and Sparrman (2010).
The model is estimated on annual frequency. The main reason for this is that the
unemployment equation that forms the basis for the analysis is performed on annual
data. Moreover, annual data has the advantage of a allowing a much longer time span,
as very few countries have quarterly data for the ﬁscal policy from the 1960s and 70s.
Finally, it has also been argued that annual data to a better extent captures the actual
ﬁscal decisions, as the ﬁscal impulses are likely to follow annual budgets, see discussion
in Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010).
4.4 Empirical results
For comparison, the ﬁrst model in table 2 is a reestimation of the unemployment equation
in Nymoen and Sparrman (2010) where a structural break variable (detected by large out-
liers) is included. The structural break variable has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on unemployment,
and the eﬀect is longlasting. To focus on novel variables, the coeﬃcients for the labour
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Figure 1: The change in government purchases, subtracted country speciﬁc mean, the
output gap and the unemployment rate during the period 1960 to 2007
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Figure 2: The change in government purchases, subtracted country speciﬁc mean, the
output gap and the unemployment rate during the period 1960 to 2007
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Table 2: Equation (1) with the growth in government purchases and the demand for
export products
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value
Unemployment previous period, (Ut−1) 1.38 0.03 0.00 1.29 0.03 0.00 1.28 0.04 0.00
Unemployment two years ago (Ut−2) -0.52 0.05 0.00 -0.41 0.05 0.00 -0.39 0.05 0.00
Unemployment three years ago (Ut−3) 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.70 -0.01 0.03 0.82
Large outlier detectiona 0.94 0.05 0.00 0.82 0.04 0.00
Demand components:
Export market, 1st diﬀ. (ΔXMt) -0.39 0.05 0.00 -0.53 0.06 0.00
Export market, prev. period (XMt−1) 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.01
Export market, 1st diﬀ. prev. period (ΔXMt−1) -0.23 0.06 0.00 -0.30 0.07 0.00
Change govt. purchases, 1st diﬀ. (ΔdGt) -0.14 0.03 0.00
Change govt. purchases, prev. period (dGt−1) -0.21 0.05 0.00
Change govt. purchases, 1st diﬀ. prev. period (ΔdGt−1) 0.03 0.03 0.31
Change govt. purchases (dGt) -0.19 0.04 0.00
Obs = Country*Average groups 837 20 41.9 794 20 39.7 801 20 40.0
Standard deviation of residuals 0.58 0.54 0.65
χ2 of all the exogenous variables.b 335.53 (0.00) 765.02 (0.00) 287.57 (0.00)
χ2 of dummy, ﬁscal policy and exports.b 635.72 (0.00)
χ2 of policy and exports.b 118.01 (0.00) 195.35 (0.00)
1st order autocorrelationb 0.37 (0.71) 0.29 (0.77) 0.65 (0.52)
2nd order autocorrelationb -1.71 (0.09) -2.00 (0.04) 0.15 (0.88)
Estimation method: Fixed eﬀect coeﬀcients estimate, standard errors from GLS (xtgls without options).
In all equations it is also controlled for labour market institutions, cf. complete table in appendix 4.B.
a) Dummy by impulse saturation.
b) Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for the relevant null.
market institutions are not included in the table. However, the complete results are found
in table B1 in appendix 4.B.
In model 2, we add the change in government purchases and the export market vari-
able, both as ﬁrst diﬀerences and lagged level (for the government purchases, this is ﬁrst
diﬀerence of the change, and the lagged change). We observe that the government pur-
chase variables are highly signiﬁcant, and the same is true for two of the export market
variables. However, we would expect the structural break to capture some of the eﬀect of
the demand variables, reducing the size of their coeﬃcients. Thus, in model 3 we omit the
structural break variable. In this speciﬁcation the ﬁrst diﬀerence and the lagged change in
government purchases obtain essentially the same coeﬃcient, so they can be put together,
while the lagged ﬁrst diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, we end up with a
highly signiﬁcant change in government purchases, as well as three variants of the export
market market which are all statistically signiﬁcant. Note that result in model 3 is robust
to exclusion order, i.e. the lagged ﬁrst diﬀerence of the change in government purchases
is not signiﬁcant even if we ﬁrst exclude the lag of the export market. The eﬀect of gov-
ernment purchases is unaﬀected by including year dummies, cf. model 3 in table B1 in
appendix 4.B. The coeﬃcient values for the export market variables are however much
smaller with year dummies, which suggests that these dummies may capture common
shocks that aﬀect most or all OECD countries.
The autocorrelation test in the lower part of table 2, model 3, shows no sign of auto-
correlation. Figure 3 shows the estimated residuals of model 3 in table 2. Figure 3 also
supports the picture of no autocorrelation, even though there is some variation across
countries.
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Figure 3: Estimated residuals of model 3 in table 2
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Figure 4: The eﬀect of a permanent increase in government purchases, equal to one percent
of GDP, from 2008, based on simulation of equation (1) with estimated coeﬃcients from
model 3 in table 2
Figure 4 shows the eﬀect on unemployment over time from a permanent increase
in government purchases equal to one percent of trend GDP. The maximum impact of
−0.25 percentage points is reached in the second year, then the eﬀect weakens gradually
to be almost negligible after 10 years. This eﬀect is very close to the ﬁndings in IMF
(2010), based on a study of ﬁscal consolidations in 15 OECD countries over the last 30
years. They ﬁnd that spending-based deﬁcit cuts equal to one percent of GDP raise the
unemployment rate of about 0.2 percentage points. Monacelli et al. (2010) ﬁnd a larger
eﬀect on US data; an increase in government spending equal to one percent of GDP leads
to a fall in the rate of unemployment of 0.6 percentage points after ten quarters. However,
as noted above, Bru¨ckner and Pappa (2010) ﬁnd in an analysis of 10 OECD countries
using structural VARs, that a typical estimate from the impulse responses implies that a
10 percent increase in government expenditures increases the unemployment rate at peak
(which varies from 3− 16 quarters) of around 0.2− 0.5 percent.
4.4.1 Robustness checks for government purchases being en-
dogenous
As discussed above, the estimated coeﬃcient of government purchases will be biased if
government purchases also react to changes in the state of the economy that are corre-
lated with the rate of unemployment. We deal with this problem in two ways; by using
instruments for government purchases possibly being endogenous, and by controlling for
omitted variables.
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Table 3: Correlation of government purchases with other variables
Change govt. purchases (dGt)
Correlation p-value Observations
Change govt. purchases, 1st diﬀ. prev. period (ΔdGt−1) 0.13 0.00 880.00
Change govt. purchases, 1st diﬀ. prev. period (ΔdGt−2) 0.02 0.60 860.00
Change govt. purchases, prev. period (dGt−1) 0.48 0.00 900.00
Change govt. purchases, two periods ago (dGt−2) 0.32 0.00 880.00
Change govt. purchases, three periods ago (dGt−3) 0.29 0.00 860.00
Change govt. purchases, four periods ago (dGt−4) 0.25 0.00 840.00
Debt prev. period (debtt−1) -0.30 0.00 695.00
Debt two periods ago (debtt−2) -0.25 0.00 677.00
Debt, 1st diﬀ. prev. period (Δdebtt−1) -0.26 0.00 677.00
Debt, 1st diﬀ. two periods ago (Δdebtt−2) -0.26 0.00 657.00
N 1020
Instrument variable approach
One way to deal with the possible endogeneity of government purchases is to ﬁnd instru-
ments that are uncorrelated with the error term and highly correlated with the change in
government purchases. We use the lagged change in government purchases as well as the
lagged change in public debt as a ratio to GDP. Note that while our results imply that the
lagged change in government purchases is correlated with lagged unemployment, the fact
that lagged unemployment is also included in the equation implies that lagged govern-
ment purchases may well be a valid instrument. We have also tried election year, based
on the idea that governments may pursue an expansionary ﬁscal policy in connection with
elections to increase the probability of reelection; see evidence in Shi and Svensson (2006)
(2006). However, including election year did not aﬀect the result, and as election year
is potentially endogenous in countries where the government can choose the time of the
election, we decided to leave it out in the presented speciﬁcation.
Table 3 shows the correlation between the change in government purchases and several
speciﬁcations of the instrumental variables. We observe that several of the speciﬁcations
are signiﬁcantly correlated with the change in government purchases.
Table 4 shows the results of the instrumental variable estimation (for comparison, the
ﬁrst column displays the FE estimation from table 2). The point estimate indicates that
an increase in government purchases equal to one percent of GDP reduces unemployment
by half a percentage point, i.e. more than twice the eﬀect from the FE estimates. The
eﬀect is also highly statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that government purchases is
endogenous, leading to a downward bias in the coeﬃcient in the FE result. Note however
that the F-test of the instrument variables is equal to 9.2, which is at the borderline
to a sign of weak instruments. Because of the diﬃculty of obtaining satisfying instru-
ments, most of the subsequent regressions are ordinary FE estimates, not allowing for
endogeneity, and this suggests some caution in the interpretation of the results.
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Table 4: Equation (1) with instrumental variables
FEa IVb
Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value
Unemployment previous period 1.28 0.04 0.00 1.27 0.05 0.00
Unemployment two years ago -0.39 0.05 0.00 -0.43 0.07 0.00
Unemployment three years ago -0.01 0.03 0.82 0.01 0.04 0.81
Demand components:
Export market, 1st diﬀ. (ΔXMt) -0.53 0.06 0.00 -0.51 0.07 0.00
Export market, prev. period (XMt−1) 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.22 0.08 0.01
Export market, 1st diﬀ. prev. period (ΔXMt−1) -0.30 0.07 0.00 -0.28 0.08 0.00
Change govt. purchases (dGt) -0.19 0.04 0.00 -0.50 0.18 0.01
Obs = Country*Average groups 801 20 40.0 626 20 31.3
Standard deviation of residuals 0.65 0.92
χ2 of all the exogenous variables.c 287.57 (0.00) 210.14 (0.00)
χ2 of dummy, ﬁscal policy and exports.c 195.35 (0.00) 128.26 (0.00)
In all equations it is also controlled for labour market institutions.
a) Estimation method: Fixed eﬀect coeﬃcients estimates, standard errors from GLS (xtgls without options).
b) Change govt. purchases (dGt) is treated as endogenous. Instruments are: ΔdGt−1, dGt−2 and Δdebtt−1.
c) Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for the relevant null.
Controlling for omitted variables
The possible weakness of the instruments suggests that we also address the potential endo-
geneity of government purchases by other means. The idea behind controlling for omitted
variables is that ﬁscal policy might be correlated with the error term because it is aﬀected
by other explanatory variables that also are correlated with unemployment. For example,
ﬁscal policy might be pro-cyclical, because in a boom, tax revenues increase making it
possible for politicians to spend more money; this eﬀect is termed the voracity eﬀect by
Tornell and Lane (1999). At the same time, the increase in tax revenues during the boom
might be correlated with a fall in unemployment. However, in this case including tax rev-
enues as a regressor in the unemployment equation would lend ﬁscal policy uncorrelated
with the error term, removing the bias in the coeﬃcient. As the government purchases
are typically decided in the budget process in the fall the year prior to the budget year,
it would be tax revenues for the year when the budget is decided that might aﬀect the
budget. Thus, in table 5 we include the lagged change in tax revenues as a share of trend
GDP to capture that higher revenues might lead to increased government purchases. In
contrast, if the government attempts to use ﬁscal policy to stabilize the economy, one
would expect an increase in government purchases in downturns, when GDP growth is
low, or the output gap is negative. To control for this, we also include GDP growth and
the change in the output gap, both lagged, in table 5.
We observe that the eﬀect of government purchases is not aﬀected by including the
additional explanatory variables in model 2 in table 5. 2 This lends considerable support
2The sample size is reduced somewhat because of data availability, and the isolated eﬀect of this - i.e.
model 1 on the reduced sample size - yields a coeﬃcient for government purchases of 0.27. Thus, the
isolated eﬀect of the additional variables is a small reduction in the value of the coeﬃcient.
138
Chapter 4. Do government purchases aﬀect unemployment?
to the robustness of this eﬀect, as both the lagged GDP growth and the output gap are
variables that are strongly correlated with unemployment. Note however that some of the
export market variables are no longer signiﬁcant. This emphasizes that including lagged
GDP growth and lagged output gap entail a strong test of the explanatory power of the
variables.
In model 3 and 4 in table 5, we control for the possible endogeneity of government
purchases in a somewhat diﬀerent way, by also including consensus forecast for GDP
growth, unemployment and the output gap. Again, one might conjecture that government
purchases would respond to such forecasts, and that the correlation we ﬁnd between
government purchases and unemployment is due to both variables being correlated with
the forecasts. However, we see that the change in government purchases has a signiﬁcant
negative impact on unemployment even when controlling for forecasts. The coeﬃcient
value is slightly smaller, but a comparison with model 5 shows that this diﬀerence is due
to the much smaller sample size in the regressions with forecasts.
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4.4.2 Heterogenous eﬀects of government purchases across coun-
tries
The eﬀect of government purchases might diﬀer across countries, and this is explored in
table 6. Model 1 presents the base speciﬁcation allowing for country-speciﬁc eﬀects of
government purchases. We observe that there is considerable variation, yet the sign is
negative for 17 of 20 countries, and the eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level for 8 of 20 countries. If we include time dummies, cf. model 1i, the eﬀect is signiﬁcant
for 11 countries.
Model 2 presents the results using IV estimation. At the ten percent level, the eﬀect
of the change in government purchases is only signiﬁcantly negative for two countries
(Finland and France). In addition, two countries have negative coeﬃcients with p-value
of 12 and 11 percent (Ireland and Italy). Overall, the coeﬃcient is negative for 16 of 20
countries, but generally the standard errors are large. Presumably, the results reﬂects
the problem of weak instruments, which is clearly more important when we allow for
country-speciﬁc coeﬃcients for the eﬀect of government purchases.
In model 3 we address the endogeneity by including possible omitted variables, and
include the lagged growth rate of GDP, the lagged output gap (ﬁrst diﬀerence), and
indirect and direct taxes as a share of trend GDP (lagged and ﬁrst diﬀerences). We ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of government purchases on unemployment in 8 countries, and
the sign is negative in 16 of the 20 countries.
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4.4.3 Does the eﬀect of government purchases vary over the
cycle?
An important question from a policy perspective is whether the eﬀect of government
purchases varies over the business cycle. We measure the cyclical situation of the economy
by use of the output gap as measured by the OECD, and deﬁned as real GDP minus trend
GDP, divided by trend GDP, and multiplied by 100.
The ﬁrst model in table 7, we extend equation (1) by including the interaction between
the output gap and the change in government purchases. The interaction term is strongly
signiﬁcant, with positive sign, implying that an increase in government purchases leads
to a larger reduction in unemployment in bad times when the output gap is negative
than in good times. The eﬀect of the interaction term is quite large, with estimated
coeﬃcient equal to 0.07. This means that if the output gap is positive and equal to 2
percent, an increase in government purchases equal to one percent of GDP will lower the
unemployment rate by only 0.21− 0.14 = 0.07 percentage points at impact. In contrast,
if the output gap is negative and equal to −2 percentage point, the same increase in
government purchases will decrease unemployment by 0.21 + 0.14 = 0.35 percentage
points at impact.
In model 2 in table 7, we interact the interaction variable with a dummy for the output
gap being positive (“boom”, to explore possible asymmetries in the link between output
gap and the eﬀect of government purchases. Allowing for asymmetry results in a more
complex picture. The estimated eﬀect of a rise in government purchases increases rather
strongly with the absolute value of the output gap when the output gap is negative: If
the output gap is −4 percentage points, an increase in government purchases equal to one
percent of GDP is estimated to reduce unemployment by 4∗0.14 = 0.56 percentage point.
However, in a boom, the size of the output gap is less important, and surprisingly with
the same sign, implying that the eﬀect of a rise in government purchases is increasing in
the output gap. If the output gap is +3 percentage points, the eﬀect a rise in government
purchases equal to one percent of GDP is a decrease in unemployment by 3 ∗ (−0.14 +
0.18) = 0.12.
The third model in table 7 shows that there is no sign of non-linear eﬀects of the
output gap.
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Table 7: Equation (1) with interaction with the output gap
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value
Unemployment previous period 1.31 0.04 0.00 1.36 0.04 0.00 1.36 0.04 0.00
Unemployment two years ago -0.48 0.06 0.00 -0.50 0.06 0.00 -0.50 0.06 0.00
Unemployment three years ago 0.04 0.03 0.29 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03
Export market, 1st diﬀ. (ΔXMt) -0.51 0.07 0.00 -0.46 0.07 0.00 -0.47 0.07 0.00
Export market, prev. period (XMt−1) 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.25 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.07 0.00
Export market, 1st diﬀ. prev. period (ΔXMt−1) -0.27 0.07 0.00 -0.29 0.08 0.00 -0.29 0.08 0.00
Change govt. purchases (dGt) -0.21 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.96 0.05 0.07 0.48
Interaction change govt. purchases (dGt)
and output gap Y¯t 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.05 0.00
Interaction change govt. purchases (dGt)
and output gap Y¯t, boom
a -0.18 0.04 0.00 -0.30 0.12 0.01
Interaction change govt. purchases (dGt)
and output gap Y¯ 2t , boom
a 0.02 0.02 0.40
Interaction change govt. purchases (dGt)
and output gap Y¯ 2t , recession
a 0.01 0.01 0.35
Obs = Country*Average groups 698 20 34.9 698 20 34.9 698 20 34.9
Standard deviation of residuals 0.63 0.65 0.65
χ2 of all the exogenous variables.a 272.76 (0.00) 255.85 (0.00) 257.60 (0.00)
χ2 of policy and exports.a 189.17 (0.00) 204.70 (0.00) 206.36 (0.00)
1st order autocorrelationa 0.83 (0.40) 1.19 (0.23) 1.30 (0.20)
2nd order autocorrelationa -0.92 (0.36) -1.16 (0.25) -1.06 (0.29)
Estimation method: Fixed eﬀect coeﬀcients estimate, standard errors from GLS (xtgls without options).
Boom is a dummy for years where the output gap is postitive, and recession a dummy for negative output gap.
b) Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for the relevant null.
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4.4.4 Government purchases, debt and openness
A key issue in part of the literature on the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy is that the eﬀect is likely to
depend on private sector expectations on future ﬁscal policy. For example, Giavazzi and
Pagano (1990) argue that a severe ﬁscal contraction might be expansionary in situations
with concern for the risks of high public debt. This suggests that the eﬀect of government
purchases may depend on the level of public debt. In a recent study using structural VARs
on quarterly data for 44 countries, both advanced and developing countries, Ilzetzki et al.
(2010) ﬁnd that the ﬁscal multiplier depends on the level of government debt, and that
the ﬁscal multiplier is zero in high debt countries. To explore the possible importance of
public debt, we interact the change in government purchases with lagged public debt as
a ratio to GDP. To facilitate the interpretation, we measure the debt ratio as deviation
from sample mean, which is equal to 0.6. We also include debt as a separate explanatory
variable, as the levels of debt might well be correlated with the level of unemployment,
cf. Bertola (2010).
The results are shown in model 2 in table 8. Surprisingly, the interaction term has the
opposite sign of the expected, suggesting that the negative eﬀect of a rise in government
purchases on unemployment is larger in a country with high public debt. However, the
result is only marginally signiﬁcant, with a p-value of 7 percent. More importantly, as we
shall see below, one may question whether the interaction term really captures the eﬀect
of public debt, or whether there are other possible explanations.
In table 8, we also explore whether the eﬀect of government purchases depends on the
openness of the country. According to traditional Keynesian analysis, the government
expenditure multiplier is smaller in an open economy. In line with this, Beetsma and
Giuliodori (2010) ﬁnd in an analysis of 14 EU countries a clear positive eﬀect of a rise
in government purchases on GDP in “closed economies” (deﬁned as countries where the
ratio of export plus import to GDP is above sample average), and no signiﬁcant eﬀect
in the remaining “open economies”. Ilzetzki et al. (2010) also ﬁnd stronger expansionary
eﬀect of open economies than in closed. To analyse the eﬀect of openness, we interact
the change in government purchases with an indicator of openness, based on the ratio
of export plus import to GDP. As the degree of openness has increased over time, we
consider two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of this indicator. In model 3, the indicator measures
the deviation of the export plus import ratio from the sample mean, implying that the
indicator also captures the increase in openness over time. In model 4, the indicator is
measured as deviation from year mean, thus omitting the change in openness over time.
However, the eﬀect is essentially the same in both speciﬁcations, indicating that a rise
in government purchases has a stronger negative eﬀect on unemployment in more open
economies. This is the opposite eﬀect of what one would expect from theory. However,
as we shall see below, this eﬀect does not hold up when we control for monetary regime.
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4.4.5 Does the eﬀect of government purchases vary over time?
In this subsection we investigate whether the eﬀect of government purchases on unem-
ployment varies over time, by allowing for a diﬀerent eﬀect for each decade. This exercise
entails the added beneﬁt that it facilitates comparison of our results with other studies
on shorter sample periods. Model 2 in table 9 shows a striking diﬀerence. In the 1960s
and 70s, we ﬁnd essentially no eﬀect of government purchases on unemployment, with
coeﬃcient estimates quite close to zero. In contrast, in the 1980s, 90s, and 2000s, the
eﬀect is much stronger than in the total sample, with coeﬃcient estimates varying from
−0.27 in the 2000s to −0.45 in the 1990s.
One might speculate that the absence of any eﬀect in the 1960s reﬂects that unemploy-
ment in almost all countries was very stable and low, not giving much room for an eﬀect
of government purchases. In contrast, in the 1970s, unemployment rose quite sharply in
most countries, and some countries tried to counteract this rise by use of expansionary
ﬁscal policy. Thus, there could be a downward bias in the estimate reﬂecting that the rise
in unemployment induced increased government spending. This story of reverse causality
for the 1970s suggests the use of instrumental variables. However, the IV results in the
third model in table 9 are rather consistent with the FE results; no eﬀect of government
purchases in the 1960s and 70s, and a negative eﬀect for the last three decades, although
with only a p-value of 15 percent in the 1980s. For the 2000s, the IV point estimate is
almost three times as large as the FE estimate.
Kirchner et al. (2010) consider the eﬀect of government purchase shocks in the ag-
gregate euro area for the period 1980-2008. Using a time-varying structural VAR, they
ﬁnd that the short-run eﬀectiveness of government purchases in stabilizing real GDP and
private consumption has increased until the end of 1980s, but has decreased thereafter.
Kirchner et al. (2010) also ﬁnd that the multipliers in a longer horizons have declined
substantially over their sample period.
In model 4, we include government debt in the FE regression. The motivation is to
explore whether the unexpected sign for the debt-government purchases interaction in
table 8 is related to the fact that the level of debt has varied over time, cf. table A1
in appendix 4.A. It turns out that when we allow the eﬀect of government purchases
to diﬀer across decades, the debt-government purchases interaction loses its explanatory
power, with a coeﬃcient value close to zero with a p-value of 0.74. This suggests that the
signiﬁcant debt-government purchases interaction in table 8 is spurious, implying that
we do not ﬁnd any eﬀect of the debt level on the impact of government purchases on
unemployment.
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4.4.6 Distinguishing between types of government purchases:
investment, wage consumption and non-wage consump-
tion
Both from a theoretical and policy perspective it is of considerable interest to explore
whether the eﬀect of a change in government purchases diﬀers depending of the type
of purchase. In statistical sources, one typically distinguishes between three categories,
which we also use in our analysis: government wage consumption, which is essentially
public employment (dCGW ), government non-wage consumption (dCGNW ) and gov-
ernment real investments (dIG). We consider the same form of the left hand side variable
as before, i.e. the change in each of this categories (indicated by the d in the variable
name), in real terms, and measured as share of trend-GDP, see appendix 4.A for a detailed
explanation.
The results are presented in table 10. Model 1 shows that government investments and
government wage consumption both have a signiﬁcant negative impact on the unemploy-
ment rate (although government invest only with a p-value of 0.08), while the estimated
eﬀect of government non-wage consumption is close to zero and not statistically signiﬁ-
cant.
In model 2 in table 10, we explore whether the eﬀect of the diﬀerent types of gov-
ernment purchase depends on the cyclical state of the economy. The interaction terms
for both government investment and government wage consumption are positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, implying that both increased government investment and increased
government wage consumption have a stronger dampening eﬀect on unemployment when
the output gap is negative, consistent with our prior results.
The third model in table 10 presents the result of model 1 using IV; we ﬁnd that the
eﬀect of government investment is much stronger, with a point estimate of -0.59, and a
p-value of 0.05, while the other coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Ilzetzki et al. (2010) also explore possible diﬀerences between the eﬀect of government
consumption and government investment, and they ﬁnd about the same point estimates
for both consumption and investment for advanced countries, with multiplier estimates
(the eﬀect of government purchases on GDP) of 0.4 at impact and 0.8 in the long run.
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Table 10: Equation (1) with diﬀerent types of government purchases and interaction with
the output gap
Model 1 Model 2 IV 3a
Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value
Unemployment previous period 1.31 0.04 0.00 1.30 0.04 0.00 1.25 0.06 0.00
Unemployment two years ago -0.39 0.06 0.00 -0.43 0.07 0.00 -0.37 0.07 0.00
Unemployment three years ago -0.01 0.04 0.83 0.03 0.04 0.41 -0.04 0.04 0.32
Demand components:
Export market, 1st diﬀ. (ΔXMt) -0.52 0.07 0.00 -0.48 0.07 0.00 -0.51 0.08 0.00
Export market, prev. period (XMt−1) 0.26 0.08 0.00 0.24 0.08 0.00 0.19 0.09 0.04
Export market, 1st diﬀ. prev. period (ΔXMt−1) -0.33 0.08 0.00 -0.32 0.09 0.00 -0.29 0.10 0.00
Change govt. investments, (dIGt) -0.11 0.06 0.08 -0.13 0.07 0.06 -0.59 0.30 0.05
Change govt. non-wage consumption, (dCGNWt) 0.01 0.01 0.73 0.00 0.02 0.78 -0.01 0.07 0.87
Change govt. wage consumption, (dCGWt) -0.29 0.09 0.00 -0.27 0.09 0.00 -0.25 0.33 0.45
Interaction dGIt and Y¯t 0.08 0.03 0.02
Interaction dCGNWt and Y¯t 0.01 0.01 0.37
Interaction dCGWt and Y¯t 0.14 0.03 0.00
Obs = Country*Average groups 595 16 37.2 537 16 33.6 501 16 31.3
Standard deviation of residuals 0.66 0.64 0.84
χ2 of all the exogenous variables.b 237.52 (0.00) 244.56 (0.00) 185.35 (0.00)
χ2 of policy and exports.b 167.66 (0.00) 181.62 (0.00) 101.43 (0.00)
1st order autocorrelationb 1.30 (0.19) 1.39 (0.16)
2nd order autocorrelationb 0.47 (0.64) 0.12 (0.91)
Estimation method: Fixed eﬀect coeﬀcients estimate, standard errors from GLS (xtgls without options)
is used in all the regressions except for in model 3 which IV approach is used.
In all equations it is also controlled for labour market institutions.
a) Change govt. purchases (dGt) is treated as endogenous. Instruments are: (ΔdGt−1), (dGt−2) and (Δdebtt−1).
b) Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for the relevant null.
Table 11: Decomposition of government purchases, as share of total government purchases
(sample average)
Mean Std. Obs.
Government wage consumption CGW 0.54 0.09 772
Government non-wage consumption CGNW 0.29 0.08 772
Government investments IG 0.17 0.08 772
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4.4.7 Government purchases and monetary regime
In this subsection we explore whether the eﬀect of government purchases depends on
the monetary regime, as implied by standard text book macro like the Mundell Fleming
model, and also emphasized in much of the recent literature, e.g. Ilzetzki et al. (2010).
Under an inﬂation target, an expansionary eﬀect of increased government purchases will
be counteracted by a rise in the interest rate, partly oﬀsetting the eﬀect on unemployment.
Also with other types of ﬂoating exchange rates, one would expect an expansionary eﬀect
from ﬁscal policy be counteracted by changes in the exchange rate and the interest rate.
In contrast, if the nominal interest rate is unaﬀected, as it will be with a ﬁxed exchange
rate and for a small country in a monetary union, and inﬂation increases so that the
real interest falls, the government multiplier might be considerably above unity (see e.g.
Christiano et al. (2009).
We use four dummies to capture the diﬀerent monetary regimes within the sample
period; the Bretton Woods agreement (all countries until 1972), a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime, a ﬂoating exchange rate regime, and membership in the European Monetary
Union (EMU). In the Bretton Woods agreement, all currencies were tied to US dollars.
Floating exchange rate includes various forms of ﬂoating, and in recent years also inﬂation
targeting. Countries that took part in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism ERM are
deﬁned as having a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, except for Germany, which we deﬁne as
ﬂoating in light of Germany’s dominating position and the independent status of the Bun-
desbank. We also tried to distinguish between credible and non-credible ﬁxed exchange
rate regimes depending on the interest rate diﬀerential relative to the anchor country (in
most cases Germany), deﬁning the regime as non-credible if the interest rate diﬀerential
exceed 1 percentage point in annual terms. The idea here is that if the ﬁxed exchange
rate lacks credibility, a ﬁscal expansion could have a negative eﬀect on the economy by
impairing credibility, for example raising devaluation expectations and thus also push up
interest rates. However, the point estimates were essentially the same for credible and
non-credible ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, so we decided to drop this distinction in the
results we report. Further description of the monetary regimes is given in appendix 4.A.
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Model 1 in table 12 shows that the eﬀect of government purchases diﬀers sharply
across monetary regimes. The point estimate is −0.35 in the EMU and −0.45 with a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime, and highly statistically signiﬁcant. In contrast, during the Bretton
Woods regimes, and with a ﬂoating exchange rate, the point estimate is essentially zero.
These results are in line with our theoretical expectations, where ﬁscal policy is eﬀective
under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, but not under ﬂoat. The exception is of course the
Bretton Woods period; however, this ﬁnding only reﬂects the prior ﬁnding of no eﬀect
of ﬁscal policy during the 1960s and 70s. The diﬀerence across exchange rate regimes
is consistent with those of Ilzetzki et al. (2010); they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of
increased government consumption on GDP for ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, and while
the eﬀect is signiﬁcant and negative at impact for ﬂoating regimes.
Model 2 shows that the diﬀerence between regimes is indeed statistically signiﬁcant.
In model 3 and 4, we review our prior ﬁndings on the link between ﬁscal policy and the
openness of the economy. We ﬁnd that the interaction between openness and the change
in government purchases is no longer signiﬁcant. Indeed, for both speciﬁcations the point
estimate is close to zero, suggesting that our prior ﬁndings on openness are spurious and
caused by a correlation between openness and monetary regime.
4.5 Concluding remarks
The vast changes in budget policies in most OECD countries in recent years have made it
compelling for economists to ﬁnd out what the eﬀects will be on the economy. Politicians
would like to know the consequences on the GDP, unemployment and public debt, etc,
of a reduction in public expenditure, and economists have struggled with providing an
answer. In principle, there should be a clear objective answer to questions like this, even if
the answer obviously will depend on the speciﬁc situation, like type of public expenditure,
monetary policy response, the eﬀect on private sector expectations, etc. However, there
is no agreement in the literature about what this answer should be.
After decades of little research on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy, there is now a lot of recent
studies exploring this issue. Most of the studies are based on structural VARs, or analyze
the eﬀects within structural macro models. As these approaches have their strengths and
weaknesses, it is of value also to try other methods. We investigate the eﬀect of changes
in government purchases on unemployment by use of panel data estimation, building
on an empirical equation where long run unemployment is a function of a number of
labour market variables, along the lines of Layard et al. (2005) and Nickell et al. (2005).
One advantage with this approach is that we are able to control for key labour market
variables, which according to a large literature has been important for the evolution of
OECD unemployment.
We ﬁnd that an increase in government purchases has an economically and statistically
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signiﬁcant dampening eﬀect on unemployment. According to our base speciﬁcation, a
permanent increase in government purchases equal to one percent of GDP on average leads
to a reduction in unemployment of 0.2 percentage point, increasing to 0.25 percentage
points after one year, for then to gradually vanish over the following decade. Instrumental
variable estimation suggests that this estimate is downward biased, and the IV point
estimate is a reduction in unemployment of 0.5 percentage point following an increase
in government purchases equal to one percent of GDP. There is considerable variation
in the eﬀect of government purchases, across countries and also across time periods and
depending on other speciﬁc circumstances. We ﬁnd no eﬀect in the 1960s and 70s, and
a correspondingly stronger than average eﬀect in the 1980s, 90s and 2000s. We also ﬁnd
that the eﬀect is considerably larger in a weak cyclical situation; when the output gap is
equal to minus three percent, the eﬀect on unemployment is about double of the average
eﬀect. The monetary regime is important for the eﬀect. In line with the Mundell Fleming
model, we ﬁnd a strong eﬀect of government purchases on unemployment for countries
within a monetary union or with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime (excluding the Bretton-
Woods), and no signiﬁcant eﬀect of government purchases for countries with a ﬂoating
exchange rate. Distinguishing between diﬀerent types of government purchases, we only
ﬁnd a strong signiﬁcant eﬀect of government wage consumption (i.e. public employment),
and to some extent also government investment (with p-value of 5 percent), but not of
government non-wage consumption.
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4.A The Data: Deﬁnitions and sources
The data used in this paper are explained in this appendix. The sample period is from
1960 to 2007. The countries in the sample are:
Australia Finland Japan Spain
Austria France Netherlands Sweden
Belgium Germany Norway Switzerland
Canada Ireland New Zealand United Kingdom
Denmark Italy Portugal United States
4.A.1 Government purchases
The change in government purchases (dG) is measured as the growth rate in real terms
of government purchases, multiplied with government purchases as a share of trend GDP.
The data are from OECD (2008b) unless otherwise noted. The formula of dG is:
dGit =
(CGVit + IGVit)− (CGVit−1 − IGVit−1)
(CGVit−1 + IGVit)
∗ CGit + IGit − CFKGit
Y CTit
∗ 100 (A1)
where CG is government consumption, IG government investments, CFKG is con-
sumption of ﬁxed capital, and Y CT is trend-GDP. The variables are in nominal prices,
except those where the last letter V indicates real terms. Note that government purchases
do not include transfers like social security expenditures etc. Note also that we subtract
consumption of ﬁxed capital (CFKG) from government consumption to obtain the actual
expenditure, as the consumption of ﬁscal capital is an imputed measure. CFKG is not
subtracted in the real growth rate for reasons of data availability, but this is unimpor-
tant as there presumably is little variation over time in the imputed consumption of ﬁxed
capital. Investment data is missing for some countries (Spain, Italy, Switzerland) and for
these countries we use government consumption.
Trend-GDP is equal to the backward looking 10 year moving average of real GDP
(Y Q) multiplied with the two year moving average of the price deﬂator (PGDP ) to a
variable in nominal terms. Real GDP is prolonged backwards (1950-1960) with the growth
rate in GDP in The Conference Board (2010). We have used the GDPGK series expressed
in 1990 U.S. dollars. Germany is prolonged backwards with the sum of West Germany
and East Germany before 1989, and the data for East Germany is linearly interpolated
when observations are missing.
The variable IGV is calculated as IGV = IG/PIG, where PIG is the associated price
deﬂator.
The change for the categories of government purchases; dCGW government purchases
for wage-consumption, dCGNW non-wage-consumption and dIG investments in ﬁxed
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capital, are calculated by use of the formula above. The variables in real terms are
when necessary (i.e. because they are not supplied by the OECD) calculated as above;
real government wage consumption (CGW/PCGW ), real government non-wage con-
sumption (CGNW/PCGNW ) and real gross government investments (IG/PIG), where
PCGW, PCGNW, and PIG are the associated price deﬂators. There was no data avail-
able for PCGNW , which was then calculated from the identity CG = CGW + CGNW ,
which should also hold in real terms, CG/PCG = CGW/PCGW + CGNW/PCGNW ,
or PCGNW = CGNW/(CG/PCG − CGW/PCGW ). Some clearly implausible values
for the growth rate of CGNW were dropped (287 for Spain in 1983, 140 and 34 in United
Kingdom in 1967 and 1970, a fall in the same variable in United Kingdom in 1968 and
1969 of 24 and 27, and ﬁnally a fall equal to 20 in Ireland in 1971). Investment data is
missing for some countries (Spain, Italy, Switzerland) and for these countries the missing
observations are set to zero.
4.A.2 Output gap
The output gap is in percentage points and collected from OECD (2008b). The output
gap and the government purchases indicator are illustrated in ﬁgure 1 and 2.
4.A.3 Monetary regime
We have constructed 5 dummies to account for changes in the monetary regime over the
sample period; the Bretton Woods agreement (until 1972), a ﬂoating exchange rate, a
credible ﬁxed exchange rate, a non-credible ﬁxed exchange rate, and membership in the
European Monetary Union (EMU). The dummy Dbretton = 1 indicates the Bretton Woods
agreement covering all countries in the sample in the period 1960 to 1972. In the Bretton
Woods agreement, all currencies were tied to US dollars. The dummy Dfloat indicates that
a number of countries adopted a ﬂoating exchange rate from 1973: Australia, Canada,
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, United States and United Kingdom (except 1990 and
1991 3), later also Sweden (since 1992) and Norway (since 1999) adopted a ﬂoating ex-
change rate. This regime includes various forms of ﬂoating. In recent years also inﬂation
targeting. The dummy Dcred indicates a credible ﬁxed exchange rate, and Dnoncred a the
non-credible one. Countries that took part in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
ERM are deﬁned as having a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, except for Germany, which we
deﬁne as ﬂoating in light of Germany’s dominating position and the independent status of
the Bundesbank. The distinction between credible and non-credible ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes is based on the interest rate diﬀerential relative to the anchor country (in most
cases Germany), where the regime is deﬁned as non-credible if the interest rate diﬀerential
3The UK was a member of the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) from October 1990 to
September 1992
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exceed 1 percentage point in annual terms, or if the regime is non-credible in subsequent
years before entry into the monetary union. In other words, a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
is only deﬁned as credible if the interest rate diﬀerential is less than one percent in all
the following years. DEMU indicates EMU membership, covering Austria, Belgium, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain since 1999. Figure A1 and A2
illustrate the dummies for monetary regime for each of the countries in the sample.
4.A.4 Export market indicator
The export market (XM) indicator is calculated as a weighted average of the GDP-gap of
the trading partners, where the GDP-gap is the deviation of GDP from Hodrick Prescott-
trend (with smoothing parameter 100), and the weights reﬂect the share of the exports
from country i that goes to each of the trading partners j. The export market indicator
is displayed in ﬁgure A3 and A4. The formulae is
XMit = Σjwijt ∗GAPjt (A2)
where wijt = xijt/Σjxijt. xijt is export from country i to county j in year t. GAPjt is
the GDP-gap in country j in year t. The trading partners to one country in the sample
are all the other countries in the sample and the rest of ’the world’. ’The world’ is one
country’s total export subtracted the sum of exports to all countries in the sample. The
The exports data is from SITC Revision 2 OECD (2010), and are used to calculate the
export shares for each country in the sample.
The exports from Germany includes Eastern Germany since 1991 and as a partner
country Eastern Germany is included the whole sample period. The time series are
prolonged backwards with the exports to the world when observations are missing. For
instance if Australia has exported to Canada, but exports are only reported in the years
2003 and onwards, the exports from Australia to Canada is prolonged backwards with
the change in Australia’s world export growth rate and is equal to the total export for
Australia. The same method is used for extracting the time series forward. For Belgium
the exports data is only reported from 1993. Before 1993 the data is constructed by
prolonging the export data for Belgium by use of the change in exports for the Belgium-
Luxembourg Economic Union.
The GDP-gap for the XM indicator is calculated as the deviation of GDP from trend
GDP, divided by trend GDP. Trend GDP derived by use of Hodrick and Prescott (1997)
ﬁlter, (the HP ﬁlter hereafter). The value of the smoothing parameter has been discussed
in several papers in range of 6.25 up to 400, see Backus and Kehoe (1992), Correia et al.
(1992) and Baxter and King (1999). We would like to remove the diﬀerence in growth
rates from 1960 to 2007, but not remove cycles, irrespective of whether they are caused
by business cycle movements or structural changes in the economy. Therefore we use a
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Figure A1: Monetary regime, interest rate diﬀerential and the output gap during the
period 1960 to 2007.
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Figure A2: Monetary regime, interest rate diﬀerential and the output gap during the
period 1960 to 2007.
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rather high value of the smoothing parameter equal to 100, this is also in line with Backus
and Kehoe (1992).
The GDP-gap for each of the twenty OECD countries is calculated using data from
OECD (2008b). The world GDP-gap is constructed using data for the real GDP in The
Conference Board (2010). We have used the GDPGK-series with are GDP expressed in
1990 U.S. dollars, and covers 123 countries in the database. The world GDP is the sum
of the 123 countries subtracted the value of GDP in each of the twenty countries in the
sample. Note, that East Germany is linearly interpolated when observations are missing,
and Germany is prolonged backwards with the sum of West Germany and East Germany
before 1989. The aggregate of former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslav feder-
ation and Czechoslovakia is used in the world GDP due to missing observations for each
of the countries separately.
4.A.5 Election year
The election year variable ’elect’ is collected from Armingeon et al. (2010), and the original
data source is European Journal of Political Research (Political Data Yearbook, various
issues); Mackie and Rose (1991); Keesing’s Archive; Parline database. The variable de-
scribes date of election of national parliament (lower house). The variable covers the years
in the period 1960 to 2008.
4.A.6 Debt
The gross government debt variable, as a percent of GDP, ’debt’, is collected from Armin-
geon et al. (2010), and the original data source is several versions of Oecd Economic
outlook. See details regarding versions and the mission observations in Codebook by
Armingeon et al. (2010). To facilitate the interpretation of the coeﬃcients, the variable
is rescaled to be the share of GDP. Gross government debt as a percentage of GDP is
shown in table A1.
4.A.7 Openness
The openness variable is total trade (export and imports ) in percentage of GDP. The
variable is collected from Armingeon et al. (2010). See details regarding versions and
the mission observations in Codebook by Armingeon et al. (2010). To facilitate the
interpretation of the coeﬃcients, the variable is rescaled to be the share of GDP. Gross
government debt as a percentage of GDP is shown in table A1.
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Figure A3: Exports market indicator and GDP-gap. Percentage points.
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Figure A4: Exports market indicator and GDP-gap. Percentage points
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Table A1: Public debt for the countries in the panel over the sample period.
Country stats 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 1960-07
Australia mean . . 0.24 0.33 0.19 0.26
sd . . 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.09
Austria mean . 0.23 0.48 0.65 0.70 0.50
sd . 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.19
Belgium mean . 0.60 1.08 1.31 1.01 1.00
sd . 0.04 0.17 0.07 0.09 0.28
Canada mean 0.61 0.48 0.62 0.93 0.75 0.68
sd 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.17
Denmark mean . . 0.66 0.73 0.48 0.63
sd . . 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.14
Finland mean . 0.11 0.17 0.52 0.49 0.34
sd . 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.20
France mean . 0.33 0.35 0.57 0.70 0.48
sd . 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.17
Germany mean . 0.22 0.38 0.51 0.65 0.43
sd . 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.17
Ireland mean . 0.61 0.94 0.80 0.34 0.70
sd . 0.05 0.15 0.16 0.04 0.26
Italy mean 0.37 0.75 0.91 1.18 1.18 0.91
sd 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.29
Japan mean . 0.24 0.65 0.87 1.59 0.80
sd . 0.12 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.50
Netherlands mean 0.72 0.56 0.79 0.86 0.59 0.71
sd 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.13
New Zealand mean . . . 0.49 0.31 0.39
sd . . . 0.09 0.04 0.11
Norway mean . 0.43 0.34 0.34 0.47 0.39
sd . 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.08
Portugal mean . . . 0.66 0.69 0.68
sd . . . 0.03 0.04 0.04
Spain mean . . 0.47 0.64 0.55 0.58
sd . . 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.11
Sweden mean . 0.30 0.62 0.74 0.59 0.56
sd . 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.19
Switzerland mean . . . 0.45 0.54 0.49
sd . . . 0.08 0.04 0.08
United Kingdom mean 0.95 0.58 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.53
sd 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.16
United States mean 0.56 0.44 0.52 0.68 0.59 0.56
sd 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.09
Total mean 0.62 0.43 0.59 0.69 0.64 0.60
sd 0.16 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.28
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4.A.8 Unemployment rate
The unemployment variable is available at a yearly frequency in OECD (2008a)4 and
missing observations are replaced with observations from earlier data bases OECD (2002),
OECD (2006) and OECD (2008b).5
The standardized unemployment rate (UNR) in Economic Outlook OECD (2008a) is
used as a primary data source for the unemployment rate in the OECD countries, and
missing observations are replaced by the growth rate in a corresponding time series in an
earlier data base OECD (2002). Australia, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Switzerland
are prolonged by the formula in equation (A3):
Yit = Yit+1 ∗ Xit
Xit+1
(A3)
where Y it denotes (UNR) in OECD (2008a) and Xit denotes the (UNR) in the earlier
data base OECD (2002) for country i in time period t.
Australia and Denmark are prolonged ﬁve years backwards. Germany from 1991,
Spain from 1976, Switzerland from 1969 and backwards.
4.A.9 Labour market institutions
New information for institutional variables are available every second or ﬁfth year. Labour
market institutions such as the tax wedge, the union density, the coordination among
wage setters, and the beneﬁt replacement ratio and duration are used in this paper. The
variables and the method of combining data sources are discussed in detail in the next
sections.
TW: Tax wedge
The rates described here are calculated from actual tax payments. The total tax wedge is
equal to the sum of the employment tax rate (t1), the direct tax rate (t2) and the indirect
tax rate (t3), as given in Equation (A4).
TW = t1 + t2 + t3 (A4)
t1 is equal to employers‘ total wage costs calculated by the sum of wages received by
employees and taxes payed by the employer to the government. This gives the following
relationship; t1 = SSRG/(IE−SSRG), where SSRG is social security contributions and
IE is compensation to employees. The latter two consist of two main components, wages
and salaries and social contributions. Social contributions are payed by the employers to
social security schemes or private funded social insurance schemes. t2, are direct taxes
4Data are collected and organized by the author. This implies that neither OECD nor any other
source is responsible for the analysis or the interpretation of the data in this paper.
5An comprehensive overview of data and data sources is available upon request.
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payed by the households (TAXh) divided by current receipts of households (CRh), i.e.
t2 = TAXh/CRh. Finally t3 = (TAXind − SUB)/Cp, where TAXind are net indirect
taxes, SUB is the value of subsidies and Cp is the value of private ﬁnal consumption
expenditure.
The main data source for tax wedges is OECD (2008c) which contains information for
the period 1960 to 2010. The latter years are predictions. The tax rates are calculated by
the above formulas, and when a tax rate is missing, the growth rate in the same tax rate
but from the data base of Nickell (2006) in the period 1960 to 2003 is used to prolong
the time series for the following countries: Belgium is prolonged before 1965, Denmark is
prolonged before 1966, Germany before 1970, Portugal is prolonged in the period 1960 to
1995 and Switzerland is prolonged before 1990 with the tax rates in OECD (2008c). Tax
rates for Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States are not prolonged
and taken directly from the main data source OECD (2008c). New Zealand has main
data source Nickell et al. (2005) for the period 1975 to 1986 due to missing observations
in OECD (2008c). Time series for t1, t2 and t3 from Nickell (2006) is used to extend
the main data source: The growth rate of the sum of t1 and t2 is used before 1975, and
the growth rate in t3 after 1986. Note also that the t3 is interpolated due to one missing
observation in 1991.
BRR: Beneﬁt replacement rates
Beneﬁt replacement ratio is a measure of how much each unemployed worker receives in
beneﬁts from the government. The beneﬁt replacement ratio is described in detail below.
The detailed rate for unemployment beneﬁts divides data in three diﬀerent family
types: single, with a dependent spouse and with a working spouse. The beneﬁts also
depend on the employment situation: 67 percent and 100 percent of the average earnings.
Within these groups, beneﬁts are divided into the duration of beneﬁts when being unem-
ployed. One variable for how much each of the former groups receives in the ﬁrst year,
the second and third year and the fourth and ﬁfth year. The indexes used in this paper
uses the indexes aggregated over over family types. This results in six diﬀerent groups:
brr67a1, brr67a2, brr67a4, brr100a1, brr100a2 and brr100a4.
brr67a1: First year beneﬁt replacement rate for workers with 67 percent of average
earnings and the average over family types.
brr67a2: Beneﬁt replacement for the second and third year. 67 percent of average
earnings and the average over family types.
brr67a4: Beneﬁt replacement rate for the fourth and ﬁfth year. 67 percent of average
earnings and the average over family types.
brr100a1, brr100a2 and brr100a4: The same as the former but for 100 percent of
average earnings.
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The average of brr67a1 and brr100a1 is used as an indicator of beneﬁt replacement
ratios, i.e. BRR.
The main source for the more detailed beneﬁt ratios are tables in employment outlook,
see OECD (2004). Observations are provided every second year from 1961 to 2001. The
time series are interpolated over the years, and extracted by the last known observation.
BD: Beneﬁt duration
Beneﬁt duration is a measure on how long the beneﬁts last when being unemployed.
The ratio is calculated by the time series described under beneﬁt replacement rates and
equation (A5).
BDjit = α
brrja2it
brrja1it
+ (1− α)brrja4it
brrja1it
(A5)
where α = 0.6, j = {67, 100}, i = 1, 2...20 and t = 1960, 1961...2007. brrja1it is the
beneﬁt replacement rate in year 1, brrja2it is the beneﬁt replacement rate in year 2 and
3, and ﬁnally brrja4it is beneﬁt replacement rate in year 4 and 5. α = 0.6 gives more
weight to the second and third year as compared to the fourth and ﬁfth year. The index
is calculated for both employment situations, i.e. j = 67 percent and j = 100 percent of
average earnings.
The average of bd67it and bd100it is used as an indicator of beneﬁt duration, i.e. BDit.
If beneﬁt duration stops after one year, then brr67a2 = brr67a4 = 0, and BD67 = 0.
If beneﬁt provision is constant over the years, then brr67a1 = brr67a2 = brr67a4, and
BD67 = 1. However, some countries increase payments over time and the value of beneﬁt
duration is above one.
Dudnet: Union density
Union density rates are constructed using the number of union memberships divided by
the number of employed.
The main data source is Visser (2009), where they have mainly calculated the trade
union density index based on surveys. When data were unavailable, they have used
administrative data adjusted for non-active and self-employed members. The database
Nickell (2006) contains additional information for Sweden before 1975 and Ireland in 1960.
The time series for Sweden in the latter source is interpolated, are this growth rate is then
used to prolong the original time series from Visser (2009).
The interaction terms between union density and coordination are prolonged by the
last known observation for these countries.
CO: Coordination of wage setting
The index for coordination of wage setting describes the coordination level in the wage
setting. The index ranges from 1 to 5, and the most coordinated countries have index
equal to 5:
The main source is OECD (2004), see table 3.5. The frequency for observations is ﬁve-
year intervals over the period 1970-2000. The years are interpolated between means, i.e.
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between 1972-1977, and with 1970 and 2000 equal to the ﬁrst and last ﬁve-year intervals.
In the period 1960 to 1970 the observations are prolonged backwards by the last known
observation for all countries. The same procedure is used to extend the time series until
2007.
EPL: Employment protection
The time series for employment protection measures the strictness of the employment
protection for the employer. The overall measure for employment protection is measured
on a scale from 0 to 5. Strictness is increasing in scale. Some other measures only measure
the employment protection for regular- or temporary employment.
The time series for employment protection is provided by OECD (2004) for the period
1985 to 2004. The time series are based on the point observations in Annex 2.A2. 6.
Note, however, that OECD (2004) claims that judgement is made when constructing the
time series. This implies that time series for employment protection not are only a linear
interpolation between the point observations. The measure of employment protection
refers to the protection of overall employment (epl).
Before 1985, the time series are prolonged backwards using data from Belot and van
Ours (2004). The source contains data in ﬁve-year intervals, but the data are here used
annually by interpolation between the means of the observation points. The percentage
change is used to prolong the time series in OECD (2004), by equation (A6):
Yt = Yt+1 ∗ Xt
Xt+1
whereY = {epl, eplr, eplt}andX = {EPLBO bo,EP bo} (A6)
Portugal and Spain are prolonged backwards by the last known observation in the
period 1960 to 1984. The United States is prolonged backwards by the last known obser-
vation in the period 1960 to 1982.
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4.B Extra
Table B1 presents the complete results of the models in table B1, including the estimates
for the labour market variables. Thus, model 1 is reestimation of the unrestricted unem-
ployment equation of Nymoen and Sparrman (2010), including dummies for large outliers.
Model 2 includes government purchases and the indicator for the export market, and in
model 3, the dummies for large outliers are omitted.
For comparison, table B1 also includes two models more, 2i and 3i. Comparing models
2 and 2i shows the eﬀect of omitting the large outliers, which is a fairly large increase in
the coeﬃcient values of government purchases and the export market. Model 3i extends
model 3 by including year dummies. We observe that the coeﬃcients for the export
market become much smaller, reﬂecting considerable co-movement of the export markets
for all countries. In contrast, the coeﬃcient for the change in government purchases is not
aﬀected, presumably because any comovement in government purchases across countries
is not linked to comovement in unemployment.
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